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AC Armored Core 
Successful mecha videogame series created by From 
Software.
A.C.E. Another Century’s Episode 
Videogame series created by From Software since 
2005.
A.I. Artificial Intelligence 
Human-designed intelligent behaviour of machines 
and software; also refers to the field of study in com-
puter science.
A.T. Absolute Terror 
A variable value all characters in the game Shinseiki 
Evangelion 2 feature. Indicates the player’s social suc-
cess and psychological well-being.
CT Chrono Trigger 
Rpg about time travel created by Squaresoft in 1995.
designer Commonly refers to the person in charge of designing 
and developing a videogame. In this thesis, the term 
is short for all persons involved in the creative process 
from which a videogame software results.
EDF The Chikyūbōeigun [The Earth Defense Force] 
Low-budget videogame series about an invasion on 
Earth, created by SANDLOT in 2003, released as part 
of the Simple 2000 series by D3 Publisher.
Eva2 Shinseki Evanglion 2 [Neon Genesis Evangelion 2] 
Videogame created by AlfaSystem in collaboration 
with the adapted anime’s director Anno Hideaki. Re-
leased in 2003 by Bandai.
I.M. Intelligent Material 
Term used for the multiple choice interaction system 
in Eva2.
mds multiple death scenes 
Term referring to scenes in Shadow of Memories, 
which can only be reached by deliberately dying mul-
tiple times whilst preventing death is possible.
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mecha English import from the Japanese term meka, which 
is itself an abbreviation of the English term “mechan-
ical.” In Japan, mecha is widely used for machines and 
robots. In the context of this thesis, the more specific 
use of the term in popular culture, where it refers to 
the science fictional device of robots 
MGS Metal Gear Solid 
Videogame series created and released by Konami 
since 1998. Leading creative force behind the series is 
Kojima Hideo.
npc non-player character 
Character(s) controlled by the computer. 
PSX Playstation 
Game console developed by Sony, release in 1994.
PS2 Playstation 2 
Successor to the Playstation, released in 2000.
PS3 Playstation 3 
At the time of writing (September 2013) Sony’s most 
recent stationary console, released in 2006. The Play-
station 4 is announced for the end of this year 2013.
rpg role-playing game 
Games in which the player assumes the role of a 
character in a fictional world, mostly following a pre-
defined story. In this thesis, the term solely refers to 
the videogame genre.
SD super deformed 
Refers to a style of representing anime and game ro-
bots in disproportional size, with a small body and 
relatively big head.
sf science fiction 
Literary genre, here understood as the literary genre 
of plausible alternatives.
SoM Shadow of Memories 
Videogame created and released by Konami in 2001.
VS. Gundam VS. series 
Third-person fighting game subseries of the Gundam 
franchise, emphasizing an arcade experience.
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Conventions
In this thesis, I follow the recommendations the Chicago Manual of Style (16th 
edition) as closely as possible. References are given in author-date fashion. Sub-
sequent citations of the same source refer to the page number only. In the case 
of the quickly changing online encyclopaedias and other online sources without 
author, I provide the name of the encyclopaedia or website and the year of access 
in the text. A detailed record of access dates and URLs for all online sources can 
be found in the list of sources. Videogames are given with (year of publication) in 
the text, and appear with information about creator, publisher and product code in 
the list of sources. Where necessary, I have added a brief footnote with background 
information to specific games at the beginning of the respective analysis. Where I 
refer to series or subseries in the analysis, I have added a footnote with a list of all 
individual titles played for the analysis to the first mentioning. The video examples 
referred to in the analysis can be found on the attached DVD.
Passages I translated to English are marked as such. Where I believed the original 
phrasing to be informative, it is added in [square brackets]. Japanese is transcribed 
following the modified Hepburn system. In the text, Japanese names are given 
in the order of surname + first name. Where videogames or other sources offer 
translated versions, I have omitted the romanized version of the original title. For 
example, although some titles of the series Biohazard [Resident Evil] are originally 
given in Japanese katakana, I have omitted the romanized spelling baiohazādo, 
because the series itself offers both spellings in most of its games. However, where 
the original does not offer an English title version itself, I have romanized the title 
and, where necessary, added an English translation or, where available, a reference 
to the English version in [square brackets].
I have not made any emphasizing alterations to any of the passages or phrases 
quoted. In my own text, book, videogame, and videogame franchise titles, as well as 
foreign terms are italicized. In order to distinguish my own emphases clearly from 
the former, they are set in bold letters. Phrases and words used with reservation 
are enclosed in ‘single quotation marks,’ whereas phrases or terms referring to 
another author are always enclosed in “double quotation marks.”
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What makes man a political being is his faculty of action; it enables him 
to get together with his peers, to act in concert, and to reach out for goals 
and enterprises that would never enter his mind, let alone the desire of 
his heart, had he not been given this gift—to embark on something new. 
(Arendt 1970, 82)
Are we political beings? Today, to embark on something politically new, something 
geared towards fundamental change in our common reality, is a task fraught with 
difficultly. To be sure, politics have not vanished from society and decisions for 
social, cultural, economic and foreign policies are still made every day. It would be 
wrong to deny that the capitalist system can be—and has been—politically influ-
enced in innovative ways to improve peoples’ conditions. However, in most cases, 
these decisions merely seek to adjust the existing system rather than aiming for 
change and alternatives. Despite its contradictions and the problems it causes, cap-
italism, often in combination with neoliberal philosophy, is increasingly global, 
pervading more and more into society and culture. The recent tendency in univer-
sities in Europe and elsewhere exemplifies this trend towards economizing, stan-
dardizing, and evaluating everything and anything. Yet, knowing of these problems 
and experiencing them first-hand is one thing, conceiving different paths to follow 
and pursuing them, another.
In my personal experience the most striking recent example of the force 
and persistence with which the current social, economic and political system 
dominates almost all areas and layers of society is the development in Japan since 
the tragic events of March 11, 2011. The horrible nuclear accident in Fukushima 
not only confronted Japanese and other societies with an ongoing, uncontrollable 
man-made catastrophe, the harmful effects of which remain unpredictable to 
this day. The disaster also directly brought into the open the virulent problems 
of a post-war system strongly focused on economic profit. It confronted us with 
the almost inescapable totality of the current capitalist system’s reach, with its 
fierce competition, under which manpower and employment are as essential for 
individual survival as electric power and automated production are for the nation’s. 
In stark contrast to the many creative grass-roots movements and alternative 
groups that emerged from the experience of the nuclear threat and have contributed 
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immensely to the political climate in Japan since, I cannot help but have the 
impression that the overall direction and more recent political developments have 
tended towards restoring the status quo. That this return was not motivated by an 
understandable individual desire to come back to some kind of everyday normality 
after weeks and months of uncertainty and threat, but justified with a necessity to 
restore economic competitiveness for the sake of society even at the risk of the lives 
of some members of society, demonstrates the vigour and vitality of the capitalist 
system even in severe crises, and the overall lack of viable alternatives.
Finding strategies against the currents of the contemporary system may, to a 
certain extent, be a question of individual creativity—and here, successful attempts 
are fortunately numerous. Yet, these successes are local and often temporary, and 
cannot solve our problems on the larger level of society, let alone on a global scale. 
What is more, there is reason to believe that the lack of alternatives is not an issue 
of individual creativity alone. Thinkers like Theodor Adorno, Paul Virilio, and 
Hannah Arendt have long observed that political thought and action are under 
increasing threat by schematization, acceleration, bureaucracy, and capitalism. 
Frederic Jameson (2007, 228) goes even further, claiming that the future is not an 
imaginary space for alternative scenarios any more, but neutralized in its potential 
for change: the unknown future becomes “a new area for investment and for 
colonization by capitalism.” Like Jameson, Japanese philosopher Karatani Kōjin 
(2012, 11) claims that we not only lack viable alternatives, but have lost the capacity 
to imagine anything outside the current system.
Arendt’s introductory quote hints at the importance of novel goals and ideas 
for political action. Yet, if we are increasingly unable to imagine such alternatives, 
how can they be pursued? In my opinion, any system that is without alternative is 
deeply unsettling, regardless of its content. Against this background, the underlying 
question for this project is: can we imagine a society or world radically different 
from ours? Although thinking about real alternatives to capitalism is often either 
branded as driven by traditional ideologies, or regarded as romantically naïve, 
idealist, pessimistic or oppressive, my approach is guided by the belief that the 
“colonization of the future” is not yet total. Turning to an innovative market and 
a politically acclaimed genre, this explorative project asks if Japanese science 
fiction videogames and their expressive possibilities are a potential source of 
inspiration and stimuli for imagining radical alternatives to the status quo and 
the known, which can serve as the basis for political action. 
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As a relatively recent field of popular culture, videogames have rapidly developed 
into a sophisticated technological medium of artistic expression and interactive play 
(Tavinor 2009). Along with the rise of online networks, they have developed vast 
and complex social worlds visited and inhabited by millions of users. On the one 
hand, this has led to an ongoing discussion about their harmful effects on children, 
particularly in the context of violence and addiction. On the other hand, they have 
received attention as new tools for education, marketing, political communication, 
activism and advocacy, and for social and cultural simulation in general, whether 
framed as Serious Games (see for example Fujimoto 2007) or Persuasive Games 
(Bogost 2006a, 2007). On a wider scale, Gamification (see for example Inoue 2012) 
emphasizes the activating and motivating potentials of playful and goal-directed 
scenarios, advocating the deployment of game-like structures in all areas of society 
in general, and as new promising path for business models and consumer products 
in particular. From a similar perspective, Jane McGonigal (2012) discusses the 
ways in which videogames, from small-scale casual cellphone apps to epic massive 
multiplayer online worlds, can fix or at least enhance our broken reality by offering 
us more activating, fun, rewarding, socially rich, and fulfilling challenges than our 
boring everyday lives.
The diversity of subjects mentioned above gives an idea of the range of academic 
disciplines and theoretical perspectives from which videogames are studied today. 
Many inspiring analyses have emphasized the richness and distinct quality of the 
experience videogames offer. However, as far as I can see, their ideational content 
and the contribution this experience can make to our imagination of political 
alternatives remains a minor concern in most discussions in game studies, 
addressed only in occasional examinations of individual titles. Even fewer attempts 
have been made from the perspective of political science and political philosophy 
(but see Frasca 2004, Galloway 2006, and in parts Bogost 2007 for stimulating 
exceptions). The following thesis aims to contribute to such attempts. 
In order to contain the complexity of the issue, I focus on the single-player 
experience. This limitation to individual, private gameplay faces a severe criticism 
from the start. Hannah Arendt (1998, 58), for example, positions the private sphere 
in direct, fatal opposition to the properly political public sphere, arguing that in 
mass society, 
men have become entirely private, that is, they have been deprived of 
seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being heard by them. They 
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are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, 
which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied 
innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is 
seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one 
perspective.
A similar warning comes from Paul Virilio (1999, no pn). In a discussion with 
Jérôme Sans, he predicts that the future will be populated by the “the self-suffi-
cient man who, with the help of technology, no longer needs to reach out to others 
because others come to him. […] The future lies in cosmic solitude.” In addition, 
Virilio criticizes virtual play and videogames for replacing the stimuli of the imag-
ination with mechanical instruments and repetition. In his view, the videogame 
player is “hurried by the machine.” In games, “travelers are traveled. Dreamers are 
dreamed. They are no longer free to move about, they are traveled by the program. 
They are no longer free to dream, they are dreamed by the program.”
Although I don’t agree with Virilio’s evaluation of videogames, I believe Arendt’s 
implicit and Virilio’s explicit critique of the private, pre-defined character of 
videogame play must be taken seriously. Like Karatani, both authors fear a fading 
and perhaps even the end of the imagination and, more broadly speaking, the 
possibility of political action and political reason as such. However, while their 
view suggests that videogames are part of the problem rather than a potential 
solution, this thesis shows that the single-player experience of videogames and 
their expressive potentials can confront us with novel, politically stimulating 
experiences.
This task involves three steps or parts. In part I, I develop a theoretical and 
methodological perspective on videogames as ideational spaces. Following Jameson 
and Adorno, I argue that the kind of radical political imagination necessary 
today can be stimulated by disruptive conflicts between expressive elements 
of a medium. Based on an understanding of games as rule-based reifications of 
ideal play, I develop an understanding of videogames as ideational or computopic 
spaces, defined as the sum of all rules in the software. The consecutive sections 
qualify the computopic space as materially vague and contingent, partial and 
transformative in its representation, enacted by the player and performed by the 
computer. As such, any computopic space can be regarded as a universe which 
hosts a potentially unlimited number of worlds, one of which materializes based 
on player action and computer performance in each gameplay session. This makes 
| 5 |
| 1 Introduction |
it dynamic, emergent and partly unimagined by its designer. In its expression, it 
combines multiple elements and is detached from our physical reality by virtue 
of its virtual, arbitrary semantics and its internal flexibility, which mark these 
worlds as an always already Other. In its active quality, the computopic space is 
experiential and emotional. 
By way of access, chapter 3 outlines an empirical approach to the computopic 
space. Drawing on methodological discussions in qualitative research and 
ethnography, I propose a practical solution to the contingency and vastness of 
computopic universes, focusing on repeated, playfully-invading explorations, 
enriched by additional sources like walkthroughs and fan descriptions. I explain 
how these methods can be realized technically and how they are combined in 
the analytic process. In addition, I argue that the importance of transparency 
and openness, along with the distinctness of my material, demand for alternative 
modes of presenting the results. In response, I experiment with embedding video 
examples in the presentation of my results.
In part II, I turn to the field of Japanese videogames in search for concrete 
examples. Although recently declining, Japanese developments have long been a 
leading and influential source of innovation and creativity in global videogame 
culture, both in terms of hard- and software, making them a particularly promising 
field for disruptive conflicts. In order to deal with the vast variety and diversity of 
this field in the context of this explorative thesis, I propose to begin the inquiry 
in games aligned with the genre of science fiction, which is attested an explicitly 
political character by many critical theorists and literary critics. Adapting the 
characteristics of science fiction to the context of videogames, I pre-select a range 
of titles in a review of recent statistical data on videogame sales, further refined as 
to comply with the methodological and methodical constraints. Based on this pre-
selection in chapter 4, I discuss several major tendencies in the field of Japanese sf 
games in chapter 5. Given the dominance of robots, so-called mecha, in Japanese sf 
games, I explore the ways in which they are deployed in dystopic scenarios.
The findings of chapter 5 serve as a guideline for the detailed analysis of disruptive 
conflicts in part III, where I focus on the sf tropes of time travel, the alien, and war 
technology. While the strategies vary, all chapters draw on thematically related 
works of recent political philosophers and discuss the ways in which the combined 
expressive elements of selected titles present the issue at hand in disruptive conflicts 
capable of stimulating our radical imagination. 
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With this approach, I aim to show that videogames can be put into dialogue 
with radical thinkers such as Paul Virilio, Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Rancière, Hannah 
Arendt, or Giorgio Agamben in fruitful ways. The analysis shows that videogames 
can contribute to intellectual inquiries in various ways, stimulate our radical 
imagination, and offer sites of critique. This thesis aims to this thesis, I hope to 
contribute to a further theoretical, methodological, and practical interaction 
between academic and pop-cultural forms of ideational expression, and to a critical 
perspective on videogame, which emphasizes their potential and, where necessary, 
holds them accountable for their lack of political creativity. 
Part I  Framework
2 Theory
The purpose of establishing these fictional spaces is less to increase the 
trade in conventional wisdom than to expand our perception of fictional 
possibilities. Fictional colonies established as bases for traveling back and 
forth to the actual world must therefore be distinguished from fictional 
settlements founded for the sake of adventure and investigation, after 
burning the ships. (Pavel 1986, 84)
In this chapter, I formulate a set of demands on how videogames can stimulate 
our political imagination and develop a perspective on them as contingent, ac-
tion-based, and rule-defined spaces of expression. I discuss their distinct qualities 
as spaces which combine features of digital, audio-visual and computer-based me-
dia and games, with their focus on playful action. Given the ambiguity and diversi-
ty of play, games, and videogames, I do not aim to define what a videogame is, but 
instead to offer a consistent framework for analyzing games from a political-philo-
sophical perspective interested in their contribution to novel, radical imagination.
2.1 Radical Political Imagination and Disruptive Conflicts
In this first section, I aim to develop a sense of the term radical political imagina-
tion and its conditions. Broadly speaking, imagination is “a faculty that enables us 
to envision that reality can be otherwise” (Carroll 1998, 79). In this general sense, 
the quality of the difference to a given empirical reality is not specified. For exam-
ple, I could imagine to be at home in bed rather than trying to stay awake in front 
of my office computer screen, or use my magic powers to fight evil dragons in a 
fantasy world. However, a more specific understanding of such difference is neces-
sary when imagination is, as Hannah Arendt (1970, 81) proposes, regarded as one 
of the “preliminary conditions for political action,” as such allowing us to direct 
action towards a desired result that is different than the status quo. 
Raymond Geuss (2010, ix-x) emphasizes the importance of the imagination in 
all forms of politics, claiming that “[a]ny organized attempt at improvement of our 
situation will include some at least minimal exercise of the imagination, in that it 
will require agents to think of ways in which their environment or modes of acting 
could be different from what they are now.” Noël Carroll (1998, 79) establishes a 
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through the exercise of the imagination we can envision alternatives 
to what is, especially better alternatives to what is from a moral or a 
political point of view. Understood this way, the imagination is what 
makes change—changes in moral and political circumstances—possible. 
The imagination is what enables us to conceive of a better world and, 
therefore, is a pre-condition for changing it morally and politically. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term “political imagination” specifies the general 
faculty towards the visions of political alternatives to our ‘empirical reality’1—vi-
sions of different, novel conditions, structures, practices, and environments for life 
in community, which serve as the basis for political action.
Claiming that we lack imagination or even political imagination today would 
be a mistake. Neither do I believe that our contemporary media culture cannot 
offer vast arrays of products, works and ways that stimulate our imagination and 
phantasy. In this, I agree with Carroll (1998, 15-109), who refutes generalizing 
instances of philosophical resistance to “mass art” on the grounds that it renders 
the audience passive. Defining mass art by its intent to be easily accessible to a 
global mass audience on the one hand, and its technological production and 
distribution process on the other2, he argues that such art stimulates a variety of 
activities among its audiences, including imaginative and reflective powers (82-
84). “[I]f we are to understand as examples of the play of the imagination such 
spectatorial activities as interpreting dramatic situations and metaphors, as well as 
inferring, mass art does afford the opportunity to exercise the imagination” (82).
However, such imagination is not radical in the sense I use here in this 
dissertation. Examining the ways in which mass art features emotions, morality, 
and ideology, Carroll concludes his analysis by stating that in the attempt to grant 
easy and wide access, “mass art addresses widely distributed emotions, invokes 
pervasive moral principles and concepts, and exploits ideological commonplaces 
1    Throughout this thesis, the phrase ‘empirical reality’ is used to refer to the world as we 
experience and know it from scientific studies as much as from our everyday life. As such, 
it always entails a subjective factor and is not meant to point to the existence of an entirely 
objective truth.
2    In detail, Carroll’s (1998, 196) definition reads: “X is a mass artwork if and only if 1. X is 
a multiple instance or type artwork, 2. produced and distributed by a mass technology, 3. 
which artwork is intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural choices (for example, 
its narrative forms, symbolism, intended affect, and even its content) towards those choices 
that promise accessibility with minimum effort, virtually on first contact, for the largest 
number of untutored (or relatively untutored) audiences.”
| 10 |
| Part I  Framework |
because it is predicated on engaging mass audiences. Were mass art to address 
uncommon emotions, morals, and political convictions, it would not secure mass 
uptake” (413). This conclusion may be in line with Carroll’s broad conception 
of imagination and his emphasis on the contrast between mass art and avant-
garde art (207-209, 242-244). However, it highlights the limitations of such broad 
understanding of the imagination. For if imagination merely points us to situations 
different from our own but not entirely unfamiliar or “uncommon”—to use Carrols 
carefully picked term—it can hardly be expected to aim for the radical alternatives 
and drastic change on a systematic level.
Geuss (2010, 68) claims that “[i]maginary constructs can under some 
circumstances have a force capable of creating realities that go far beyond the 
structuration of merely subjective spheres of action.” The question is, what these 
circumstances are and in what ways videogames can create, aid or amplify them. 
According to Susan Buck-Morss (2002, 62-63),
[t]he power of any cultural object to arrest the flow of history, and to open 
up time for alternative visions, varies with history’s changing course. 
[…] What counts is that the aesthetic experience teach us something 
new about our world, that it shock us out of moral complacency and 
political resignation, and that it take us to task for the overwhelming lack 
of social imagination that characterizes so much of cultural production 
in all its forms.
Along with historical factors, she emphasizes novelty, shock and critique as central 
factors for stimulating radical imagination. These factors are widely discussed in 
literary theory, in particular where the inquiry focuses on literary “universes con-
taminated by radical otherness” (Pavel 1986, 106). Most explicitly, this is the case 
in science fiction (hereafter sf) and utopian studies and their respective literary 
objects, which display a relation with all three factors. Pioneer sf theorist Darko Su-
vin (1979, 7-8, italics in original), for example, defines sf as “a literary genre whose 
necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and interaction of estrangement 
and cognition, and whose main formal device is an imaginative framework alterna-
tive to the author’s empirical environment.” He claims that “SF is distinguished by 
the narrative dominance or hegemony of a fictional ‘novum’ (novelty, innovation) 
validated by cognitive logic” (63, italics in original). In other words, sf deploys a 
novum to create an alternative environment geared towards estranging the reader 
cognitively. 
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Frederic Jameson (2007, xiv) identifies a similar mechanism at the heart of the 
utopian genre—which he regards as a socio-economic sub-genre of sf. In his view, 
utopian thought experiments are “a critical and analytical method” that answers 
“the universal ideological conviction that no alternative is possible, that there is 
no alternative to the system” (230-232). Presenting us with alternative, unfamiliar 
places of Otherness, utopian narratives distance us from our empirical reality and 
are political through their “disruptive” effect on our common perception and our 
resignation (231).
Common to these descriptions is a sense that some kind of novelty or Otherness 
that distances us from our own empirical reality can have an estranging or 
disruptive effect. However, specifying these two aspects in the context of radical 
political imagination is a difficult task. Not only is it unclear if such disruption 
can amount to more than a critical review of the already existing situation and 
the awareness of one’s own “complacency,” it also remains questionable if total 
Otherness is possible and what it would look like. Jameson (2007) is well-aware of 
the problem this paradoxical question hints at. On the one hand, he claims that the 
possibility of a radical Other, such as, for example, a new colour “is allegorical of 
the possibility of imagining a whole new social world” (120). On the other hand, 
he remains sceptical of the possibility of such genuine Otherness, concluding 
that even the most radical attempts at imagining otherness in SF are nothing but 
mirrors of the self and projections of our own situation (111, 211). According to 
Jameson, the utopian genre can only solve this problem by means of its formal 
ability to draw together diverse existing elements to generate new contradictions 
and to imagine the other by shifting the known (134).
This notion of productive contradictions can also be found in the writings of 
Theodor W. Adorno, who remains one of the most provocative thinkers of the 
potentials and dangers of works of art and culture, despite his tendency towards 
elitisms and his arguably arrogant and sometimes apparently ignorant, generalizing 
dismissal of mass culture3, jazz music, and especially “the other” of extra-
3    Carroll (1998, 105) dedicates a long section to analyzing Adorno’s resistance to mass art, 
arguing that “the interlocking senses of autonomy and freedom that are fundamental 
to Adorno’s theory of genuine art and to his dismissal of mass art are fragments, albeit 
distorted fragments, of Kantian aesthetic theory.” The following paragraphs show that 
Carroll is right in claiming that Adorno demanded of art to invoke independent thought 
and judgments. However, I hope to show that he formulates this demand for art and culture 
in general, rather than using it, as Carroll’s discussion of Adorno suggests, to discriminate 
“mass art” merely due to its status.
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European art (see Geuss 1998, 310-311). In his insightful discussion of Adorno’s 
understanding of art, Geuss observes that Adorno emphasized the importance of 
art with its potential for internal criticism and its ability to produce something 
new (Geuss 1998, 298-303), against the tendency of the Enlightenment rationality 
towards universal instrumental reason and its repressive homogenization, which 
he rejected (299, 309).
Geuss highlights the importance of negativity and critique in Adorno’s thought, 
as well as the influence that, on the one hand, Kant and Hegel play in his writings, 
and, on the other hand, his experience of Nazi Germany had on him (306). For 
Adorno, he claims, 
[t]he most radically negative kind of art would be one which did two 
things at the same time. First, one which through exclusively artistic 
means turned the most fundamental received laws of a certain kind 
of artistic activity upside down or inside out, and did so precisely by 
treating these received laws, principles, and rules of procedure with the 
highest seriousness and developing them consistently in a non-arbitrary 
way into their opposite. Second, a fully radical form of art would be one 
which by its internal negation of the artistic tradition also succeeded in 
inculcating into people an appropriately cognitively grounded negative 
attitude toward their own society. (307)
At the same time, Geuss reminds us that Adorno also laboured to “defend what he 
calls ‘the non-identical’: the unique, the qualitatively specific, the unrepeatable, the 
‘other’, that which cannot simply be seen as just one more indistinguishable spec-
imen of a general category, interchangeable ad libitum with any other specimen. 
This ‘other’ is that which slips through the network of our concepts and theories” 
(310). It is here that I believe one can find traces of a more prospective project in 
Adorno’s writing. In his emphasis on critique, Adorno not only displays a deep 
concern for society, he also formulates demands on culture and art to realize their 
political potential. It is this aspect, which might contribute substance to the vague 
concepts of Otherness and disruption mentioned above. 
Despite his pessimism, Adorno (2001b, 106) believed in a free society of 
“autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for 
themselves.” His insistence on ideas and thought as the decisive factors in social 
change is most explicitly expressed in his statement that “[t]he Utopian impulse in 
thinking is all the stronger, the less it objectifies itself as Utopia – a further form 
| 13 |
| 2 Theory |
of regression – whereby it sabotages its own realization. Open thinking points 
beyond itself ” (Adorno 2001e, 202). While cautioning against the threat reification 
poses to thought, Adorno (2001c, 193) also stresses the possibility of novelty and 
alternative, “new” thoughts or productivity as “the ability to bring forth something 
that was not already there.” In a way, this potential to invite productive thought 
may be regarded as his standard for judging art and culture—by which most mass 
cultural products of his time failed to be genuine. It also specifies the demands 
on disruption beyond mere negativity or criticism, as a shock that stimulates our 
imagination. 
In line with his rejection of instrumental reason, Adorno insisted on the 
importance of individual “Phantasie” for novelty. Translated as “imagination” 
into English (see Adorno 2001c, 192), Phantasie is a faculty which “might of its 
own accord gather together the discrete elements of the real into its truth” (2001f, 
63). With this concept, Adorno not only opposes purely schematized, “rational” 
thought, but also his critique of a unimaginative “spirit (Geist) of a science which 
is no longer spirit” (Adorno 2001c, 192). His emphasis on “a certain unruliness of 
mind which was incompatible with the efficient [rationelle (Adorno 1977, 648)] 
division of human life” (Adorno 2001c, 190), or the fact that “[e]ven fooling around 
need not be crass, and can be enjoyed as a blessed release from the throes of self-
control” (192), point to a broad but decisively political understanding of Phantasie 
or imagination as a faculty opposed to the systematic status quo. Specifically, he 
regards Phantasie as an opposing force to the culture of administration:
For that which is administrated, administration is an external affair 
by which it is subsumed rather than comprehended. This is precisely 
the essence of administrated rationality itself, which does nothing but 
order and cover over. In the chapter on amphiboly in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, Kant […] denied rationality the ability of cognition of ‘the 
interior of things’. Aporia prevails between the absolute purpose of the 
cultural and the absolute rationality of administration, which is nothing 
but the rationality of scientific ratio. (Adorno 2001a, 112-113)
In this sense, Phantasie refers to a way of accessing the inner logic of a work that in-
cludes a “sensuous moment” beyond “measurement, comparison, and assessment 
of physical phenomena” (Adorno 2001f, 87). As a counter-concept against Enlight-
enment rationality, Phantasie is not limited to “scientific rationality” and rejects 
purely schematized imagination, although not entirely detached from cognition.
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Most importantly, Adorno believes that culture and art can stimulate and trigger 
Phantasie by confronting us with internal conflicts, which, neither solved within 
the work nor obvious, confront the individual with a new situation, demanding for 
independent thought and autonomous judgments. Claiming that such conflicts are 
only possible in “wholeness,” which is another way of saying internally, he rejects 
distinction in general, be it between theory and practice, mass culture and high art, 
work and free time, or between society and art/culture, as a regressive means (of 
capitalist society in particular) to avoid internal contradictions and conflicts and to 
ultimately incorporate the now detached realms into its mechanisms of production 
for a consumer society.4 Against this background, I propose the following working 
hypothesis for my project:
videogames can be disruptive of our common beliefs and experiences, 
thus stimulating our radical political imagination, if they succeed 
in confronting us with a contradictory situation, the novelty of 
which requires us to think about solutions independently and judge 
autonomously. 
Interestingly, Ian Bogost (2007) mentions a similar notion of disruption in his 
analysis of Persuasive Games. Drawing on Alain Badiou’s idea of the event “which 
offers a chance to disrupt the state of a situation and reinvent it, wholly anew, under 
a different organizing logic” (58), he argues that a videogame and its procedural 
rhetoric “persuades when it helps discern the evental site of a situation—the 
place where current practice breaks down.” (333) However, while claiming that 
“procedural rhetorics make claims about the structure of a situation, in the hopes of 
inspiring a disruptive event,” Bogost remains vague about the status and potentials 
of such events in games, because he thinks of them as representations of social 
and cultural reality: “Persuasive games expose the logic of situations in an attempt 
4    In “How to look at Television,” Adorno (2001d, 159), for example, states that “the present 
rigid division of art into autonomous and commercial aspects is itself largely a function of 
commercialization.” More generally, this claim appears in his speech on Free Time, where 
he argues that in modernity, free time is being detached from work life deliberately, in order 
to make it a target for commodification. Such practice of categorizing and dividing is, in his 
view, related to the dominant current in society: “the prevalent ethos [herrschender Geist 
(Adorno 1977, 648)] is suspicious of anything which is miscellaneous, or heterogeneous, 
of anything which has not clearly and unambiguously been assigned to its place” (Adorno 
2001c, 190) Likewise, his ideal of art is not that of high art, but rather of a field of art that 
encompasses various forms and contents, because only by containing them, does it allow 
them to contradict each other. Claiming that art can only be critical of society if it is part of 
society, not detached from it, Adorno (2001a, 116-117) agrees with Paul Valéry that true art 
can only exist where it abandons its ambition to be art.
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to draw player’s attention to an evental site and encourage them to problematize 
the situation. Videogames themselves cannot produce events; they are, after all, 
representations” (331-332). In line with his focus on games as tools for political 
communication, education, and advertisement, he emphasizes that persuasive 
games use “procedural rhetoric to support or challenge our understanding of the 
way things in the world do or should work” (59).
Whereas Bogost thus seems to regard videogames as representative structures, 
granting them a critical potential towards a situation without questioning the 
status of their author and their representative (simulating) relation to the empirical 
reality, this thesis asks if disruptive conflicts with that reality can be possible 
as internal contradiction within a work. The question, in other words, is, if the 
disruptive conflicts can produce expressive novelty or Otherness. I hesitate to 
embrace Jameson’s claim about the impossibility of imagining absolute Otherness—
interestingly, he himself is rather evasive in this context. Instead, my hypothesis 
entails the question, whether the conflicts that result from reconfigurations of 
(existing) elements—here I agree with Jameson—deserve to be called radical 
Otherness. This question has to be answered in the analysis. At least on a very 
general level, I believe that a search for political alternatives and Otherness has 
to start from a position best expressed by Thomas Nagel (1979, 171), who argues 
that “to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe 
or understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance.” This is why I have 
capitalized [O]therness. At the same time, Nagel’s remark conveys a considerable 
portion of my scepticism about the possibility of identifying and describing such 
Otherness.
2.2 The Otherness of Reified Play
With these general conditions for radical political imagination in mind, I would 
like to proceed to discuss the structural potentials and limitations videogames have 
in this context. By now, the study of play, games, and videogames can look back 
on a great variety of stimulating contributions made in multiple fields and from 
diverse perspectives. However, while the majority of discussions focuses on ques-
tions of the nature and impact of play, game design, or player engagements, theo-
retical considerations of games and videogames as spaces of Otherness and radical 
imagination are rather few in number. 
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Theorists who discuss the status of ideas in games tend to stress their relation 
to our empirical reality. Ian Bogost, for example, regards games as simulations. In 
Unit Operations, he argues that “more than merely seeking to model the function 
of the material world, simulations also mark a meeting place between unit-based 
rules and subjective experiences” (Bogost 2006b, 94). He defines the concept of 
simulation as “the gap between the rule-based representation of a source system and 
a user’s subjectivity” (107). Importantly, this definition recognizes the influence of 
subjective choices as well as ideological influences, thereby providing an interesting 
perspective on videogame play. However, in his examples and in his framing of the 
idea, Bogost’s notion of the source system focuses on the existing and its mimesis. 
This tendency is even stronger in his later book Persuasive Games (Bogost 2007). 
In his inspiring attempt to situate videogames in a philosophical discourse on art, 
Grant Tavinor (2009) develops an approach to videogames as interactive fictions. 
However, his focus on the quality of the “representational beauty” of videogame 
worlds rather than its content, and where the latter is focused, the discussion 
frequently tends towards an emphasis on adequate, realistic representation. This 
is for example the case in his discussion of the rich fictional world of Grand Theft 
Auto IV, of which Tavinor claims that its “interest in creating a more realistic and 
detailed graphical fictional world – in essence depicting a dynamic modern city 
in a virtual way – is also one of the reasons that games like Grand Theft Auto IV 
should be considered art” (68).
In order to approach the specificity of Otherness in videogames from a different 
direction, I would like to start with a brief discussion of their relation to play. In 
many discussions of play, the concept is defined by its separation from ordinary 
life.5 Heideggerian philosopher Eugen Fink (1960, 1968) regards it not only as 
detached, but as opposed to the ordinary. Whereas everyday life is dominated by 
the “futuristic mode of being,” in which any activity is directed towards a “telos” or 
“final goal” in the future, play “interrupts the continuity and purposive structure of 
our lives” (Fink, Saine, and Saine 1968, 20-22). For Fink and his co-authors Ute and 
Thomas Saine, play offers a radical alternative to the ordinary, because it has only 
immanent purpose and is “not subordinate to the ultimate purpose served by all 
5    Johan Huizinga (1970, 47) defines play as “a voluntary activity or occupation executed 
within certain fixed limits of time and place, according to rules freely accepted but 
absolutely binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy, and 
the consciousness that it is ‘different’ from ‘ordinary life’.” Roger Caillois (1961, 9-10), uses 
the terms free, separate, uncertain, unproductive, governed by rules, and make-believe to 
describe play.
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other human activity” (21). Given his ontological quest and his emphasis on play as 
an opposing force, it may seem surprising that he nevertheless qualifies it as “finite 
creativity in the magic dimension of illusion” (28). 
This remark, I believe, can be read as an attempt to bridge the gap between play 
as theoretically conceptualized ontological entity, and playing as human activity. 
In other words, Fink, Saine and Saine acknowledge the ideal character of play and 
concede that it can only be realized illusively. Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004, 102-103) 
expresses this illusive quality with regards to “playing” more explicitly: “The player 
himself knows that play is only play and that it exists in a world determined by the 
seriousness of purposes.” He thereby points to the commitment to the illusion of 
play required of the players. In a similar thrust, Huizinga ([1949] 1970, 40) claims 
that “[t]he play-mood is labile in its very nature. At any moment, ‘ordinary life’ may 
reassert its rights either by an impact from without, which interrupts the game, or 
by an offence against the rules, or else from within, by a collapse of the play spirit, 
a sobering, a disenchantment.” These statements underline that play depends on a 
social contract between the players, who agree on upholding its illusion.6
Gadamer (2004) discusses this necessary transformation of ideal play into a 
human activity in more detail. He understands play in general as a “to-and-fro 
movement that is not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end,” and regards 
human play as a particular case (104). Human play, he claims, always plays 
“something”, meaning that it is necessarily structured by rules and orders as “the 
way the field of the game is filled” (107). Whereas Fink, Saine and Saine (1968, 21) 
regard play as a mode of human being which rejects the purposive structure of 
the ordinary and is not afraid of the “profound uncertainty,” Gadamer (2004, 107) 
argues that one cannot abandon the ordinary and is 
even in his play, still someone who comports himself, even if the proper 
essence of the game consists in his disburdening himself of the tension 
he feels in his purposive comportment. […] Every game presents the 
man who plays it with a task. He cannot enjoy the freedom of playing 
6    This is why Huizinga (1970, 30) makes a telling distinction between the “false player” or 
“cheat,” who “pretends to be playing the game and, on the face of it, still acknowledges 
the magic circle [that separates play from the ordinary, mer],” and the “spoil-sport,” who 
“trespasses against the rules or ignores them,” thus shattering the play-world itself. “By 
withdrawing from the game he reveals the relativity and fragility of the play-world in which 
he had temporarily shut himself with others. He robs play of its illusion” and “threatens the 
existence of the play-community.” He claims that the play society is much more “lenient” 
with the false player than with the spoil-sport, because the former disguises his cheating. 
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himself out without transforming the aims of his purposive behavior 
into mere tasks of the game.
For him “the space in which the game’s movement takes place is not simply the 
open space in which one ‘plays oneself out,’ but one that is specially marked out 
and reserved for the movement of the game. […] Setting of the playing field […] 
sets off the sphere of play as a closed world, one without transition and mediation 
to the world of aims” (107). In this sense, human play can only exist in a structured 
form with rules, orders and tasks or “make-believe goals” (108). Huizinga (1970, 
29) suggests a similar understanding when he refers to play spaces as “temporary 
worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an act apart.”7 
These observations suggest the importance of rules and goals, which have to be es-
tablished intentionally in order to separate a space for play from the ordinary. This 
is not to say that such separate spaces cannot, in Roger Caillois’ (1961, 13) terms, 
range in their character on a continuum between the convention-oriented “ludus” 
and the uncontrolled “paidia.”8 However, I do follow Gadamer insofar as I believe 
that uncontrolled play (paidia) in its ideal form can only exist in brief instances. 
This to be another way of saying that in human conduct, ideal play can only exist 
in its reified form as game, and must be consciously upheld by the players.9
In its reification, the temporary game world distances the action from the 
ordinary but never manages to detach it completely.10 In Spiel als Weltsymbol, Fink 
7    In the German version this sentence emphasizes the closure necessary for play even more 
explicitly, referring to the act as “self-contained” or “finite” [in sich abgeschlossen] (Huizinga 
[1939] 2009, 19).
8    In a similar way, Juul (2005, 28) argues that “[p]lay is mostly taken to be a free-form 
activity, whereas game is a rule-based activity.” Game scholar Bo Kampman Walther (2003, 
no pn) distinguishes play from games, arguing that “[p]lay is an open-ended territory in 
which make-believe and world-building are crucial factors. Games are confined areas that 
challenge the interpretation and optimizing of rules and tactics - not to mention time and 
space.”
9    Notably, most of the above-mentioned thinkers thought and published in languages which 
do not distinguish between play and games (German Spiel, French jeu, Dutch spel). This may 
have contributed to The Ambiguity of Play, of which Brian Sutton-Smith (1997, 214) shows 
that it majorly originates in the rhetoric of play in various fields of study. He states that “it is 
clear that verbalizations about a ludic experience are not the same as that experience” (216). 
By drawing on the distinction between game and play to reorder the complexity of play, I 
do not claim to solve the ambiguity and diversity of the term and its experience. Rather, this 
step is geared towards emphasizing the ideational quality of games as approximation of free 
play embedded in a social context, and their dependence on rules and player commitment.
10   The relation between the game or play space and the “ordinary” is widely and controversially 
discussed in game studies, where Huizinga’s metaphor of the “magic circle,” or rather, the 
separateness alluded to this term, has become a central element of disagreement among 
scholars. Mia Consalvo (2009, 415) for example argues that “There is No Magic Circle,” 
because “players never play a new game or fail to bring outside knowledge about games 
| 19 |
| 2 Theory |
(1960, 229, my translation) highlights this peculiar dual, illusory [Schein] character 
of the play space, observing that the “thing, with which the player plays, and the 
fellow players, with whom he enters the game [Spiel], are as real as he is, and belong 
to the same dimension of reality. Yet, in playing together, they enact [erspielen] an 
unreal play-world.” Although play is constituted by exclusion and interrupts the 
continuity of purposive action, it still requires real space and real time, “but the 
space and time in the play-world never continue seamlessly into the space and time 
surrounding it” (234, my translation).
How then, are games related to ideational Otherness and conflict? Huizinga 
(1970, 96) famously claims that play is a sphere in which “the antithetical and 
agonist basis of civilization is given from the start,” and suggests, in the words of 
Thomas S. Henricks (2010, 16), “that play was once an energizing, even culture-
creating activity in the life of societies.” This conclusion invited substantial criticism 
for its limitation to agonistic games (see Caillois 1961, 3-4) and his rough historical 
analysis and methodology in general (see Henricks 2010, 16-17). Moreover, my 
claim that all human play is reified suggests that human creativity in play is limited 
to the extent to which it depends on predefined rule-structure. However, even if 
we do not follow Huizinga in his entirety, the widely shared definition of play as a 
space apart from the ordinary is strikingly similar to how Jameson (2007, 15-16) 
positions utopia as “imaginary enclave within real social space.” This enclave exists 
“like a foreign body within the social,” beyond its reach and therefore testifying to 
its political powerlessness, but nonetheless offering spaces where “new wish images 
of the social can be elaborated and experimented on.” Against this background, 
it is not surprising that the court of justice can serve as a historical example of 
and gameplay into their gaming situations. [...] There is no innocent gaming.” In a keynote 
given at the second Under the Mask conference, Garry Crawford (2009, 9), points out that 
videogame players’ and, more general, “media audiences’ engagement with texts will often 
live on beyond the screen or page.” He urges the reader to “Forget the Magic Circle” and 
pay more attention to on the interrelation and interaction between games and their social 
contexts. Jesper Juul (2008, 59-60) shares this critique against detachedness and reminds us 
“that Huizinga describes the magic circle as one type of social space among others. […] The 
magic circle is a description of the salient differences between a game and its surrounding 
context. It does not imply that a game is completely distinguished from the context in which 
it is played.” Interestingly, he refers to the impact of social status on playing, arguing that 
games are not separate because “winning and losing may have social consequences, and 
players may play accordingly. The most obvious example is playing against a boss or playing 
against a child, in which case the player may decide that it is preferable to lose the game.” 
This example arguably offers a strong argument for my understanding of play as an ideal to 
which games aspire. Both players can only “play” the same game on equal terms if they shed 
their social backgrounds and balance the differences in their ability.
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such an enclave for Jameson (15-16), and as one of the spaces of play for Huizinga 
(1970, 28-29), “in form and function play-grounds, […] isolated, hedged round, 
hallowed, within which special rules obtain.”
For Jameson (2007, 5), the enclave and its distancing closure are necessary 
conditions for developing utopian and science fictional alternatives to the 
present from within. In a similar way, Phillip Wegner (2002) identifies utopia as a 
closure towards everyday experience and ideology on the one hand, and abstract 
theorizing on the other. Applying Henri Lefebvre’s tripartite model of space11, 
Wegner claims that narrative utopia derive their critical force from their character 
as conceived or “pretheoretical” spaces. They occupy “a middle ground between 
the phenomenological concreteness of the literary aesthetic and the abstract 
systematicity of the theoretical,” that is between the representational practices 
of literature that expresses lived experience, and those practices of theory that 
attempt to perceive these experiences in an abstract, systematic fashion (xviii). 
Due to position between these poles, “the displaced or neutral world of the utopia 
[becomes] a place wherein these [social and cultural; mer] contradictions do not 
come to a resolution but instead are allowed to play against one another” (37).
[W]hile crucial aspects of a newly emergent social reality are present in 
the utopian figure, the relationship between these elements, dispersed 
as they are throughout the text, cannot yet be articulated. That is, the 
utopia presents a narrative picture of history-in-formation rather than 
the theoretical description of a fully formed historical situation. (38)
In other words, Wegner claims that ensembles or patchworks of existing elements 
can open spaces neither found in our empirical reality, nor accessible to theoretical 
summary, which have the potential to point our thinking to new directions. 
Importantly, he emphasizes the contradictory nature of these patchworks, thus 
supporting my earlier emphasis on the conflict in Adorno’s writing as a specifically 
powerful and stimulating structure of Otherness. This is why Wegner (xx) can 
11   Lefebvre (1991, 38-40) distinguishes three interrelated, but not necessarily coherent, 
dimensions of the social production of space, namely “spatial practice,” which “propounds 
and presupposes” social space dialectically; “representations of space” or “conceptualized 
space,” the space of scientists who “identify what is lived and what is perceived with what 
is conceived,” and “representational space,” which is the space as directly lived or directly 
described. Corresponding to these are different modes of bodily engagement, namely 
perceiving of social practice, conceiving or thinking of representations of space, and living of 
lived space. According to Wegner (2002, 14), the middle terms of conceived representations 
of space “point toward what we […] conventionally think of as ‘space’ proper, mediating 
between and drawing all three of the levels together into a coherent ensemble.”
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write that “[b]y inserting something heretofore unknown in the world […] the 
narrative utopia generates the cognitive space around which new kinds of lived 
experience and theoretical perceptions form.”
It is tempting to argue that, in the attempt to secure a space for “an act apart,” 
games occupy a similar middle ground. Their dual character arguably suggests 
a potential for the “pretheoretical” and the “not yet existing” alike. Games and 
videogames are distanced from the “ordinary” by means of spatial and temporal 
boundaries, as well as rules that do not apply in the everyday. However, this 
existence of well-defined rules and their status as reified play in general can also 
be interpreted as a strong theoretical foundation, particularly because these rules 
have to be determined in advance, deliberately securing the playing field. The 
following sections show that, in contrast to ‘conventional’ games—for lack of a 
better term—videogames as a particular case of reified play can in fact be host to 
distinct spaces of a middle-ground Otherness in Wegner’s sense and can host a 
variety of conflicting elements.
2.3 The Computopic Universe
If rules are important for human play, they are indispensable to videogames. Con-
ventional games not only present the player with spaces for action, but also fea-
ture rule sets which can be subjected to change within certain boundaries.12 Such 
changes take on the form of agreements between the players, which also exist in the 
realm of videogames. In contrast to conventional games, however, in videogames 
“there is no ‘ball’ that can be out of bounds” (Juul 2005, 165), because the rules are 
authored by the designer13 in the program code. Except through manipulations to 
the code, these rules cannot be changed. In conventional games, all rules have to 
be agreed on and consciously renewed in a kind of social contract by the players. 
12   Game rules may be adapted to the specific spatiality of this environment or the context 
in which the game is played. An example would be soccer games played in parks. In cases 
where the requirement of 22 players or that of sufficient space for a standard playing field 
are not available, a similar game can still be played in a slightly adapted form.
13   The use of this term requires a brief explanation. In the context of this thesis, I adapt 
this term from conventional videogame jargon, in it refers to the person supervising the 
creative process of design and development that leads to a complete videogame software. 
Considering the number of people and companies involved in this process in most cases, 
this is a gross simplification. However, in this thesis, I cannot do justice to the complexity of 
this creative process. The term designer thus refers to all those involved in creating the final 
product as I experience and analyze it. Where instructive, I mention influential key persons.
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In videogames, a large part of the rules is upheld by the computer, “freeing the 
player(s) from having to enforce the rules; and allowing for games where the player 
does not know the rules from the outset” (Juul 2005, 53-54). Michael Liebe (2008, 
332) claims that while in traditional games, restrictive rules differentiate the game 
space from ordinary life, in videogames, on the contrary, 
the virtual game field and the virtual space surrounding the playground 
are both based on the same code. […] The consequences of this are that 
in a computer game everything is programmed, every possible action, 
every physical simulation, even the boundaries of the virtual space itself. 
[…] Players do not have to adhere to the code of behavior and the rules, 
but simply have no other choice than to act within the frame of the 
possibilities provided by the computer program.
Juul and Liebe point to an important potential and limitation of the player’s 
agency. On the one hand, action is confined to what is afforded by the software. 
This limitation is necessary, because it affords the game goals and the challenge, 
or, as Marry Flanagan (2009, 61) puts it, “the pleasures of gaming derive from 
the structures of rules that define the game environments.” On the other hand, 
rules may be learned in the process. I will come back to this point below. Before, 
I would like to examine the status of the rules as such in more detail. Despite his 
general tone, Liebe’s examples suggest an unnecessarily narrow conception of the 
term “computer game,” limited to the game intended by its designer. Discussing 
the difference between the conventional version of Solitaire and its computer 
counterpart, he argues that in the latter, “the software program fulfils the function 
of the referee, so it is impossible to change the rules or winning conditions 
spontaneously. […] [I]t is even impossible to make accidental mistakes” (Liebe 
2008, 335-336). Here, Liebe runs the risk of ignoring the existence of cheating and 
bugs, the flexibility of the game rules and subversive player practices. 
In Cheating, Mia Consalvo (2007, 2) shows that, despite rigid rule-sets, 
videogame players nonetheless cheat and “challenge the notion that there is one 
‘correct’ way to play a game.”14 Likewise, Talmadge Wright, Eric Boria, and Paul 
14   Consalvo (2007, 87-89) points out that players define cheating differentlyhave different 
ways of defining cheating. While generally regarded as an act that gives a player an unfair 
advantage, player’s opinions as to what counts as cheating range from broad definitions like 
“anything other than a solo effort in completing a game” to narrow definitions of acts that 
result in an unfair disadvantage of others, which do not regard the use of cheat codes and 
walkthroughs in single player games as cheating. Although Consalvo does not make this 
explicit, the latter definition implies an understanding of single-player games as the sum of 
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Breidenbach (2002, no pn) show with empirical evidence that “[p]laying is not 
simply mindless movement through a virtual landscape, but rather movement 
with a reflexive awareness of the game’s features and their possible modifications.”15 
Flanagan (2009), who emphasizes the critical practices of “unplaying” (enacting 
forbidden scenes and alternative scenarios), “reskinning” (altering characters or 
objects) and “rewriting” (redefining play from within) (33-34), goes as far as to 
claim that “[t]he digital ‘magic circle’ that players enter is an open environment 
focused on experimentation and subversion” (61). I am not ready to generalize this 
claim for all videogames. However, Wright, Boria and Breidenbach show that it is 
advisable to distinguish the sum of all rules of the game world at least theoretically 
from those of the game intended by the designer.16 
If alternative and subversive player actions are not to be excluded from the 
analysis from the start, it has to encompass the sum of all rules defined in the 
software, including the pre-defined rules of representation and graphical, audio, or 
other databases the game involves, as well as those rules that make modifications 
to these databases and other elements by the player possible.17 Liebe’s observations 
are nevertheless important and, I believe, can be maintained if they are applied to 
the totality of all rules in the software. Within this totality, the player “does not have 
to artificially limit his action possibilities according to the rules in order to play 
correctly. Illegal actions cannot be performed or they are automatically penalized. 
all rules in the software similar to my own—anything permitted by the software is part of 
the game and its ideational expressivity.
15   In their analysis of creative player actions in the computer game “Counter-Strike”, Wright, 
Boria and Beidenbach (2002) show how this difference between the videogame as intended 
by the designers and the videogame world as created by the architects. Most revealing is 
their account of unpredicted communication practices through which “[t]he dead have 
found a way of communicating with the living.” They show how by exploiting the game 
system, the players have found ways to bypass the intended restrictions of the game. The 
game does not permit communication between the dead players, who can follow the 
gameplay through the eyes of any avatar still in the game, thus potentially able to give away 
enemy positions to their team members. Yet, the designers overlooked the possibility of 
voting, a communication tool available at all times. Voting an opponent’s position away 
is not recognized as a rule-breach by the computer, although it might be conceived of as 
cheating by the human players.
16   To stick with Liebe’s example, it is quite possible to use the random function of the ‘deck’ 
in computer Solitaire for gambling, if two players decide to bet on the colour of the card 
appearing next. Of course, this is first and foremost a theoretical point to highlight the 
flexibility of even the most rigid rule structure.
17   For the purpose of this thesis, this excludes the practice of modding, although the boundary 
here is arguably not clear-cut. Furthermore, I will not pay attention to uses of videogames 
other than playing, like machinima, a practice of creating film sequences by recording the 
action in the game world.
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The rule system does not have to be magically upheld by aware players. The rules 
are upheld by the program code” (Liebe 2008, 333-334). This conclusion allows me 
to identify the object of this study as the ideational space defined and qualified 
by the sum of all rules in the software. I call this the computopic space of a 
videogame.18 The computopic space is not identical with the software, nor can it be 
reduced to the software without loss. Why not? The software defines a videogame 
on an abstract level, not only with regards to its rules, but also with regards to the 
objects of the game world, their behaviour, and in most cases, their appearance 
in the shape of included databases. Yet, these abstract definitions are different 
from the game world a player encounters in play in crucial ways. In its concrete 
instantiation, the computopic is a dynamic space generated by the computer based 
on the programmed algorithms, the data provided with the software and the 
player’s input. 
A look at contemporary software design and its guiding principle of object 
orientation helps to explain this difference. Object-oriented programming 
(hereafter oop) follows the idea that a program is most efficiently structured in 
the form of independent objects which are instantiated and interact during run-
time. Bogost (2006b, 39) mentions four main characteristics of oop. It has to 
follow the principle of abstraction, meaning that programmed objects have to be 
disassociated from any specific use. It has to be encapsulated, meaning that an 
object’s content remains hidden to other parts of the program or system. It has to 
be polymorphic, meaning that instances of a class can have different behaviours. 
It is based on inheritance, meaning that a class can be created from or based on a 
parent class. These principles hint at the distinction between classes in the program 
code or software, and concrete instances of these classes during program run-time. 
A class is defined only once and in an abstract manner. If equipped with variables, 
the computer can not only create multiple instances of it, but also assign different 
content to each instance as needed.
18   The term “computopic space” is inspired by a blog post by Pink Tentacle (2009) on the 
“~pink tentacle” blog from October 22, 2009, entitled “Computopia: Old visions of a high-
tech future,” which discusses a 1969 Shōnen Sunday feature series of illustrated articles 
about a computerized future called “Computopia.” Recently, I have come across a book 
by historian of Japan and Korea Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1988), entitled Beyond Computopia, 
in which she analyzes the emergence of “information capitalism.” Morris-Suzuki discusses 
the implications of this trend and the possibilities for its transformation, concluding 
her analysis by sketching a vision of an “information democracy,” in which the “private 
appropriation of social knowledge and its conversion into a source of corporate profit” is 
reversed into a “re-socialization of knowledge” (205).
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This dual structure of software is not new to informatics.19 However, in 
combination with the importance of player input and the dynamic, algorithmic 
character of videogames, it has several far-reaching consequences for the 
computopic. First and foremost, this combination means that the computopic 
space hosts multiple material realities or worlds, the quantity of which depends 
on the number of variables, their type, the predefined values that can be assigned 
to these variables and their dynamic behaviour. If all the ways in which a player 
can act on the game in each moment are taken into account, their number easily 
approaches infinity. This means that the computopic is also the sum of all instances 
it hosts and affords. 
In his discussion of Fictional Worlds, Thomas Pavel (1986, 51) offers a helpful 
model for a similar situation. He regards any number of fictional worlds as members 
of universe or set K if they meet the conditions specified by an actual member of 
K and a relation R of alternativeness. Any world x1 that is possible given a specific 
relation R to a given member of K is part of K. According to Pavel, R can follow 
different conceptions of possibility, such as logical, metaphysical, or psychological. 
However, in my case, the alternativeness of the possible worlds in a videogame is 
given by the sum of all rules that make them possible. Slightly adjusted, then, I 
propose to capture the contingency of a specific computopic space by referring to 
any of its instances as it appears to the player at play with the term computopic 
world. If R is simply defined as a link to the same software, the entirety of possible 
computopic worlds can be called computopic universe. The term computopic 
space remains viable throughout this thesis as an abstract signifier for the sum of 
all rules of the software.
The computopic universe is virtual and digital, which, within the limitations of 
what soft- and hardware afford, frees it from the physical and social laws of our 
empirical reality. This in itself marks it as a space of Otherness, albeit not distinct 
from fictional worlds in other media. I have mentioned that this space cannot be 
reduced to the sum of its rules as it is represented in the software code. It is neither 
19   In his sensible and innovative approach to Cybertext, Espen Aarseth (1997, 10-11) claims 
that databases are an epochal break on the physical level because, through the distinction 
between interface and storage medium, they signify new ways of using textual material. He 
argues that, on a semiotic level, cybertexts show a “unique dual materiality” and thus have 
to be differentiated into surface and deeper layer (40). Since the early 2000s, databases have 
gained more and more attention from media scholars and philosophers like Lev Manovich 
(2001) or Azuma Hiroki (2001), reflecting their increasing importance and pervasiveness 
(see Schäfer and Roth 2012).
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intelligible as material manifestation on the computer memory during run-time. 
Rather, access to it is only possible in the experience of its sensual representation 
on the screen, in the speaker, and with the vibrating controller in hand. 
Due to its definition as the sum of all rules, the computopic space includes its 
rules of sensual representation and their content. Usually, a computopic world and 
its objects exceed the actual, momentary representation on the screen. In addition 
to this partiality, the representation of the computopic space is also selective and 
involves a transformation. Lev Manovich (2002, no pn) explores this dimension 
in the case of visualization. He defines visualization as particular subset of the 
general practice of mapping data, understood as re-presentation of data in another 
way or form. As such, visualization refers to the transformation of non-visual 
data into (novel) visual representations of that data. Observing that most data is 
more complex than the four dimensions human beings are used to in the everyday 
(3D space and time), Manovich claims that visualization is based on a politics of 
mapping, in which actors decide on which mapping to apply, what dimensions to 
select, and what interface to provide the user with. In the context of this thesis, 
the term “representation” is used to convey this double transformation of the 
computopic space in its sensual mapping, reduced both to a partial and abstracted 
appearance in sound, visuals, and vibration. This notion of representation is similar 
to Gadamer’s (2004, 114) understanding of mimicking as a decontextualizing 
practice of abstracting and emphasizing, in which “imitation, as representation, 
has a special cognitive function” because it makes us recognize something new. 
In Figure 1, I have visualized the idea of the computopic space, consisting of a 
contingent universe based on the software and concrete reifications in worlds 
generated by the computer and player input. 
2.4 Action
The computopic space is not only represented, its worlds are also enacted. In his 
discussion of “Gamic Action,” Alexander Galloway (2006, 2) emphasizes this cen-
trality, claiming that “videogames are actions” insofar as they “exist when enacted. 
[...] With video games, the work itself is material action. One plays a game. And 
the software runs.” Galloway distinguishes videogame action into machine acts and 
operator acts, and into diegetic and non-diegetic acts. The latter division refers to 
“the game’s total world of narrative action” as opposed to “those elements of the 
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gaming apparatus that are external to the world of narrative action” (7). Given my 
definition of the computopic space as the sum of all rules in the software, the dif-
ference between diegetic and non-diegetic is not central at this point.20 However, 
the emphasis on machine acts and operator acts is helpful to discuss the different 
qualities both have.
20   Galloway (2006) himself acknowledges the vagueness of this distinction, both with regards 
to operator and machine acts. In the sphere of operator (player) acts, the non-diegetic 
refers to actions of configuration, like pause, cheats, hacks, not explained or motivated by 
events in the game world (12). Opposed to this, diegetic operator acts are either move acts 
(movement in the space of a game world) or expressive acts (linking the player character 
to an actionable object in the game world) (22). In a self-critical remark, Galloway points 
out that “actions of configuration are often the very essence of the operator’s experience 
of gameplay—simple proof that gaming may, even for limited moments, eschew the 
diegetic completely” (14). In the sphere of machine acts, he distinguishes between diegetic 
machine acts or “pure processes,” meaning ambience acts by the computer in which “[t]
he game is still present, but play is absent” (10), and non-diegetic machine acts, meaning 
“actions performed by the machine and integral to the entire experience of the game but 
not contained within a narrow conception of the world of gameplay. […] Included here 
are infernal forces like power-ups, goals, high-score stats” (28). Here, too, Galloway admits 
that the distinction between diegetic and non-diegetic is blurry, particularly with regards to 
this last category. Indeed, it seems very plausible to conceive of a power-up or other item as 
crucial for the narrative progression of a game. Since my framing of videogames does not 
distinguish between diegetic and non-diegetic elements, all examples Galloway mentions 
have to be regarded as part of the computopic space.
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I would first like to take a look at operator acts or player actions. Player input is 
one of the most basic, most important features of videogames—without it, playing 
would not be possible (Juul 2005, 60). Player input is also an important factor in 
universal contingency and world plurality. It affords choices about the direction 
and character of the game world, from difficulty and sound volume, to narrative 
paths or the choice of weapons. In combination with the possibility of repetition 
and saving featured in many games, this means that a world or universe can be 
revisited and enacted differently, thus allowing for the exploration of multiple 
instances—a repetitive practice arguably at the heart of videogame play.
In contrast to literature, videogames thus allow the player to act physically 
on their universe and shape or alter its materiality.21 In the above section, I have 
already mentioned the potential of exploring a game world without knowing 
the rules and effects of one’s actions, and the limitation of player action as being 
constrained to the possibilities authored in the software. The existence of such 
absolute limitation may lead to the conclusion that videogames are indeed spaces 
of predefined behaviour or even reaction rather than creativity and autonomy.22 
However, as discussed above, the computopic rules are often somewhat different 
from this initial set, either because they are intentionally left vague and only 
disclosed partially, or because the available rules can be subjected to alteration or 
used subversively to create new games. Whereas the conscious effort of maintaining 
the rules in conventional games is a struggle against the intrusion of the ordinary, 
the struggle to overcome or experiment with the rules of a computopic universe 
does not risk opening the door to reality, but rather allows for a direct assault 
on reality’s boundaries.
The double structure of absolute limitation on the one hand, and vagueness and 
flexibility on the other, opens up a space that affords speculative, non-predefined 
player action. In The Aesthetics of Music, Roger Scruton (1999) discusses the 
21   I believe that there is a crucial difference between such alterations on the one hand, and 
ripping out pages of a book or censoring its content in some way on the other. Although 
these practices can be formally described in similar terms, it is crucial that alterations of the 
physical reality of a work are the central characteristic of videogames and to a certain extent 
not only intended, but also necessary for play. 
22   In a more detailed fashion than Paul Virilio’s brief remarks (see Introduction, p. 4), 
Claus Pias (2000) rejects the idea of the player as free subject in videogames. He argues that 
videogame contingency and emergence is merely an effect of the illusion videogames create 
by disguising their programming as black box. He shows that in action games, the player is a 
device interconnected with the computer; playing requires an accommodation that affords 
time-critical input (123).
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importance of “unasserted thought” and the speculative quality of the imagination. 
In his terms, “[r]ationality involves the ability to represent to ourselves absent or 
hypothetical situations, to project our thought in a speculative arch away from the 
immediate present, into regions which are past or future, possible or impossible, 
probable or improbable, and from which it returns with insight into the nature of 
things” (88). In a sense, speculations are important in videogame play, because 
they allow us to project the possible outcomes of our actions and speculate about 
the computopic space. As Juul (2005, 176-177) puts it, 
the representation and fictional world presented by the game cue the 
player into making assumptions about the rules of the game. […] In 
video games, the rules are initially hidden from the player—this means 
that the player is more likely to use the game world to make inferences 
about the rules. In fact, the player may need a fictional game world to 
understand the rules. […] The way a given object or character behaves 
will characterize it as a fictional object; the rules that the player deducts 
from the fiction and from the experience of the playing of the game will 
also cue him or her into imagining a fictional world.
In other words, the appearance and behaviour of the game world, and the 
actions that correspond to input serve as the basis for a player’s assumptions about 
a computopic universe. In videogames as much as elsewhere, such speculations 
always depend on earlier experiences and knowledge. Yet, games are virtual spaces 
of Otherness in which the rules of our empirical reality do not necessarily apply, and 
the rules of which we may not know in their entirety—where we need to experience 
a world in order to make sense of it. Espen Aarseth (1997, 1-3) famously argues 
that videogames are an example of the “ergodic cybertext,” which he defines as a 
“machine for the production of variety of expression,” requiring “non-trivial effort” 
of its users. Given the totality of rules for the respective effort, this also means that 
an ergodic work “in a material sense includes the rules for its own use” (179). In 
other words, they are explored in action. What is more, the process of making 
sense of the game world is not geared towards interpretation, but often towards 
configuration—a practice of acting in favour of a specific goal or situation rather 
than in a sensible manner in harmony with the narrative. In his attempt to rescue 
videogame studies from the colonization by literary or film studies, Eskelinen 
(2001, no pn) claims that “the dominant user function in literature, theatre and 
film is interpretative, but in games it is the configurative one. To generalize: in art 
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we might have to configure in order to be able to interpret whereas in games we 
have to interpret in order to be able to configure.” This argument is inspired by 
Aarseth (1997, 110-111), who distinguishes between a narratologist understanding 
of game tasks as gaps in the narrative filled in by the users on the one hand, and 
“openings” or “keyholes” in games, which are filled in order to make the game 
continue, on the other. According to Aarseth, the adventure game “disintegrates 
any notion of story by forcing the player’s attention on the elusive ‘plot’” (112). 
Although I don’t believe that interpretation and configuration practices are ever 
exclusive in the engagement with the computopic space, these observations 
highlight the importance of both categories and shows that action in videogames 
does not necessarily depend on interpretation and may neither be restricted to acts 
that contribute to narrative consistency.
On a subjective level, the limited action possibilities can at least hypothetically 
be deployed on a computopic world in a spontaneous fashion, not based on the 
highly probable predictions that define large portions of gaming.23 An example 
can be found in the counter-intuitive practice of “rocket jumps,” which directs 
explosives to the ground while jumping, thereby injuring the player character but 
also accelerating it (Wikipedia 2013o). In a limited sense, this technique has to 
be discovered by the player, both as a way of moving and in its highly demanding 
choreography—failing to execute it properly leads to substantial damage. However, 
if successful, it can propel the player to places otherwise unreachable. One might 
point out that, in most cases, the designers intended rocket jumping. Yet, for 
the individual, this possibility may still have to be discovered in trial-and-error 
fashion or by chance. Furthermore, there are numerous examples of a more 
radically unpredicted and unpredictable “emergent gameplay” resulting from rule 
23   An inspiring thinker of action and matter, although probably outdated by any contemporary 
biological or cognitive science standards, Henri Bergson (1912) distinguishes between 
those actions grounded in the intellectual mind, and those pursued by the creative mind in 
Schöpferische Entwicklung [Creative Evolution]. The intellect, he claims, orders the world and 
presupposes space, but cannot construct it (215). Moreover, this order exists for the intellect 
and reflects it in the ordered objects (227). The free mind, on the contrary, is perpetual 
progression and creation (227). I do not propose to follow Bergson in all his questionable 
distinctions. However, his framing of creative action as “jumping in at the deep end” (197-
198) describes the potential for creative, spontaneous action in videogames rather well. 
Such action is disruptive of the intellectual ordering, which denies the uniqueness and 
unpredictability of life and, instinctively, attempts to identify resemblances to the already 
known in any situation (35-26). I believe Bergson’s understanding of action and matter 
could contribute to a philosophical perspective on videogames fruitfully. However, it would 
stretch the boundaries of this thesis too far to engage with his thought in the necessary 
depth, particularly given his problematic terminology and his tendency towards mysticism.
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complexity or glitches (Wikipedia 2013g). 
This discussion suggests that the difference between the accessible or knowable 
(and maybe even the intended) rules and the actual sum of all rules in the 
computopic might correspond to a difference between rule-based and creative 
player engagement. Raymond Geuss (2010, ix) claims that “[t]o act is in an 
important sense always to create something new, an object, a change in an existing 
situation, a new reality.” The broad understanding of action and novelty this 
statement suggests, may tempt us to conclude that the possibility of action alone 
marks videogames as spaces in which the player can not only imagine, but also 
create novelty or Otherness. However, it remains to be seen whether the tendency 
towards creative play is strong enough to justify the term action in its narrow, 
political sense, as well. In any case, the tension between analytic, calculating 
play directed towards the intended goals and playful, creative explorations of 
the computopic is crucial for understanding the character of its Otherness, and 
provides some of the potentials for conflict.
Next, I would like to turn to the role the computer plays for the computopic 
space. As already mentioned, Galloway regards the computer as a second agent. He 
states that in videogames, “software instructs the machine to simulate the rules of 
the game through meaningful action” (Galloway 2006, 2). In combination with the 
contingency of the player actions and the indeterminate character of the software 
algorithms, the involvement of the computer shifts the designer’s role from an 
artist of a work of art to an artist of a variable structure. In order to explain this 
shift, a brief excursus to Carroll’s (1996b) ontological effort towards defining the 
“moving image” may be helpful. Carroll identifies five necessary conditions for 
what he terms “the moving image”: 
[W]e can say that x is a moving image (1) only if x is a detached display, 
(2) only if x belongs to the class of things from which the impression of 
movement is technically possible, (3) only if performance tokens of x 
are generated by a template that is a token, and (4) only if performance 
tokens of x are not artworks in their own right. (70)
He adds the fifth category of “two-dimensionality” in order to distinguish moving 
images from three-dimensional, moving sculptures. For my purpose, conditions 
3 and 4 are most relevant. Carroll arrives at these conditions by distinguishing 
the moving image from play performances (66-70). Play performances are tokens 
generated by interpretations, whereas moving images are “generated from tem-
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plates which are tokens.” In contrast to plays, Carroll regards their performance 
(the showing) itself not as artistic, but as a technical engagement with an apparatus. 
Although I disagree with the observation that the technical process of performing 
a moving image—and other kinds of media, for that matter—is not also an artistic 
process, Carroll’s terminology may serve as a starting point for the consideration 
of the generative process of ideational Otherness in videogames. 
In analogy to the moving image, videogame software can be conceived as 
template created by the designer. This generative process, however, differs from 
that of the moving image, because it involves mediation by the computer, which 
cannot be reduced to a technical engagement in Carroll’s sense. The variability and 
contingency of the computopic implies that the concrete instance of the designer’s 
ideas created by the computer can potentially involve an interpretation—it is not a 
coincidence that the “interpreter” is a common term in computer science, referring 
to a program that “executes, i.e. performs” a source code (Wikipedia 2013j). 
Interpreting and performing the instructions in the software, the computer adds a 
layer to the artistic process. 
If technology in general is not seen as “neutral,” the performance of a template 
could be said to involve a transformation of the original data already in the case 
of moving images. However, I would argue that the relationship between template 
and token remains linear in most cases, meaning that it could be regarded as a 
projection in the common geometrical sense. If there is a large hole in the screen 
or if the projector of a film moves too slowly, it will likely have a similar effect on 
the entire performance. In contrast, world-plurality, contingency, player input, as 
well as indeterminate algorithms—most famously, random functions—turn the 
performance of a videogame at least theoretically into a non-linear, unpredicted 
and in some cases unpredictable transformation of the coded template.
In this sense, the computopic can be characterized as a space that does not fully 
originate in the designer’s imagination. In other words, the concrete computopic 
worlds are in part unimagined, and so thus by extension is their universe.24 It 
allows the designer to author variable, contingent ideational structures or meta-
24   The intense testing period prior to a game release not only targets errors in the program 
code, but is also a necessary means to verify the predictions made in the design phase in the 
actual, playable form. Together with the established practice of updates and patches issued 
after the game release, this testifies to the unimagined quality of software and the lack of 
control the designer has over its complexity and thus the results of the creation process, 
as well as to its flexibility and receptivity to post-release changes. This corresponds to the 
emergent quality of player actions.
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ideas (character classes, the choice of difficulty and its effect) and to define their 
possible content (the appearance of a specific character, the levels of difficulty 
available, etc.). The concrete computopic world a player encounters, including 
its representation at any given moment, is determined at play, based on player 
and computer acts. The computer enacts the code as it is, with all its flaws, 
contradictions, and bugs—unintentional mistakes in the program or rule system. 
At the same time, the computer is also responsible for interpreting player input. 
In a sense, the machine becomes a particular kind of artistic device in its own 
right, a non-human player who performs the program code and plays with 
various kinds of input to generate concrete manifestation of the variable ideas 
authored by the designer.
2.5 Expression
With the abovementioned characteristics in mind, I would like to take a look at the 
concrete expressive elements of the computopic. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
term expression is used in a practical sense to encompass all ways in which vid-
eogames convey ideas, whether abstract, philosophical or concrete, sensually per-
ceivable. In this broad definition, it includes diverse elements such as rules (action, 
world and object behaviour, goals, etc), sensual representations (visuals, sound, 
movement), narrative content (story, setting), or controls. Given this breadth and 
diversity, I don’t intend to discuss all elements in detail. Instead, I propose to focus 
on the general character of computopic expression and its potentials and limita-
tions for Otherness, leaving elaborations on concrete elements for the analysis.
It seems helpful to begin with the relation between different expressive elements. 
In the attempt to establish videogames as a distinct medium in its own right, much 
attention is directed to the rules as main expressive element of games. Bogost (2007, 
2-3) emphasizes the potential games have due to their “procedurality,” meaning “a 
way of creating, explaining, or understanding processes.” He claims that computers 
and videogames are “particularly adept at representing real or imagined systems 
that […] operate according to a set of processes” (5). For Bogost, this includes 
representations of culture, society and human behaviour (7-9). He goes as far as 
to claim that in videogames, “image is subordinate to process” (25). This view is 
representative of a widely shared conviction that in the computopic space rules are 
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superior to other elements.25 According to Juul (2005, 121) 
[r]ules and fiction compete for the player’s attention. […] However, it 
is not possible to deal with fiction in games without discussing rules. 
The fictional world of a game is projected in a variety of ways—using 
graphics, sound, text, advertising, the game manual, and the game rules. 
The way in which the game objects behave also influences the fictional 
world that the game projects. Though rules can function independent of 
fiction, fiction depends on rules.
He adds that “[o]n a formal level, games are themable, meaning that a set of rules 
can be assigned a new fictional world without modifying the rules. […] Neverthe-
less, fiction matters in games and it is important to remember the duality of the 
formal and the experiential perspectives on fiction in games” (199).
Procedures and algorithms doubtlessly constitute a central element of 
computopic expressivity. The focus on procedures seems even more plausible, 
considering that they also regulate sensual representations and organize the image 
or representation. In this sense, representations might be understood as subordinate 
to process. However, I hold against this view that, as I have argued above, the 
procedures or processes, as they exist in the software or in their instantiated form 
on the computer hardware, are not sufficient to afford gameplay. On the contrary, 
they depend on representation to be perceivable and intelligible for the player. 
A brief consideration of the various versions and interpretations of the well-
known game Tetris shows that the sensual representation of the rules itself can have 
a deep impact on the ideational content of a game. From a perspective on games 
as interpretations of experience, Janet Murray (1997, 143-144) argues that Tetris 
is a “a perfect enactment of the overtasked lives of Americans in the 1990s—of 
the constant bombardment of tasks that demand our attention and that we must 
somehow fit into our overcrowded schedules and clear off our desks in order 
to make room for the next onslaught.” Juul (2005, 133) remarks that this is one 
possible, allegorical reading of the game, albeit not a very convincing one. Yet, it 
25   See, however, a recent article by Miguel Sicart (2011, no pn), who criticizes “proceduralists” 
for their focus on pre-structured, “instrumental play.” Drawing on authors like Adorno and 
Horckheimer, and Fink, he argues that “[g]ames structure play, facilitate it by means of 
rules. This is not to say that rules determine play: they focus it, they frame it, but they are still 
subject to the very act of play. Play, again, is an act of appropriation of the game by players.” 
Sicart’s argument highlights the importance of looking beyond the rule system when 
analyzing videogame expression, although he exaggerates the limitedness of proceduralist 
perspectives—emergence, disruption and player subjectivity are by far not being ignored by 
Bogost or Flanagan, whom Sicart mentions as representatives of “proceduralists.”
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should not be too difficult to imagine a version of Tetris where the bricks falling 
down look like documents and files, and the bottom of the playing space like a desk. 
In a blog post on his website, game designer Raph Koster (2009) reports that his 
hypothetical, distasteful version of Tetris skinned as a gas chamber he proposed in 
A Theory of Fun for Game Design (Koster 2005) was realized by a team of designers. 
As the blog-post recalls, this extreme thought experiment should prove that “[y]
ou could have well-proven, stellar game design mechanics applied towards a quite 
repugnant premise.” This point could have been proven in a far less extreme way, 
but the experiment emphasizes the fact that the experience of a game can change 
profoundly with its respective skin—particularly in the case of abstract games, 
mechanics and rules can be deployed for expressing various meanings. Thus, even 
if videogames are flexible and “themable” in terms of their representation, specific 
themes have a strong influence on their ideational content, and its perception 
and experience.26 Extending these findings to videogame expression in general, I 
propose to regard computopic expressivity in principle as generated from a flexible 
combination of multiple elements. This includes elements familiar from other 
media, such as narrative structures and textual descriptions, images, or movies 
(cut-scenes), but also distinct elements like game rules, goals, and player actions. 
Despite his strong emphasis on the dominance of processes in videogames, Bogost 
(2006b) offers a helpful framework in his earlier proposal to regard contemporary 
media products as Unit Operations.27 Here, Bogost demands that “[we] should 
26   Notably, Bogost’s (2007, 103-109) own example of the game Tax Invaders does not support 
his claim convincingly. Tax Invaders is a reskinned version of the popular game Space 
Invaders created by the Republican party in the U.S., in which the player controls a graphical 
representation of the head of George W. Bush and has to shoot down invading taxes (issued 
by the hostile democrats), represented textual through large sums of money moving towards 
her. Bogost regards this as a sophisticated example of procedural rhetoric, because “the 
player completes the game’s argument [here, the conservative anti-taxation position; mer] 
by firing the projectiles that defend the nation from Kerry’s potential tax plans.” He argues 
that “Tax Invaders takes the metaphor beyond verbal and visual rhetoric,” as it redefines 
taxes as a foreign, even alien, enemy. Although the game is an interesting example of a 
procedural argument, Bogost himself has to admit that Tax Invaders “mounts its argument 
partly through verbal rhetoric […] and partly through visual rhetoric.” In order to translate 
its rule-based system (its procedures) into a political context, Tax Invaders relies heavily 
on both graphical and textual symbols and takes advantage of the meanings represented 
by the original game Space Invaders. Thus, although the rules of the game (shooting down 
intruding enemies) might be understood as “symbolic structures of a higher order than 
natural language,” these rules – the procedure – of the game alone are not always sufficient 
to reframe the game. Tax Invaders exemplifies my argument for an inquiry of the way, in 
which procedural and sensual elements are combined in videogames.
27   Sharing a quite similar intuition to that of Bogost, Linda Hutcheon (2006, 31-32) mentions 
Richard Dawkin’s concept of “memes,” or “units of cultural transmission or units of 
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attempt to evaluate all texts as configurative systems built out of expressive units” 
(70). He argues for a broadly defined analytical approach to contemporary media 
products that views them as results of “unit operations,” meaning a “configurative 
system, an arrangement of discrete, interlocking units of expressive meaning” (ix). 
This approach derives its strength and flexibility from the postulated openness 
of the “unit,” which, according to Bogost, can be anything from a single physical 
element to a complex thought or structure consisting of multiple interconnected 
units (5). “Unit operations” point to a dynamic representation of units created 
by spontaneously deriving meaning from the interrelations of their discrete 
components (4, 8). As such, this model provides an adequate description of the 
combinatory character of computopic expression, and will serve as a guideline for 
the following analysis and its methods.28 
What are the boundaries of such expression with regards to Otherness? An 
initial observation is that despite its actionable character, computopic expression is 
not limited to the physical environment in the same sense as conventional games 
are, because it is not only fictional, but digital and virtual. In conventional games, 
the player is part of the physical spaces of the game. In videogames, he or she is 
physically positioned outside of these boundaries, connected to the computopic 
space only through remote control. Accordingly, player actions take place within 
one system to which Newton’s laws of force, impulse, and reaction apply (even if 
the objects force is applied to have a meaning different from the ordinary). In the 
case of videogames, the player environment and the computopic space are different 
material realities—they both physically exist but are not continuous. The player’s 
actions are translated and transposed to be meaningful within the differing physics 
and laws of the game world.29
imitation” as a potentially fruitful approach for adaptation studies in A Theory of Adaptation, 
but does not actively pursue this direction.
28   Beyond its compatibility with the multifarious character of videogame worlds and its 
representations, this definition further takes the character of software into account, stressing 
the similarities the unit shares with the encapsulated (discrete), polymorphic objects of 
object-oriented programming, thus potentially preparing the ground for a technologically 
oriented discussion that may be related back to the elements of the computopic, where it 
identifies objects through their representation.
29   The force applied to a key or button to generate input may be irrelevant to the electronic 
signals sent to the computer or the digitalized input that arrives in the game world, not 
due to friction, but due to the process of abstraction called “digitalization” itself. The 
mouse may serve as an even better example. Whereas the force applied to the mouse on 
the table seems to be reflected in the movement of the cursor on the screen or in the game 
world, the possibility of changing mouse sensitivity rather reveals it as a relation of scalable 
congruency. The same may be said for contemporary trends like Nintendo’s Wii or other 
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A similar arbitrariness characterizes the semantics of the computopic space. 
As mentioned above, computopic representation is not bound to the rules of 
representation we are used to, but rather to those indeterminate, flexible rules 
applied to fiction in literature or film. A representation might be deployed in order 
to make the object meaningful from our point of view, but it may also have no 
purpose or defy our expectations—doors that cannot be opened, cars that cannot 
be driven.30 With respect to its representation, the computopic space or its objects 
may appear contradictory from a perspective grounded in our everyday experience 
and, where they are directed towards goals, even contradict fictional coherence. 
Furthermore, both representational and object features may change over time, 
due to player actions, or depending on the player—weapon upgrades or player 
character appearance are but a few examples of this.31 
In sum, the computopic space is distanced from ‘empirical reality’ from 
the start in that it initially always appears as an Other space. Whereas utopian 
narratives require a distancing mechanism, like an imaginative journey through 
space or time, whereby the reader is prepared for the Otherness of what is to come 
(Wegner 2002, 17), the computopic reverses this process insofar as the Otherness 
of its objects and environments is dimmed down by the introduction of familiar 
signifiers, behaviours and rules, both based on our empirical reality and on other 
games and conventions. One of the most concrete expressions of this reversal is 
the strong tendency towards realism in the representation of the game world and 
the respective theoretical framings of videogames as simulations of our empirical 
reality. Such realism strengthens the status of a game as mass art in Carroll’s sense, 
increasing mass accessibility through commonplace references to the everyday. In 
turn, it serves to reduce, or, reverse Otherness.32 
games that scan body movement.
30   Juul (2005, 184) mentions the productive, satirical  potential of incongruities between rules 
and fiction, but does not expand on this issue.
31   A freely available multiplayer first-person shooter created by the U.S. military as a recruiting 
advertisement, America’s Army” shows that even the appearance of the same object in the 
same computopic world can differ between multiple users. Although the players are divided 
into two opposing teams, the respective adversaries are represented as “threat” to the 
American army to which all players belong. While fighting against each other, all players 
are U.S. soldiers, always fighting an external enemy (see Bogost 2007, 77-78).
32   I am not arguing that realism in games and their qualities as simulations cannot make 
a contribution to specific aims. Scholars like Fujimoto Tōru (2007) or Ian Bogost (2007) 
convincingly claim that “serious games” and “persuasive games” geared towards educating 
us about a specific subject, situation, or practice can contribute to our understanding 
of society, culture, and politics, and can convey complex messages in innovative ways. 
Examples like the games of La Molleindustria (2013) or newsgaming.com (2013) show the 
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In the context of this analysis, the focus lies on the concrete ways in which 
computopic expressivity can generate disruptive conflicts. In the broad sense in 
which Adorno understands this term as stimulating Phantasie, such conflicts 
might target any kind of cognition, including its emotional dimension. Grant 
Tavinor (2009, 131) argues that emotions are involved in videogames in many 
ways.33 Given my emphasis on action, this is particularly important, because “[n]ot 
only do the fictions of videogames arouse our emotions, but these emotions have 
an impact on what the player is and is not willing to do in a game world” (132). 
Tavinor claims that emotions work to “frame the world as represented, by making 
salient those parts that deserve our attention. Faced with a rich decision space in 
which we need to act, emotions not only focus our attention, but also help to bias 
the choice over options so that efficient decisions can be made” (144).
Tavinor observes that, “[t]he fictional status of videogames means that our 
emotional buttons can be pushed in absence of the consequences with which 
they are usually associated. Fictional worlds seem to allow us a greater access to 
some kinds of emotionally provocative situations, given that acting in a fictional 
world lacks the cost of acting in the real world” (146). Thus, emotional and moral 
elements deserve attention and may turn out to make relevant contributions to 
disruptive conflicts in a virtual environment in which theoretically, “anything 
goes.” What elements are actually disruptive in which constellation, is a question 
that the analysis will need to answer.
The detached, virtual character of games does not mean that anything is 
creative potential videogames have to this extent. Rather, my point is that the more a game 
is aimed towards simulating our empirical reality, the less likely it is to stimulate radical 
political imagination in the sense deployed in this thesis.
33   In his analysis of emotions in videogames, Tavinor (2009, 133-136) discusses the “paradox 
of fictional emotions,” i.e. the question “how something that is known to be fictional – and 
subsequently known to have no real existence – can be the cause or object of the strongly 
felt emotions evident in gaming.” Against existing views, he argues that this can neither be 
explained with the real effort of the player or the real existence of the games as obstacles, 
nor by referring to concepts like “mistaken beliefs” or “suspension of disbelief,” because 
“playing a fictive videogame involves an acknowledgement of the fictive status of the game, 
and so involves the special cognitive attitude characteristic of fictive practice as a whole. 
[…] Videogames involve us, guided by digital props, imagining or ‘make-believing’ that 
certain things are the case, and the perceptual properties of these props and our make-
beliefs about what is fictional are emotionally affecting. My emotions for the Little Sisters 
[an example of a non-player-character in the game Bioshock Tavinor refers to] are possible 
because what we imagine is often just as capable of causing emotions as what is believed.” 
In a later section, he adds that “[i]t is make-believe – both in partially causing our emotions 
and in conditioning our response to those emotions – that is crucial to explaining how we 
become emotionally immersed in the fictional worlds of videogames” (139-140).
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possible. It seems appropriate to point out some of the limitations of computopic 
expression. Videogames can target our sight, hearing and touch sense, they can 
convey complex narratives and rapid, emergent movement, and they afford player 
action and reaction. They can push our emotional buttons by presenting adorable 
or scary creatures, and more generally experiences ranging from boring, joyful and 
empowering to horrible and angst inducing. The intensity of shooter games and 
the adrenaline fast-paced action can induce are comparable to or maybe stronger 
than what any other medium can offer. 
Some theorists go as far as to argue that games can even convey the experience 
of extreme “real-life” situations. Bogost (2007, 126-129) makes an argument in this 
direction in his discussion the game 9-11 Survivor, in which the player is spawned 
in random locations in the burning World Trade Center towers in New York on 
the day of the horrible attacks of 2001 and has to escape—sometimes without any 
chance of succeeding. He claims that the game offers an “embodied experience of 
the procedural interactions between plane, building, and worker” and a “careful 
treatment of victim’s actual and potential experiences.” Here, Bogost certainly 
points to the very important fact that videogames can deploy the variability of their 
procedures in ways capable of generating intense experiences and make arguments 
through non-repetitive repetition. However, I am sceptical about the physical 
dimension of this potential. Despite involving button-mashing and player input, I 
believe that videogame experiences are still dominantly cognitive, and by no means 
comparable with the actual experience of life-threatening situations human beings 
experience, with all their immediacy and physicality. The significance of player 
action and the variability and potential for repetition in videogames can arguable 
offer distinct and possibly novel ways of conveying ideas and emotions. However, 
such limitations should be kept in mind during the exploration.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter established the theoretical framework for the following analysis. 
Claiming that alternatives to the current system require radical political imagina-
tion, I identified the disruptive conflict as its stimulus. Based on this, I argued that 
human play is always reified in rule structures and defined the ideational dimen-
sion of videogames that concerns this analysis as computopic space or the sum of 
all rules in the software. A closer examination of this space has pointed to several 
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characteristics, such as world contingency, partiality of representation, enactment 
by player and computer, its broad-ranged, combinatory expressivity and its princi-
ple physical and semantic flexibility and arbitrariness. 
These qualities render the computopic space an active, contingent, partly 
unimagined and necessarily Other space, which has a wide variety of potentials 
for disruptive conflicts, but remains limited in several directions. The consecutive 
analysis maps these potentials and limitations and aims to answer the question 
formulated in the first section, whether Otherness and genuine disruptive conflicts 
are possible—a potential of which I have argued that it needs to be examined with 
a healthy amount of scepticism. This demands an adequate methodology, which I 
develop in the next chapter.
3 Methodology and Methods
Neo: Is that... 
Cypher: The Matrix? Yeah. 
Neo: Do you always look at it encoded? 
Cypher: Well, you have to. The image translators work for the 
construct program, but there’s way too much information to decode 
the Matrix. You get used to it. I — I don’t even see the code. All I see is 
blonde, brunette, redhead...Hey, you want a drink? (The Matrix 1999, 
quoted from Wikiquote 2013)
In the first chapter, I have established the computopic space as a theoretical frame-
work and pointed to its distinct potentials for radical Otherness and productive 
conflicts. The following chapter discusses the methodological and methodical de-
mands this space puts on the concrete analysis of a given computopic universe. 
With their contingency, world plurality, active and partly unimagined character, 
computopic universes confront the ‘scholarly’ analysis with several difficulties. 
Due to its contingent existence between hardware, software, and partial represen-
tation, the computopic space lacks a well-defined object of study that can be lo-
cated and delimited. In addition, each universe potentially offers myriad worlds, 
some of which differ significantly. This might be problematic in a space in which I 
as a player-researcher have an immediate, materially generative influence on each 
world I experience: as a player, my choices in a game have a direct effect on where 
I go or can go, what parts of the universe I see and don’t see, explore or choose 
to ignore. The following chapter discusses these issues and offers theoretically in-
formed, practical solutions for the analysis of the computopic space. By way of 
doing so, it also takes a stance with respect to what I regard as a scholarly attitude, 
including the issue of presenting the results to an audience, you the reader.
3.1 Ethnography as Context
At the outset, the features of the computopic space and its demands on the analysis 
suggest a structural similarity with anthropology and ethnographic research. Eth-
nography is “an approach for studying everyday life as lived by groups of people” 
(Boellstorff et al. 2012, 1). Since the space I analyse is not populated by human be-
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ings, some of its central methodological and ethical concerns, such as the anonym-
ity of the subjects, as well as a large part of its methods geared towards collecting 
data from or of other living beings, do not apply here. However, in terms of flex-
ibility of the exploration, as well as the process from fieldwork to data interpreta-
tion, provides a blueprint for this project and can offer help with several important 
methodological problems. 
For some ethnographers, such borrowing may appear threatening. “With far more 
researchers adopting ethnographic methods than those who have been formally 
trained in those methods—in either its historic anthropological or sociological 
traditions—the irony is that its popularity threatened to undermine its validity and 
effectiveness” (Marcus 2012, xiii, see also Boellstorff et al. 2012, 3). Yet, while this 
statement refers to the danger of deploying the notion of ethnography as a “license 
to indulge speculation in a more authoritative guise” (Marcus 2012, xiv), I have no 
intention of claiming that my methodological or methodical considerations are 
adequate on the grounds that they draw on an established methodology—nor am 
I convinced of the effectiveness of such strategy; the usefulness of methodological 
claims and methodical decisions has to be proven in the analysis. Instead, I draw on 
these discussions because they frame research as a mode of discovery, which draws 
its questions from the fieldsite (Boellstorff et al. 2012, 32). Given the character of 
the computopic, this emphasis on explorative approximation is crucial as a guiding 
principle for my methodology.
3.2 Too many Worlds
In The Matrix, those who rebel against the computer system have learned how to 
read the real-time stream of code on the screen—they imagine what an algorithm 
would look like in the 3D virtual environment of the Matrix. In lack of such faculty, 
I have to find other ways of accessing the computopic universe. Whereas a large 
part of literary and media studies deals with contained objects or texts, the number 
of worlds and representations a computopic universe hosts is neither known, nor 
consistent over different titles. It is also not fixed, since the computopic worlds en-
countered at play are not entirely determined by the designer. A major aim for the 
methodology is thus to find an approach adequate to dealing with the ontological 
vagueness of the computopic space and its contingency, and to derive respective 
methods from this approach.
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This section develops such methodological approach and suggests concrete 
methods for exploring a computopic universe. To begin with, I believe that the 
character of the computopic space requires an engagement guided by principles 
similar to those listed by Hine (2000, 63-65) for Virtual Ethnography, which she 
regards as an “adaptive ethnography which sets out to suit itself to the conditions 
in which it finds itself.” She demands that such ethnography has to be mobile, 
with its object shaped in terms of flow and connectivity rather than location and 
boundary as organizing principle. Boundaries are not assumed but explored in the 
process, the idea of a complete ethnography of a given object has to be abandoned, 
each decision means to reformulate the object itself. Virtual ethnography is 
necessarily partial and “[p]ractically, it is limited by the embodied ethnographer’s 
constraints in time, space and ingenuity” (64). At the same time, “[t]he shaping of 
the ethnographic object as it is made possible by the available technologies is the 
ethnography. This is ethnography in, of and through the virtual” (65).
These demands on virtual ethnography are helpful guidelines for the engagement 
with the computopic space, because they stress the openness and flexibility of the 
inquiry, its explorative and intervening character, as well as its partial, technology-
based access and its practical constraints. With regards to the first shared feature 
of contingency and indefiniteness of the object, we find a radical specification of 
the respective methodological openness and flexibility in the writings of Jacques 
Derrida. In “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” 
Derrida (1992) discusses the problem of defining a field without knowing its 
content, deploying the concept of play to this end. He distinguishes two kinds of 
structure, namely the centred structure based on “sure play,” and the non-centred 
structure and its “play without security.” In his analysis, “[t]he concept of centered 
structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play 
constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and reassuring certitude, 
which itself is beyond the reach of play. And on the basis of this certitude anxiety 
can be mastered” (1117). Such “sure play […] is limited to the substitution of given 
and existing, present, pieces” and “seeks to decipher […] a truth or an origin which 
escapes play” (1125). In contrast, non-centred play “plays without security” and “is 
no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and 
humanism, the name man being the name of that being who […] has dreamed of 
full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play” (1125).34
34   The similarity Derrida’s approach shares with Gadamer’s understanding of non-human 
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This theoretical dichotomy is a useful framework for thinking about the problem 
of openness and flexibility of the analysis. Similar to the concept of utopia (see 
Wegner in chapter 2, p. 20), the computopic space occupies a middle ground 
between two extremes. Finite and limited by its software, it is nonetheless plural 
and open-ended in its instances. On the one hand, this means that abandoning 
the search for origin or inclusive comprehension and thus bearing anxiety is 
a necessary condition of access. However, its structure is nonetheless limited, 
rigorously defined and reflected in each instance.
A similar structural tension in works of music is one of the main concerns in 
the philosophy of music, which may provide some helpful suggestions for the 
approach. In his discussion of the ontology of a work of music, Stephen Davies 
(2003, 58) states that “[t]he composer [in my case the designer; mer] provides the 
event specification from which the work takes its identity, but it is the performer 
[respectively the player-researcher and the computer; mer] who executes this 
specification and thereby generates tokens of the work.” Analysing this difference 
between the work and its performance, he concludes that 
ontologically speaking, it is the nature of the work that determines these 
properties of its instances by virtue of which they are its instances. The 
epistemic process goes in reverse, however. We come to know the work 
through its performances. We abstract the work from its instances, 
stripping away from its performances those of their properties that are 
artistically irrelevant, and then stripping away those artistically relevant 
properties that are properties of the performance but not properties of 
the work, thereby exposing the work and its properties. (68) 
A work in the case of the computopic space is the computopic universe, 
meaning the sum of all worlds a software program facilitates. As such, it is only 
open to access by the computer. However, as a player-researcher, I can influence the 
play as to-and-fro movement (see chapter 2, p. 17) supports Derrida’s (1992, 1117) own 
remark that “one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure.” Yet, rather than 
criticizing Derrida’s concept of play as a modern idealization, as Sutton-Smith (1997, 148) 
does, I propose to take it as a radical intellectual challenge or desire to conceive of a no-
place or utopia—a space which cannot be grasped spatially. Even play does not entirely 
serve its purpose here. As Sutton-Smith rightly claims, defying conventional expectations 
merely means to play by some other rules, and a player can only be playful in the first 
place, if he is “in a known, rule-bound play context” (150). However, I believe that the idea 
of pure, insecure play can still inform the research process and shape my attitude to the 
computopic universes I visit, emphasizing the value of intense exploration and its infinite 
nature at the same time.
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performance directly and am, at the same time, its audience. This double character 
of the player-researcher provides me with the possibility of actively exploring and 
generating multiple worlds, as opposed to an audience which can only rely on an 
external performer’s choices. In turn, playing is also a part of the experience and as 
such, in a sense, of computopic expressivity. This suggests that playing is both the 
most effective method of exploration and the one most adequate for accessing the 
breadth of expressive elements and potentials of a computopic universe, including 
the dynamics of action, tension and involvement. 
Against the background of Davies’ understanding of the epistemic process, a 
first demand on the analysis of a computopic universe is that it has to be based on 
an exploration of multiple worlds, which are then extrapolated and abstracted 
from. In order to map the computopic universe, I have to develop what Davies 
(2003, 214-215) calls “an awareness of the overall pattern of […] events. It is the 
recognition of repetition, similarity, instability, emphatic closure, and so on (but 
not necessarily of the technical devices by which such results are achieved), and 
more generally of patterns that emerge from successions of such events, that 
amounts to the recognition of musical form.” Whereas ethnographic research 
focuses on participation and observation, this suggests a more active mapping. 35 
Maintaining openness in the analysis, I propose to adapt Derrida’s notion of play 
without security not only on a methodological level, where it informs an open 
and explorative approach, but also on the methodical level. Here, the exploration 
of the computopic has to be a playfully invading one rather than participatory-
observing, not only playing the game multiple times, but also playing with its 
rules in search of its structures and boundaries. 
The proposal to accept the anxiety of pure play in the analytic exploration 
remains an important guiding principle, placing the responsibility for any 
decisions with regards to direction and quantity of the data collection in my own 
hands. In emphasizing my own play, I highlight the fact that my experiences 
of a computopic universe are different from other player’s experiences due to 
my interest in videogames as political spaces. In the sense that I am interested 
in disruptive conflicts as a potential rather than a widely shared experience, the 
approach adapts Carroll’s (1998, 271) view, who argues that identifying a specific 
35   This is not to say that ethnographers ignore their influence on the field. In fact, the role of 
the researcher has been subjected to long and ongoing discussions, to which I come back in 
the next section.
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structure or element in a work “is a matter of textual analysis, albeit against the 
cultural and biological background in which the text is produced. It is not a matter 
of sociological polling.” 
However, to the extent to which the computopic space is non-textual and 
materially contingent, this approach remains very limited. More than the warnings 
of ethnographers that qualitative and subjective approach should not be mistaken 
for an invitation to dilution of the empirical data or ungrounded speculation 
(Marcus 2012, xiii-xiv), this contingency is an issue due to the time constraints this 
project is under. Many of the computopic universes analysed below offer several 
dozen to several hundred hours of distinct experience. In addition, the emphasis 
on the subjective quality of the engagement not only marks playing as a preferred 
method of engagement, it also gives reason to believe that other players may access 
different worlds and have different experiences. As a practical counter-measure, 
both exploration and primary data are expanded on and enhanced by additional 
materials on the games, such as handbooks, walkthroughs, etc., and narratives of 
other players. Methodologically, this does not solve the problem of partiality, but it 
does allow for a triangulation36 of the data, thus offering a stronger empirical basis 
for my analysis, while maintaining the primary status of my own exploration.
3.3 Subjectivity and Experience
So far, I have identified explorative play as the main method of data collection, 
backed and enhanced by secondary sources about the respective computopic uni-
verse. This approach puts a strong emphasis on the role of the player-researcher. 
My actions within a computopic universe change the analytic process not only be-
36   In the context of qualitative social studies, triangulation refers to the use of multiple 
methods, perspectives, or types of data in the research process. This approach is expected 
to provide a better understanding of complex phenomena and subjects (see Rothbauer 
2008). Summarizing the existing literature, Uwe Flick (2007, 519-520) refers to four types 
of triangulation: “data-triangulation”, “researcher-triangulation”, “theoretical triangulation” 
and “methodical triangulation. He argues that triangulation is not so much an aiding tool to 
strengthen validity claims (although originally designed as such), but rather an alternative to 
“validation strategies,” capable of elevating breadth, depth, and consistency of a methodical 
approach. For example, an empirical study of the significance of music in the everyday 
of teenagers, in which the interviews with the respective age group are complemented 
with a study of recent trends in popular music, allows the interviewers to ask more precise 
questions based on his or her first-hand knowledge, to understand the answers given better, 
and to respond to the answers given more adequately, thus potentially offering a deeper 
insight. Likewise, my exploration of the computopic space and its interpretation benefitted 
from the knowledge of the games and other players’ perspectives and observations.
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cause my experience of these actions is part of the data, but also because my input 
influences the material worlds I can visit and explore—and the disruptive conflicts 
I am confronted with. In turn, my actions are influenced and informed by my ex-
periences, intentions, emotions, and my skills as a player-researcher.37
Here, my methodology faces a potential criticism often voiced against 
ethnography and auto-ethnography, which emphasizes researcher subjectivity 
in all “fieldwork.” Boellstorff et al. (2012, 41) defy the criticism of subjectivity in 
ethnographic research, arguing that “[s]ubjectivity is an inescapable condition of 
science; no pure realm of objectivity exists in which interests, biases, predilections, 
concerns, attitudes, dispositions, conceits, judgments, axioms, and presuppositions 
of investigators are absent and without impact. We always begin from somewhere.” 
On the contrary, they claim that subjectivity is vital to ethnographic rigor, because 
it not only makes a position for the interpretation of data possible, but also provides 
a basis for intersubjective understanding of the outcomes and interpretations of an 
analysis (41-42). Against attempts to reduce ethnography to “personal experience,” 
they hold that even in auto-ethnography, where the ethnographer’s action is part 
or the central element of the collected data, such experience is always accompanied 
37   A potentially interesting but equally intricate thinker in this respect is Henri Bergson 
([English 1912, French 1896] 2004), who examined the relation between our actions and 
the image we perceive of the material world in Matter and Memory. Writing at the turn of 
the 19th century, Bergson was not accustomed to videogames. His biological terminology 
and many of the scientific findings his arguments are based on seem far outdated. However, 
I believe that his emphasis on action and his interest in the process of determining our 
course of action could provide an interesting perspective for the study of videogames in 
general and the computopic contingency in particular. For Bergson matter is “the aggregate 
of images, and perception of matter these same images referred to the eventual action of one 
particular image, my body” (8). Thus, perception is a kind of filtering process by means of 
which we arrive at a number of possible actions that can be carried out on the material 
world by “centres of real action, represented by living matter” (21). His emphasis on the 
enhancing effect the development of the nervous system has on our action possibilities 
both in terms of options and with regards to their ‘reach’ (21) seems surprisingly compatible 
with my intuition about the effect repeated ‘experience’ has in the computopic space, 
more distant areas of which become gradually available to the more experienced player. 
Bergson suggests that the growing richness of this perception symbolizes a “wider range of 
indetermination left to the choice of the living being in its conduct with regards to things” 
(21). This results in a functional filtering of action possibilities, which is, apart from bodily 
abilities and intentions, strongly influenced by memory (or experience), which amplifies 
the perception and make its speedy functioning possible, while at the same time a source of 
all kinds of illusions (24-35). I doubt that Bergson’s analysis of our neurological processes 
is correct in its details, but his interest in contingency, action and intuition suggests that 
he might provide an interesting model for conceiving the computopic space, although this 
discussion has to be left for later inquiries. Already, Bergson has an direct and indirect 
influence on game studies where it draws on his or Gilles Deleuze’s Bergson-inspired work 
in discussions of action and memory (see for examples Mukherjee 2011, 2008).
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by analytic expertise (43-44).
While it would be too ambitious to reflect on and discuss these issues within 
such demanding and broad frameworks like phenomenology or empiricism, it 
nevertheless seems helpful to examine this relation between experience and analysis 
in more detail. For Jackson (1989, 2), lived experience is itself a critical attitude 
or method, because “[i]t remains skeptical of all efforts to reduce the diversity of 
experience to timeless categories and determinate theorems, to force life to be at 
the disposal of ideas.” However, this framing does not deny conclusiveness and 
closure its place: “Lived experience accommodates our shifting sense of ourselves 
as subjects and as objects, as acting upon and being acted upon by the world, of 
living with and without certainty, of belonging and being estranged, yet resists 
arresting any one of these modes of experience in order to make it foundational to a 
theory of knowledge” (2). Based on this conceptualization, Jackson introduces his 
version of “radical empiricism”, which methodically 
includes the experience of the observer and defines the experimental 
field as one of interactions and intersubjectivity. Accordingly, we make 
ourselves experimental subjects and treat our experiences as primary 
data. […] As of our comparative method, it becomes less a matter of 
finding “objective” similarities and differences between other cultures 
than of exploring similarities and differences between our own 
experience and the experience of others. (4)
In addition to my general insistence on the status of the computopic as a space 
of experience in its own right, Jackson’s discussion provides a strong argument 
for treating my experience of this space as primary data and basis for my analysis. 
As the cited discussion of ethnographic methodology shows, this should not be 
taken for a claim about the randomness of the collected data, but rather as strong 
responsibility for approaching this data analytically. Here, the emphasis on the 
disruptive conflicts emerging from the Otherness of the computopic space and 
its expressive elements serve as analytic framework. As these conflicts have to be 
found actively, a similar demand for methodological rigor needs to be applied to 
the exploration itself, which has to balance its intentional, “scientifically interested” 
invasion of the computopic universe with the frivolously playful mode of gaming 
as entertainment, which is itself part of the expressivity of the medium. Due to the 
absence of any guidance in this respect, the success of this balancing or oscillating 
between different modes of engagement can only be measured by its results. Jackson 
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urges us to acknowledge the limitations of all individual experience, calling for 
comparison with others as a way of strengthening findings and arguments. Here, 
my attempts at triangulation can only provide a surrogate. Ultimately, the analysis 
marks a first step, hoping to invite active interrogations by other researchers and 
gamers.
3.4 Data Collection and Interpretation
Based on these methodological considerations, it seems possible to outline the 
concrete analytic process from data collection to interpretation and the methods 
applied in each step. With regards to data collection, I have identified repeated 
playfully-invading explorations of the computopic as central element. As is the 
case in participatory observation of virtual environments (see Boellstorff et al. 
2012, 69), access to the computopic can be very time intensive and demanding in 
terms of player skills. Insofar as computopic worlds only exist if they are enacted, 
this means that the skills of player-researcher determine the range of worlds and 
places he or she can access. Since these worlds exist only temporary during game-
play—although a specific place or situation may be revisited via save-files—they 
are transient spaces.
With regards to the first issue of skills, I would describe myself as an average 
videogame player. My skills have certainly increased over the course of this project, 
but in several cases, repeated attempts at a stage or situation were necessary to 
proceed in difficult games. However, where the lack of skills and the time consuming 
practice of repeated attempts threatened a fruitful and sufficient exploration of a 
computopic universe, I have resorted to walkthroughs and hints in order to gain 
more insights. As mentioned above, such walkthroughs themselves, among other 
secondary sources, have proven to be helpful additional materials for the analysis. 
In terms of the second problem of the transient, temporary nature of computopic 
worlds, participatory observation usually relies on fieldnotes, which are used as 
primary data. Boellstorff et al. (2012, 82) urge their reader to be rigorous in their 
documentation: “If we fail to write it down, it might as well not have happened!” 
While this may certainly be true for social situations in which retrospective notes 
are the only option, videogames and digital media in general are compatible with 
data recording of various kinds. In this project, I counter the transient nature of the 
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computopic by recording my gameplay via a video capturing device.38 This allows 
for later comparison between different worlds, as well as playback of particularly 
interesting moments and sequences.
Yet, such recordings do not capture experience of the player, with its 
spontaneous, emotional, and physical quality. In order to secure a channel for 
additional comments on the experience and tentative thoughts and impressions of 
the games that does not interfere with the flow of playing—as pausing to take notes 
would—I used a headset connected to the audio out of the game screen39 and the 
microphone plug of a voice-recorder. I have sketched the setup in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Technical setup for game exploration.
This setup facilitates clear in-game sound, without causing significant 
interference with my own audio-comments. Whereas using the audio-comment 
function that comes with the capturing device merges both audio streams, the 
38   Specifically, I used the Elgato game capture HD, which is compatible with the PS2 and the 
PS3, and offers several options for recording quality. This is necessary, because I focus 
on console games rather than computer games, which could be captured with respective 
software.
39   The Asus VE 247 is one of the few full-HD monitors featuring both an HDMI-in and an 
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advantage of the separate audio recording is the guaranteed clarity of both feeds, as 
well as the relatively small size of these comments, which allows for separate review. 
One of the disadvantages is, however, that synchronizing requires conscious effort 
and that multiplicity of devices introduces another potential source of corruption 
and technical problems.40 
Following the initial data collection, I transcribed the audio comments on 
important sequences and worlds, and juxtaposed them with the video footage 
where necessary.41 This resulted in what Pavel (1986, 50) would call “books” about 
fictional worlds. Separating the states of affairs in a world from the statements 
describing these states of affairs, Pavel draws attention to the relation between 
both and to the limitations of representing fictional worlds, at the same time 
raising the question how these worlds are or can be represented to us, and which 
of their aspects might be difficult or impossible to describe. While keeping these 
limited capacities of video sequences and transcripts to convey the experience of 
videogame action in mind, I believe that these methods of documenting proved 
to be adequate means for making both the visited worlds and my individual and 
subjective experience of the respective computopic universes accessible to the 
analysis in a more permanent, textual form. 
During the course of playing, analysing, and writing, I supplemented my own 
“books” with others, most notably secondary sources such as official and fan-
based walkthroughs, online accounts of the games and game worlds in question, 
discussions in magazines, and on developer websites. These additions provide a 
stronger basis for my arguments, expand them or offer insights into and guides 
towards worlds or places I have not visited myself (yet). However, they are not 
aimed at covering the wide range of worlds and information about these worlds 
available on- and offline. While helpful as additions, these secondary sources are 
far from systematically collected data. Whether a more systematic approach leads 
to different results is a question for critical review and future studies.42 I have tried 
40   In particular, the capture device was subject to some fluctuation and instability in the early 
stages of the project. Furthermore, empty batteries in the voice recorder interrupted the 
audio-recordings a few times.
41   Initially, I expected one of the benefits of this method to be the possibility to merge the 
video/audio feed with the audio comments into a multi-layered video-document that could 
be analyzed in detail. Due to the length of the explorations and the amount of data they 
generated, this idea quickly proved impracticable for all examples.
42   Insisting on the necessary partiality of any account of the fictional, Pavel (1986, 53) himself 
gives reason to remain sceptical about the possibility of a full account of a computopic 
universe or even one of its worlds. On the contrary, he argues that in some cases, language 
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to schematize the analytic process in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Analysing computopic universes.
The search for disruptive conflicts was based on the theoretical framework 
developed above. As the figure indicates, the abstract expressive potentials of the 
computopic space were examined in concrete computopic universes and worlds. 
A flexible and emergent process of “finding, creating, and bringing thoughtful, 
provocative, productive ideas to acts of writing” (Boellstorff et al. 2012, 159), 
the analysis was conducted in consultation of various existing findings about 
the respective works, about games in general, and, most importantly, against the 
background of a wide range of works from the field of political philosophy. 
can be too limited to describe a world or universe. “An idiom containing a finite number 
of constants and no variables cannot describe a universe displaying an infinite number of 
beings; a language lacking quality predicates will prove inadequate for a universe containing 
colors.”
books about a computopic universe
empirical reality, political theory 
and political philosophy as context 
and reference for all processes
radical potentials
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3.5 Intersubjectivity
I have mentioned intersubjectivity as an important principle in ethnography and 
qualitative research in an earlier section. As such, intersubjectivity does not only 
require a structured, analytic approach to the field and the interpretation of data, 
it also requires transparency. Given the strong factor of subjective interpretations 
and the lack of rigidity in the process of qualitative media research, this is a com-
mon goal with qualitative projects. For example, Bernd Schorb and Helga Theunert 
(2000, 40) emphasize the importance of strict and transparent rules in qualitative 
media research, and of the effort to make the research process visible (accessible) 
to external scrutiny. This project does not satisfy the strict demands these authors 
make, in particular because it does not meet their requirement that interpreta-
tions have to be negotiated between multiple researchers in the analysis. However, 
this should not suggest that their demands, or, more generally, the methodological 
principles of qualitative research, do not have to be taken seriously in a project that 
employs a similar explorative and interpretive approach.
Ensuring transparency does not mean to confront the reader with the collected 
data and the field notes I have made during the exploration. Boellstorff et al. 
(2012, 82) give a good reason against such practice, claiming that “it is the job of 
researchers during analysis and writing to select and contextualize data that will 
support their arguments, so that readers are not overwhelmed by a flood of detail.” 
This would certainly be the case here, as my primary data consists of approximately 
350 gigabyte of raw video footage and 2 gigabyte of audio data, with a recorded play 
time of more than 150 hours.43
However, this does not imply that there is no meaning in providing insight into 
the analytic process beyond the textual narrative of the results. Several reasons 
suggest the opposite. First, the already mentioned openness of the computopic 
means that, theoretically, even players familiar with the games I discuss may 
not have encountered the situations I based the analysis on—or may be able to 
relativize or refute my generalizing claims based on their alternative experiences. 
Secondly, I refer to a number of games, which are not available outside of Japan. 
Thirdly, I am committed to communicating the results of this thesis not only to 
videogame experts, but also to an audience not familiar with games. Aiming to 
increase transparency, intersubjective understanding and openness in all these 
43   The initial exploration of a wide range of games, including some of the examples, is not 
included in this number, because I did not record this stage.
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dimensions, this project commits to exploring non-textual ways of presentation in 
the shape of a video documentary of crucial aspects in each computopic universe 
along with the written interpretation. Figure 4 shows the division of the screen and 
the function of its parts.
Figure 4. Screen division and elements of the video examples.
Each example includes the chapter title, a number with which it is referred to in the 
text, and a title. The left column contains an overview of the content of the exam-
ple, as well as additional information about the respective content where helpful. 
Most of the right column is filled with the video feed. On top, I have included short 
explanatory comments on the scenes. Below the video feed, subtitles are given 
where the content is Japanese only. These subtitles are white, if they are taken from 
English game versions or respective dialogue scripts, and orange, where they are 
my own translation. Subtitle sources are given in a footnote with the first example 
that includes the respective game.
Some of the sequences are taken from the original data collection process, while 
others have been recorded deliberately for the purpose of showing aspects of a 
game. Although this account is selective and sometimes involves a considerable 
amount of manipulation and intentional performance, I nevertheless tried to 
subscribe to the principles that guide documentary film, such as authenticity 
and truthfulness. In this, I follow Louise Spence and Vinicius Navarro’s (2011, 2) 
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is actuality treated in order to sanction the documentary’s claims to be telling the 
truth?’ And ‘How does the need to tell an effective story or make an argument 
encourage one kind of treatment over another?’” They conclude that there is no 
intrinsic conflict between aesthetics and nonfictional representation (3). 
I would like to add Carroll’s (1996a, 284-285) claim that selectivity is compatible 
with objectivity, if the relevant standards are maintained. Against the current of 
poststructuralist attempts to deconstruct the difference between fiction and non-
fiction film, he argues that this distinction has to be maintained as a distinction 
between “the commitments of the texts, not between the surface structures of the 
texts” (287). In particular, Carroll rejects the sceptics’ critique that “the nonfiction 
film does not represent the world objectively, but proffers a surrogate superaddition 
in place of something called ‘lived experience’” (289). Convincingly arguing that 
it makes no sense to assume that a film can stand in for any lived experience in 
the first place, he proposes instead to emphasize the constructive act of selecting, 
which creates new meaning and knowledge, including the discovery of novel causal 
relationships which cannot be reduced to a narrative distortion of reality, because 
they are often grounded in the empirical (290-291).
With these arguments in mind, the attempt to include and experiment with 
alternative modes of presentation and respective media in this thesis is not only 
geared towards transparency and easier access to broader audiences. It also 
experiments with new ways of constructing meaning, taking videogames and the 
claims I have made about their non-textual quality seriously. As Jackson (1989, 
186) remarks in a different context, “[r]ather than pretend there is no difference 
between science and art or argue that one can be epistemologically privileged over 
the other, we have to learn to play them both off against the other.” I believe this 
can be said about videogames as well. Rather than pretending that the experience 
of playing games can be described sufficiently or exhaustingly in academic prose, 
we should aim to find ways in which analytic accounts can be complemented 
and played off against other modes and channels of expression. In this project, 
the visual and sonic expressivity of the documentary videos creates a distinct 
alternative perspective on the issues at hand, thus complementing and adding to 
the interpretation and discussion significantly.
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3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have discussed the methodological difficulties the computopic 
space confronts us with and have offered a set of methods based on this discus-
sion. Drawing on ethnography and qualitative research, I have argued for an active, 
playfully-invading approach to computopic universes that turns my experience 
into a central element of data collection. Acknowledging my subjective, physical 
and temporal limitations as a player-researcher, I have proposed to confront them 
as truthfully and faithfully as possible, both by enhancing my play with external 
sources, and by reflecting on the influences my own actions and subjective ex-
periences have on the data collection and the analysis. Based on this, I have out-
lined the technical setup for the data collection and described the analytic process. 
Lastly, I have argued for an exploration of non-textual modes of presentation and 
explained my use of video examples throughout the thesis.
This approach does not solve the problems of the computopic contingency, nor 
can it fully account for the experiential dimension of gaming. However, it aims to 
engage with the subject of this thesis as truthfully as my own limitations and those 
of this project allow. By way of a brief reflection on the overall process, I would 
like to point out that initial observations made during the data collection process 
were of high value for the interpretative process, which underlines the importance 
of the voice recorder. The fact that the pool of data involved not only extensive 
visits to a singular computopic world, but also several different instances of a 
universe—sometimes multiplied by secondary sources—granted access not only 
to momentary computopic conflicts within an individual world, but also to such 
conflicts that develop across multiple worlds or over longer periods of time—in fact 
sometimes across multiple titles. This shows the profound expressive potentials of 
the computopic and supports the initial theoretical framing with its insistence on 
universal contingency.
 
Part II  Field
4 SF as Starting Point
[T]he science fiction narrative […] demonstrates the incompatibilities 
existing between our presence in the world and the various levels of a 
certain anesthesia in our consciousness that, at every moment, inclines 
us to see-saw into more or less extensive absences, more or less serious, 
even to provoke by various means instantaneous immersions in other 
worlds, parallel worlds, interstitial, bifurcating, right up to that black 
hole, which would be only an excess of speed in these kinds of crossings, 
a pure phenomenon of speed, abrogating the initial separation between 
day and night. (Virilio 2009, 85)
In part I, I established the theoretical framework around the notion of the com-
putopic and presented a methodological approach to deal with the various chal-
lenges this framework presents. What is missing from these elaborations is a sense 
for the material basis for this project. This is the task set for part II. As a first step, 
the following chapter aims to define the scope of titles for the analysis, discussing 
and applying various selection criteria to the market of Japanese videogames. Giv-
en the explorative character of this study, I argue that the genre of sf, which makes 
novelty its central aim without losing touch with our empirical reality, can be a 
helpful guide in the initial search for stimulating examples. As mentioned, this 
project is based on two presuppositions. Firstly, I focus on Japan as a particular-
ly dense, vivid, and globally successful market and geographical field for videog-
ame development and consumption. Secondly, I limit the analysis to single-player 
games and modes, in order to reduce complexity in an already complex field. Other 
restrictions and limitations will be referred to where adequate.
4.1 Science Fiction as a Field
In the first chapter, I have developed a perspective on videogames as a space of 
Otherness termed the computopic. For inspiration, I drew on literary theory and 
the study of science fiction and utopia, because these genres share the enclavic 
character of play and games. However, if, as I have claimed, the computopic is 
always already a space of Otherness, the question is whether the content of a com-
putopic universe has an influence on its potential to host disruptive conflicts. 
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Adorno’s emphasis on Phantasie suggests that any cultural product or work of 
art can potentially stimulate our autonomous thought. However, to follow this 
suggestion would go far beyond the boundaries of this project. Jameson’s analysis 
provides a narrower perspective, because he links disruption to the content of 
science fiction and utopia as much as to its form. The underlying assumption 
shared by many science fiction authors is that sf derives its critical momentum 
from its status as scientific fiction and the link this status creates to the empirical 
reality of its readers. I adopt this assumption in my analysis for two reasons: Firstly, 
it provides a way of limiting the initial exploration to a more or less consistent, 
contained field. Secondly, while not granting sf any exclusive rights on disruption, 
I do believe that this genre, in the way in which I define it, offers the most readily 
available and immediately relevant conflicts.
Tracing this critical immediacy to its sources, the following sections offer a 
stronger basis for the preference on science fiction and at the same time qualify the 
sense in which I deploy sf in the selection of examples. While drawing on various 
attempts to define the genre, I do not intend to add another definition. Rather, the 
following discussion of some major characteristics of sf serves as a rough, flexible 
guideline for the consecutive approximation to the field of Japanese videogames.
4.2 Plausibility
Comparing SF to critical theory, Carl Freedman (1987, 188) argues that both de-
ploy critique “in order to clear space upon which positive alternatives to the exis-
tent can be constructed.” The question, why this tendency is particularly strong in 
science fictional literature, is not easy to answer, because theorists characterize sf 
variously. As Chris Goto-Jones (2010, 22) observes, “SF is […] a difficult terrain, 
and its dimensions are continuously contested. It exists in a condition of peril with-
in broader realms of literature.” I have already mentioned Suvin’s influential defini-
tion of sf as the genre of cognitive estrangement based on the novum (see chapter 
2, p. 10) In contrast, recent definitions of the genre appear rather vague. Adam 
Roberts (2006, 148), for example, concludes his analysis as follows:
Here is exactly where we find science fiction, at the point a stick turns 
into a horse. It might be said that all literature, or all art, does this; but I 
think that SF is much more playful (in this profound sense) than other 
literature. It is predicated upon a fundamental hospitality to otherness, 
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to the alien, where other aspects of culture compromise. SF is a 
metaphorical discourse in a particular sense, the cognitive, imaginative, 
affective, creative sense that Ricoeur opens up. Its metaphor is aesthetic, 
which is to say poetic and speculative.
Against Suvin’s emphasis on cognitive estrangement, Gregory Renault (1980, 116) 
points out that all fiction has estranging capacities. Thomas Pavel (1986, 62) gives 
reason for a similar objection when he states that, in general, “[w]orks of fiction 
more or less dramatically combine incompatible world-structures, play with the 
impossible, and incessantly speak about the unspeakable.” Yet, there seems to be 
a difference in the source and quality of the estrangement between sf and other 
genres. According to Suvin (1979, 7), “SF is as fully opposed to supernatural or 
metaphysical estrangement as it is to naturalism or empiricism.” 
It might be helpful to examine this position between the supernatural and the 
natural in more detail. Renault (1980, 130) argues that Suvin’s attempt to isolate SF 
from the latter is flawed because it is based on a simplification: 
Most significant in Suvin’s discussion of fantasy and SF is his implied 
distinction between empirically possible and impossible Others, ideal 
possibility versus ideal impossibility, a distinction corresponding to 
that between scientific and utopian socialism in the Marxist tradition. 
Unfortunately, Suvin’s use of this important distinction suffers from a 
confusion regarding elements of figural and literal discourse. Because 
they are non-empirical, imaginative constructs, all literary devices, as 
figural signifiers, have the same ontological status as lies. By attempting 
to base the “cognitive” validity of SF and fantasy upon the possibility/
impossibility of the devices or elements utilized in a particular literary 
strategy, Suvin confuses the function of the referent in literal experience 
with that of the literary element in fictive signification. As many critics 
point out, SF’s fidelity to science consists of merely “maintaining the 
illusion of plausibility,” a function of the larger task of literary realism.
Interestingly, Suvin himself is rather vague about the status of possibility, suggest-
ing that the quality of sf does not necessarily depend on its scientific rigor. This has 
to do with the position of the science fictional novum, or, “the point at which the 
SF text distils the difference between its imagined world and the world which we 
all inhabit” (Roberts 2006, 17). For Suvin (1979, 64-65), “[t]he novum is postulated 
on and validated by the post-Cartesian and post-Baconian scientific method. This 
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does not mean that the novelty is primarily a matter of scientific facts or even hy-
potheses.” Here, Suvin puts the emphasis on the scientific scrutiny of author and 
reader, whereas the novum itself may originate in non-scientific imagination. 
More explicitly, Japanese writer Abe Kōbō (2002, 343-344) argues that SF is 
grounded in a “Vitality of Pseudo-Science,” and that “it is a separation from science 
that can open new vistas and new possibilities for science fiction.” Like Suvin, Abe 
suggests that the estrangement in literature is not so much based on scientific 
fictions, but rather on the scientific method of sketching out the consequences of 
a postulated hypothesis (or novum). “In literature, proximity to discovered facts is 
far less important than adherence to the internal laws of discovery itself. In other 
words, it’s a question of forming a hypothesis and then seeing to what extent you 
can erect a new system of rules, utterly different from the existing rules of our 
everyday lives” (346).
This brief discussion suggests that the ‘possibility’ and validity of sf, as opposed to 
the ‘impossibility’ of fantasy, does not hinge on a strict sense of science. Discussing 
the problem of possibility in Fictional Worlds, Pavel (1986, 46-47) argues that a 
narrow understanding of possible fictional worlds as only those worlds which 
share all members with the real world is impractical. In most cases, the relation 
between a fictional world and an underlying world A, for example the empirical 
world, cannot be verified, because most fictional worlds are abstractions and as 
such do not represent all their members or laws. To circumvent this problem, 
he suggests that one regards the vague relation of possibility as a function of the 
reader’s “aesthetic intuition.” Granting the “really real world” ontological priority 
over fictional worlds, Pavel proposes to understand fictional worlds as secondary 
universes in relation to our empirical reality as the primary universe (57). This dual 
structure, he argues, can further be categorized into isomorphic or “existentially 
conservative” and non-isomorphic or “existentially creative” relations. The latter 
contain elements that lack a correspondent in the primary universe and are 
therefore referred to as “salient structures.”
This model entails a more nuanced understanding of the ontology of possible 
fiction than both Suvin and Renault apply, and reveals the inherent contradiction 
of the genre of sf, which might be said to be the source of its vitality: if the well-
accepted concept of the novum dominates a fictional world, a given sf world can 
only be a secondary universe in a salient structure. At the same time, sf maintains 
a link of possibility—cognitive validation (Suvin) or aesthetic intuition (Pavel)—
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to our empirical reality. Freedman (1987, 186-187) elaborates this notion of 
possibility in his analysis of the similarity between sf and critical theory, arguing 
that this similarity is a matter of
shared perspectives […], of the dialectic standpoint of the SF tendency, 
with its insistence upon historical mutability, material reducibility, and, 
at least implicitly, Utopian possibility. In a sense, SF is of all genres the 
one most devoted to historical specificity: for the SF world is not only one 
different in time or place from our own, but one whose chief interest is 
precisely the difference that such difference makes, and, in addition, one 
whose difference is nonetheless contained within a cognitive continuum 
with the actual (thus sharply distinguishing SF from the irrationalist 
estrangements of fantasy or Gothic literature, which secretly work to 
ratify the mundane status quo by presenting no alternative to the latter 
other than inexplicable discontinuities).
Whether we want to embrace Freedman’s terms or not, his characterization of sf 
suggests that the “aesthetic intuition” about its possibility is grounded in a sense of 
continuity with our empirical reality. In this sense, sf targets an intuition about the 
possibility of imagining or even realizing the alternative it presents, rather than the 
correctness of its scientific assumptions. Well-known sf and fantasy author Orson 
Scott Card (2001) promotes a similar understanding. He insists on a shared epis-
temological framework of all speculative fiction, which “by definition is geared to-
ward an audience that wants strangeness, an audience that wants to spend time in 
worlds that absolutely are not like the observable world around them” (20), claim-
ing that both “science fiction and fantasy stories are those that take place in worlds 
that have never existed or are not yet known” (18). Yet, Scott Card distinguishes 
between the two, claiming that “science fiction is about what could be but isn’t; 
fantasy is about what couldn’t be” (22).
The above discussion suggests that sf can be characterized as a genre of not-
yet existent but possible worlds. Importantly, this judgment is, as Scott Card 
emphasizes, made by the reader. Suvin’s reference to “cognitive validation” suggests 
a similar understanding.44 In this sense, the possible not-yet does not deny the 
44   Renault (1980, 130) criticizes Suvin for his lack of interest in the reader, pointing out that 
“[t]he tension in SF literary discourse between is and ought, same and other which generates 
a perception of/desire for new possibilities in the old, is certainly formally embodied in the 
work, but it also must be sparked in the socially and historically-located reader. By not 
treating cognitive estrangement as part of the cultural reception dialectic, Suvin is forced 
to isolate his genre from other forms of the Fantastic.” While making an important point, 
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importance of the reader’s subjectivity—and, one may add, his or her cultural 
background and ideological or religious beliefs. However, it does entail a sense of 
continuity with our empirical reality. In order to bring both factors together and 
to avoid confusion with other notions like possibility or the scientific, I suggest 
calling this relation plausibility. While sharing the commitment to Otherness 
with fantasy, the latter threatens any intuitive plausibility because it is “existentially 
creative” beyond the technically possible. Sf, on the other hand, can be regarded 
as a deliberate attempt at balancing possibility and Otherness—conservative and 
creative elements—in such a way as to afford its fictional alternative immediate 
social and political relevance.45 This direct, explicit addressing of the reader makes 
sf a particularly promising starting point for an analysis of the political potentials 
computopic space affords.
4.3 Tendency and Banality
I would like to make two additions to this characterization of sf in the context of 
videogames. The first concerns the relation between possibility and impossibili-
ty. Pavel (1986, 49) regards worlds as impossible, if “[t]he presence of contradic-
tions effectively prevents us from considering fictional worlds as genuine possible 
worlds.” Such logical or technical contradictions are based on a primary world A, 
which serves as standard of comparison (48). In the case of sf, this evaluation is 
based on our empirical reality. In the context of videogames, however, the notion 
of contradictions is problematic, because in most cases, their Otherness is experi-
enced as contradictory at some level.
Renault seems to simplify Suvin’s discourse. True, Suvin does not focus on the reader 
directly. In this sense, the centrality of the author and his scarce references to the necessity 
of validating the novum’s work cognitively may be regarded as neglect. However, it seems 
crucial to point out that his conversion of “science fiction” into “cognitive estrangement,” 
like the notion of “disruption” applied by Jameson, can be read as a decisive step away from 
a formal definition of the genre, towards a conceptualization of its political possibilities in 
consumption and thus for the reader—who else could be estranged.
45   Where Frederic Jameson refers to sf ’s necessary failure to invent the absolute Other, he 
seems to address not only the limitations of human imagination, but also the genre of sf and 
its critical potential itself, in the sense that an absolute Other would risk to fail stimulating 
our radical imagination precisely because it would omit the reason for embarking on 
something new in the first place—a reason which, at least for Jameson, can only lie in a 
dissatisfaction with the present. In this sense, Jameson’s remark on the impossibility of 
absolute Otherness—which I claim is surpassed by videogame expression in a certain, 
limited sense—may be understood as an attempt to secure the critical and political potential 
of SF alternatives within the boundaries of our enlightened, ‘scientific’ society.
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Juul (2005, 123-130), for example, discusses several incoherences and 
contradictions, such as multiple lives or impossible physical phenomena, arguing 
that players usually make such worlds coherent by referring to the game rules. In his 
example, the multiple lives granted to the player character Mario in Donkey Kong 
are not plausible—in the above sense of the word—and may only be explained by 
referring to the significance this rule has for the gameplay. “With only one life, the 
game would be too hard” (130). In general, videogames are intended to be playful 
and entertaining much more than they are meant to be plausible. In addition, they 
frequently mix genres, themes or signs in contradictory ways. Juul concludes that 
videogames are Half-Real, because they combine real rules with fictional worlds (1, 
202). This suggests that even science fictional games might not fully withstand the 
plausibility test. Even if some omissions in videogames are simply abstractions, it 
would be challenging to argue that features like unlimited repetition of death and 
rebirth, the ability to save games, to carry heavy weight or large-size objects, etc. is 
continuous with our empirical reality.
Yet, I believe that the idea of an “aesthetic intuition” about plausibility, on the 
grounds of which the player may choose to ignore some of the elements in favour 
of an overall tendency, is useful. Here, I follow Freedman (1987, 181-182), who 
discusses the issue of clear-cut distinctions between fictional genres and suggests 
we circumvent this problem by
displacing the category of genre from a static and classificatory to 
a dialectical sense. A literary genre—SF or any other—ought to be 
understood not as a pigeon-hole into which certain texts may be filed 
and certain others may not, but rather as an element or, still better, as 
tendency, which is active to a greater or lesser degree within a literary 
text which is itself conceptualized as a complexly structured whole. 
Accordingly, there is probably no text which is a perfect and pure 
embodiment of SF but, on the other hand, there are perhaps relatively 
few texts which lack the SF tendency altogether. […] Star Wars might 
be described as a work in which the SF tendency is visually strong but 
conceptually weak. It follows that, in the strictest sense, it is incorrect to 
say that any given text “is” or “is not” SF. But it is nonetheless justifiable 
to make an at least provisional discrimination on the basis of whether, 
in any actual text, the SF tendency is sufficiently strong to be considered 
dominant. 
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Freedman’s proposal offers a practical solution to the problem of identifying “prop-
erly plausible” works for the analysis. In the selection, I follow his suggestion and 
identify works as sf if I intuitively expect their tendency towards science fictional 
plausibility strong enough, even if they are not plausible in all aspects. 
The second addition concerns the problem of popularity. Renault points out 
that Suvin’s exclusive emphasis on “cognitive estrangement” implies an elitist, 
intellectualizing focus on high culture. Suvin (1982, 21) himself proves Renault 
right in a later article on the range of sf, in which he cautions us against a tendency 
towards substituting the “radical novum” with “a slumming sensation that does not 
give rise to a parable on or counter-project to the established power.” Against this 
exclusive focus on sf as an intellectual project of resistance, Renault (1980, 135) 
argues that textual signification is always a dialectic of the sensual and intellectual, 
and that “[c]ulture as cognition and affect combined, both deadly serious and 
playfully parodic, grounds political ambivalence; suppress this dialectic in theory 
or practice, and the real source of resistance is lost.” In his view,
SF […] strongly combines the fantasy “escapist” restorative function 
of mass culture with the instructive function of high culture. From 
this perspective we can see how SF can be entertaining and thought 
provoking at the same time. […] While prurient and escapist interests 
characterize the body of SF works, functionally such concerns are the 
vehicle for those critical cognitions SF offers. (137)
Renault’s insistence on a broad view on sf and its “playfully parodic” elements is 
particularly important in the context of a playful, experiential medium. In videog-
ames, the tension between frivolous entertainment and education, between sensu-
al pleasures and intellectual endeavours, is not only played out in a game’s fictional 
content or its rules, but also in serious and spontaneously playful action motivated 
by intellectual and emotional factors alike.46 Insofar as this tension itself might 
generate productive conflicts, selection and analysis have to be open not only to 
tendency rather than strict boundaries, but also to frivolous entertainment just as 
well as to serious intellectual content. 
46   The label “serious games” symbolizes the attempt to derive something ‘meaningful,’ socially 
accepted from a medium that is also just as much a silly and frivolous means for ‘killing 
time’ and for ‘meaningless virtual killing.’ Examining recent currents in game studies, 
McAllister and Ruggill (2010, 55) go as far as to say that, in times where video games are 
thus celebrated as meaningful and serious, “anamnesis” (the loss of forgetting), meaning a 
return to the “less valued” moment of videogame play, may be the only fruitful course for 
game studies in the future.
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In the case of videogames, Renault’s emphasis on mass entertainment is 
important for yet another reason. Given the high production costs of contemporary 
professional games, it is fair to say that the medium relies on popularity more than 
literature.47 Although the search for disruptive conflicts has distanced my theoretical 
aim from Noël Carroll’s perspective on mass art, his emphasis on accessibility and 
the importance of the audience is crucial for the following analysis. This is not 
to say that minor works cannot be expected to be equally disruptive. Against the 
background of the importance of playful frivolity in videogame expression, it does, 
however, demand for an unbiased (but not uncritical) view on mass-produced 
videogames. For the purpose of this exploration, I regard popularity as a helpful 
indicator in the initial search for interesting examples, leaving the questions about 
the quality of a work and its dialectic, ambivalent status between the sensual and 
the intellectual for the analysis. The following approach to the field of sf takes this 
perspective as a starting point, focusing on popular titles as well as less prominent 
but acclaimed works.
4.4 Sf in the Japanese Market
With these qualifications in mind, the following section aims to identify the recent 
shares of popular sf games in the Japanese videogame market. This means focus-
ing on console games rather than the minor area of computer games, because the 
former have dominated the commercial scene until fairly recently, when they were 
challenged by cell phone games.48 Popularity is usually measured in sales numbers. 
47   The fact that games target mass consumption is not to say that this development is not 
ambivalent. Historically, the rising general popularity of videogames has both allowed 
for a wide range of experimental games to appear on the market, and, more recently, put 
increasing constraints on new productions, because the necessity to sell large quantities 
suggests a tendency towards established ideas and franchises. For Japan, Hichibe (2006, 
68, 2009, 171) points out that the increasing development costs for console games force 
the designers more and more to stick with successful series and known formats, instead of 
experimenting with new ideas. While the historical production conditions of videogames 
are not subject to closer scrutiny in this thesis, it should be pointed out that the analytical 
focus on titles which were developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s or are part of a larger, 
long-running franchise, is not coincidental.
48   This choice should not imply that Japanese computer games may not be an intriguing, 
highly politically charged area of research and in some cases, reach astonishing levels of 
popularity. On the contrary: in Japan, computer games have been a vivid field of independent 
productions and amateur activities for a long time, and at the same time constitute a crucial 
playground for future game designers and programmers which, to some extent, exists 
outside of market logics and societal restrictions such as videogame rating and censorship. 
However, due to its subcultural status, this field is less accessible and thus requires a very 
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However, in the case of games, statistics need to be consulted with care, as the 
industry is generally reluctant to reveal their own figures. Some indication can be 
gained from data published by the industry itself, such as the charts found in the 
annually released CESA Games White Paper. In addition, the online portal vgc-
hartz.com provides estimated annual records of the 100 top-selling games in Japan.
Sf is a well-established theme in the European and U.S. American market, where 
the pursuit of realistic and plausible worlds seems to be one major direction for 
high-budget productions such as Call of Duty or Grand Theft Auto, to name just a 
few popular examples. The Japanese market, however, appears to be less invested 
in the idea of natural grass movement and exact weapon reconstruction.49 Even 
major titles are far less dominated by concerns with realism. For example, most of 
the Japanese role-playing games, which have developed into a globally recognized 
subgenre of role-playing games, are characterized by a mix of fantasy and sf 
elements. 
This tendency impacts the prominence of sf in the statistics. Under the rubric 
“Past domestic million shipment titles,” the 2012CESA Games White Paper 
(Unozawa 2012, 228-233) lists 204 titles, which I have categorized in Table 1 on 
the following page. 50 The table shows that more than half of the titles belong to 
dominantly ‘implausible,’ or fantastic franchises, such as Super Mario, Dragon 
Quest, Final Fantasy, or Pokémon. Of the remainder, 51 titles are simulations, 14 
are puzzles and edutainment, and 17 titles are implausible or abstract, but do not 
belong to any of the other categories (music games, titles like Doraemon). Among 
204 videogames sold more than one million times in Japan, a total of 7 titles shows 
a sufficient tendency towards sf, namely Chrono Trigger and RESIDENT EVIL 2 
(both rank 65, with 2.030.000 units), Resident Evil 3 Nemesis (rank 111, 1.450.000 
units), XEVIOUS (rank 141, 1.270.000 units), Resident Evil (rank 164, 1.110.000 
units), Parasite Eve (rank 186, 1.060.000 units), and Metroid (rank 191, 1.040.000 
different approach that is out of reach to this project.
49   On a technical level, Nintendo has withdrawn from the race for ever stronger consoles—
more apt to represent realistic environments and complex physical processes required by 
most of the high-budget productions mentioned above—instead aiming for casual gaming 
and new consumers with the DS and the Wii. The latter in particular led to a series of games 
emphasizing bodily movement, which are arguably much more ‘real’ than any realistic 
visual representation, and, not by chance, contributed to a blurring of the categories of 
videogames and sports and fitness.
50   According to the 2012 White Paper (Unozawa 2012, 233), the list is based on the responses 
of four companies to a research survey conducted for all titles released since 1983, as well as 
earlier data. Titles are given in Japanese and English in the original.
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units). One could argue for including Final Fantasy VII (rank 14, 4.000.000 units), 
because of its strong sf tendency, although most of the Final Fantasy franchise 
shares the general tendency of Japanese role-playing games to mix sf with fantastic 
features.51 However, this does not change the fact that sf play a minor role on the 
market.
The picture looks slightly more diverse when considering the annual 100 top 
sales in Japan from 2000 to 2011 as listed by vgchartz.com (2012b).52 Apart from 
51   A good example of this mix of fantasy and sf is the game Makai Tōshi SaGa [The Final 
Fantasy Legend] of which the English Wikipedia (2012) entry remarks that “the game 
features equipment from different genres, ranging from magic and swords of fantasy to 
plasma rifles and chainsaws of science fiction.”
52   According to their own description, vgchartz.com (2012a) employs a broad range of 
Table 1. Sf among the Japanese all-time million-sellers listed in the 2012 White Paper.










Various (Monster Hunter, Super Smash Brothers, Dragon Ball, Inazuma 
11, Yoshi’s Island, Kindom Hearts, Secret of Mana, Arc the Lad)
17
subtotal 115
B. Simulations  
(fighting, racing, golf, baseball, mah-jong, horses, etc.)
51
C. Puzzle, Edutainment  
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the numerous ambiguous role-playing games (hereafter rpg), these charts display 
a more or less stable 10-15 percent of sf titles for each year. I have compiled the 
popular sf titles found in this data between 2000 and 2011 in Table 2. 
Franchises/Series Number Individual Titles Year
Gundam 39 Dino Crisis 2 (PS) 2000
Super Robot Wars 19 Extermination (PS2) 2001
Mega Man 15 Zone of the Enders (PS2) 2001
Resident Evil [Biohazard] 14 Disaster Report (PS2) 2002
Metal Gear Solid 10 Metroid Fusion (GBA) 2003
Armored Core 5 Classic NES Series: Xevious (GBA) 2004
Ace Combat 5 Famicom Mini: Star Soldier (GBA) 2004
.hack 5 Global Defence Force (PS2) 2005
Sakura Wars 4 Lost Planet 2 (PS3) 2010
Another Century’s Episode 4 God Eater (PSP) 2010
Macross 4 Gods Eater Burst (PSP) 2010
Custom Robo 3 Steins;Gate (PSP) 2011
Star Fox 2 Black * Rock Shooter: The Game (PSP) 2011
Front Mission 2 Chikyuu Boueigun 2 Portable (PSP) 2011
total franchise/series 131 total individual titles 14
added total 145
scope of the thesis 119
The data indicates that the market share of Japanese sf videogames is mostly dom-
inated by a few large and long-time franchises on the one hand, and the theme of 
giant robots, or “mecha”53, on the other. Adapting popular anime content, the titles 
belonging to Gundam, Another Century’s Episode, and Macross amount to almost 
one third (47) out of a total of 145 games. Together with other mecha series like the 
Custom Robo, Armored Core, Front Mission, and Mega Man, these games represent 
methods to estimate sales numbers, such as polling with gamers and retailers, statistical 
trend fitting, price analysis, and industry consultations.
53   Mecha is the English version of the Japanese term meka, itself a short form adapted from 
the English terms “mechanism” and “mechanical.” According to the English and Japanese 
entries in Wikipedia (2013k, l) the term is widely used to refer to machines in Japan. In 
the context of Japanese popular culture, it commonly refers to the science fictional device 
of robots controlled by human pilots. Early prominent examples of mecha are the manga 
Mazinger Z published by Nagai Gō between 1972 and 1973, or the tv anime series Mobile 
Suit Gundam from 1979, which developed into one of the most influential cross-media 
franchises in Japan. I use the term mecha throughout this analysis to refer to such robots.
Table 2. Sf titles among the top 100 sales between 2000 and 2011 as listed by vgchartz.com.
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the strongest current in the field of Japanese SF videogames. Other themes and se-
ries like Resident Evil [in Japan released as Biohazard] or .hack are less prominent, 
and the number of successful individual titles is relatively small.
In the table, the number of titles which meet the sf-requirement of this thesis 
does not include the Super Robot Wars series, the Sakura Wars series, and the Star 
Fox games. This decision is based on the ambiguity towards sf these series display. 
Whether in the shape of magical or spiritual powers the mecha or their players 
possess in Super Robot Wars and Sakura Wars, or by replacing human pilots with 
animal characters, like in Star Fox, these games break openly with the demand for 
plausibility identified as a major requirement for sf.
This preliminary selection is supported and refined by two additional factors. 
Firstly, it was tested, verified, and adjusted during a long-term research stay in 
Japan. This trip gave me the opportunity to gather information about potentially 
interesting games in textual resources as well as in random, explorative interviews 
with players and videogame researchers, who contributed greatly to the insight I 
have gained so far into the field. Easy access to a broad range of games, some of 
which were never released outside of Japan, allowed me to pursue the various leads 
in a timely and in-depth fashion. This pre-analytic phase not only supported the 
choice of some of the abovementioned titles for the analysis, thus lending some 
support to the vague statistical data. It also resulted in several new discoveries, some 
of which have made their way to the consecutive chapters. To give an overview of 
the scope of this thesis, I have combined the statistical results with the pre-analytic 
exploration in Table 3, and grouped them according to the attention they are given 
in the analysis.
In Table 3, the discoveries from my fieldwork are highlighted in grey. From top 
to bottom it lists the games analysed in detail, titles only mentioned briefly, titles 
not mentioned due to their lack of potential or simply due to time constraints, 
and titles excluded from the closer range due to platform issues. The last category 
reflects several adjustments to the selection. Given the difficulties involved in 
recording handheld console gameplay, I have excluded all titles only or dominantly 
available for portable devices in order to maintain methodical consistency in the 
data collection process. Given the scarcity of titles not designed or at least available 
for Sony’s Playstation consoles Playstation (herafter PSX), Playstation 2 (hereafter 
PS2), and Playstation 3 (hereafter PS3), I further decided to limit the scope to titles 
for Sony’s platforms. While this results in excluding important series like Custom 
Table 3. Games within the scope of this thesis, categorized by the attention given to them.
Category Franchise(F)/Title(T)**** Year Chapter(s)
discussed
Gundam (F) 1980s~ A.0
Metal Gear Solid (F) 1998~ A.3
Armored Core (F) 1997~ A.0
Ace Combat (F) 1992~ A.0
Front Mission (F) 1995~ A.0
Chrono Trigger (T) 1995 A.1
Global Defence Force** (T) 2005 A.2
Rez (T) 2001 A.2
Shinseiki Evangelion 2 [Neon Genesis Evangelion 2] (T) 2003 A.2
Shadow of Memories (T) 2001 A.1
mentioned (titles 
explored but not 
analyzed in depth)
Biohazard [Resident Evil] (F) 1996~ A.3
Another Century’s Episode (F) 2005~ A.0
Lost Planet 2 (T) 2010 A.3
not mentioned (ti-
tles dimissed in the 
initial exploration or 
left for future work)
Mega Man (F) 1987~
.hack (F) 2002~
Macross (F) 1980s~
Parasite Eve (T) 1998
Dino Crisis 2 T) 2000
Extermination (T) 2001
Zone of the Enders (T) 2001
Disaster Report (T) 2002
Gunparade March*** (T) 2000
Shinseiki Evangelion: Jo [Neon Genesis Evangelion:Jo] (T) 2009
Koufuku Sousakan [Happiness Investigator] (T) 2004
out of immediate 
or technical range 
(handheld titles or 
differing platform)
Custom Robo (F) 1999
Metroid (F) 1986~
Classic NES Series: Xevious (T) 2004
Famicom Mini: Star Soldier (T) 2004
God Eater (T) 2010
Gods Eater Burst (T) 2010
Steins;Gate (T) 2011
Black * Rock Shooter: The Game (T) 2011
Chikyuu Boueigun 2 Portable [Earth Defense Force 2 Portable] (T) ** 2011
Pikmin (F) 2001
* Asterix in Black * Rock Shooter in the original title.
** Discussing the first title of the series, The Earth Defense Forces.
*** Game system discussed in the context of Neon Genesis Evangelion 2.
**** This differentiation indicates the status of the item listed.
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Robo or Metroid, its merit for this project is that it helps reduce the factors involved 
in the analysis, such as differences between consoles and controller types. 
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter provided a rough overview of Japanese sf videogames, which serves 
as a starting point for the following analysis. The aim was to arrive at a relatively 
small, consistent pre-selection of titles and franchises for the following analysis. In 
the first parts, I have discussed the characteristics of sf and provided some justifi-
cation for focusing on this genre in the initial exploration. Based on the notion of 
a tendency towards plausibility and the index of popularity, I have analysed statis-
tical data on videogame sales and actively explored the Japanese market. With sev-
eral additional restrictions, this resulted in a list of games for closer consideration. 
This list may not reflect the market share and range of Japanese sf videogames 
accurately, because it excludes the vast field of amateur and professional computer 
games. However, I do believe that it serves its purpose of providing a rough 
overview of the field targeted in this project, and thus a sufficient starting point 
for the analysis. I have tried to make the process and the conditions leading to the 
selection of works as transparent as possible and hope to have provided enough 
background to contextualize the consecutive observations both from an academic 
perspective, and against the background of the field of Japanese videogames. I hope 
that future work can focus on those areas and titles not examined in depth here.
5 Mechapocalypse
Let’s make no mistake: whether it’s the drop-outs, the beat generation, 
automobile drivers, migrant workers, tourists, Olympic champions or 
travel agents, the military-industrial democracies have made every 
social category, without distinction, into unknown soldiers of the order of 
speeds. (Virilio 2006, 136-137)
In the last chapter, I defined the material field for the analysis. The following chap-
ter shifts the attention to its contents, discussing several major currents in Japanese 
science fictional videogames. Examining both adapted and original videogames, I 
focus on the ways in which the pervasive trope of mecha—giant robots controlled 
by human pilots—is deployed in computopic universes. This preparatory analysis 
provides insight into the field and points to several common potentials and lim-
itations of science fictional games, which serve as a basis for later examinations.
5.1 Science Fictional Skins
The statistical data suggests that some of the most popular sf games are adapta-
tions of mecha anime. This is true for Gundam games, which are part of the Gun-
dam franchise and mostly adapted from the various Gundam anime that appeared 
since the late 1970s, and the crossover54 series Another Century’s Episode (hereafter 
A.C.E.), which adapts story elements, characters and, most importantly, mecha 
from a wide range of works.55 According to Linda Hutcheon (2006, 8) an adap-
tation is an “acknowledged transposition of a recognizable other work or works,” 
a “creative and an interpretive act of appropriation/salvaging,” and an “extended 
intertextual engagement with the adapted work.” In her analysis, “the adaptive fac-
ulty is the ability to repeat without copying, to embed difference in similarity, to be 
at once both self and Other” (174). In their emphasis on fluidity and contingency, 
adaptations can be subversive, because they “destabilize both formal and cultural 
identity and thereby shift power relations” (164).
54   A “fictional crossover” is a special case of adaptation, in which different independent works 
are adapted (Wikipedia 2013h).
55   As opposed to the Super Robot Wars franchise, which includes so-called “super-robots”—
mecha, which have fantastic powers—A.C.E. restricts its pool to “real robots”—referring to 
mecha more or less explainable by real-world science (Wikipedia 2013a, s, m).
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However, a brief examination of the adaptive strategies in Gundam and A.C.E. 
reveals the limitations of such subversive potentials. Covering a broad range of 
videogame genres and subgenres from first-person and third-person shooters to 
strategy role-playing games, Gundam displays a variety of adaptive strategies.56 
Titles like Giren no Yabō [Gihren’s Ambition] (2002) or Ichinen Sensō [One Year 
War] (2005), make a considerable effort to contextualize the gameplay with a 
narrative corresponding to the anime, thus offering an alternative, more subjective 
experience of the respective story adapted. In contrast, the majority of games 
reduces the context to a minimal reference in the shape of a rough narrative 
framing or by presenting characters, mecha—in Gundam called “mobile suits”—
and locations familiar from one of the anime. As Example 5.1 shows, this tendency 
is particularly strong in the “arcade mode” of the Gundam VS. sub-series (hereafter 
VS.).57 While introducing the context of the games roughly in the prologue, 
these games decontextualize the action from the familiar narrative. This is most 
strikingly the case in the “arcade mode,” which confronts the player with a series of 
loosely connected scenarios. They reduce the link to a vague reference to setting, 
while at the same time offering a wide range of correspondently adapted but 
decontextualized characters and mobile suits.
In more than one case, the choices available or the results of a mission openly 
contradict the anime narrative. Such subversion is more actively explored in the 
strategy rpg of the SD Gundam GGeneration series.58 Offering a high degree of 
freedom when it comes to choosing pilots for the various machines and mobile 
suits available, as well as the possibility of convincing less fundamentalist villains 
to change sides during the battle, these games create situations not in line with 
the original anime. Such deconstructive tendencies are even stronger in the third-
person shooter games of the A.C.E. series, which combine mecha, characters, 
56   At the time of writing (July 2013), the Gundam franchise includes 44 titles for the Playstation 
alone, not to mention other platforms (Wikipedia 2013i). Due to time constraints, the 
analysis can only focus on some of these titles. I tried to cover the most important sub-
series and sequels.
57   For this analysis, I played Mobile Suit Gundam: Renpō vs. Jīon DX [Federation vs. Zeon DX] 
(2001), Mobile Suit Z Gundam: AEUG vs. Titānzu [AEUG vs. Titans] (2003), Mobile Suit 
Gundam: Gundam vs. Z Gundam (2004), and Mobile Suit Gundam Seed: Rengō vs. Z.A.F.T. 
[Federation vs. Z.A.F.T.] (2005).
58   Of the series, I played SD Gundam G Generation Neo (2002), SD Gundam G Generation 
Seed (2004), SD Gundam G Generation Spirits (2007), and SD Gundam G Generation Wars 
(2009).
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and story elements from more than one franchise.59 As a general tendency, these 
titles feature an adaptive strategy that reduces the source material to elements of a 
database shuffled according to need and player choice. In this they are examples of 
postmodern database consumption, a term coined by Japanese philosopher Azuma 
Hiroki. Azuma (2001, 71-83) argues that the trend towards decontextualizing 
characters from the “grand narrative” culminates in a database of characters and 
character elements, which can be recombined in myriad ways and exist outside any 
specific narrative context.60
This tendency towards a ‘databasification’ of decontextualized elements also 
converges with the themability of games mentioned above (see chapter 2, p. 34), 
revealing the mecha and even the characters to be scarcely more than decorative 
skins. Combining various elements of Gundam with the gameplay of the successful 
beat’em up series Shin Sangoku Musō [Dynasty Warriors]61, the Gundam Musō 
[Dynasty Warriors: Gundam] games62 deploy this practice most explicitly. Gundam 
Musō confronts the player with epic martial arts battles against several hundred 
enemy mobile suits and rewards high kill-rates—a stark contrast to the anime with 
its emphasis on the psychological struggle of inexperienced civilians forced to fight 
over life and death and the terrors of war in general. In a different way, the above-
mentioned VS. series deploys inter- and intra-game skinning practices, reusing its 
framework and format (and possibly parts of the software code) in successive titles 
or deploying a minimal number of stages in a large number of contexts.63 
These observations hint to another dimension of adaptations, namely their 
economic aspects. In general, economic considerations are certainly a dominant 
force behind the majority of the Gundam games. Hutcheon (2006, 30) grants 
that “[v]ideogames derived from popular films and vice versa are clearly ways 
to capitalize on a ‘franchise’ and extend its market.” However, she claims that 
59   For this analysis, I played Another Century’s Episode (2005) and Another Century’s Episode 
R (2010).
60   For a more detailed discussion, see Schäfer and Roth(2012).
61   The third-person fighting games offer a choice of characters among the historical figures 
known from the “Three Kingdoms” period in China (220-280 AD), which the player has to 
reunite.
62   For the analysis, I played Gundam Musō 2 (2008a) and Gundam Musō Special (2008b).
63   A similar tendency is present in the SD Gundam GGeneration, in which notable changes 
are mostly of aesthetic nature or concern the referenced work(s). My analysis of “Playing 
‘Naruto’” (Roth 2013) suggests that this is not unique to the Gundam games, but a might be 
considered a general current in (Japanese) manga, anime and games (production) culture. 
It would be interesting to analyze the impact such practice has on the economic model the 
game production and the franchise as a whole is based on.
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economic considerations are always part of adaptations.64 In the case of Gundam 
and arguably also A.C.E., the appearance of familiar mecha and characters 
is likely to be the major factor for the popularity of what would otherwise be 
highly repetitive videogames lacking narrative depth to an extent where they are 
presumably hard to follow for outsiders. Contributing to one or multiple major 
franchises, these games also play a role as advertisements for other products, just 
as the original mecha anime series were sponsored by toy makers like Bandai, 
who expected elevated sales of real-life models of the mecha and other series-
related toys for children. A particularly prolific part of the Gundam franchise, 
the “super deformed” SD Gundam GGeneration games are a striking case of the 
economics behind adaptations.65 However, the fact that the “super deformed” style 
is presumed to be a strategy of circumventing licensing fees to the Gundam license 
holder Sunrise (Wikipedia 2013q), the series also indicates the complexity of the 
economic dimension of franchises and adaptations in general, which cannot be 
discussed in detail here.
In summary, games committed to—accurate or original—storytelling tend to 
offer alternative perspectives and subjective experiences of the Gundam world. 
However, the majority of games discussed so far tend towards decontextualization, 
databasification, standardization and skinning. These games arguably offer 
their fan-players what Hutcheon (2006, 117) calls the intertextual pleasure of 
“understanding the interplay between works, of opening up a text’s possible 
meanings to intertextual echoing.” They also develop a considerable deconstructive 
force with respect to the original Gundam universe. However, by abstracting the 
narrative, characters and mecha from their context and from their specific features, 
they also reduce its political content66 to a choice between different skins only 
meaningful for insiders. The lack of novel contributions to the Gundam universe 
most of the games display marks them as highly self-reflexive.
64   This should be taken as a claim about professional adaptations that have a commercial 
background. Amateur- and fan-works certainly follow other intentions and may, to some 
extent, be regarded as adaptations for the sake of adaptations. Unfortunately, Hutcheon 
does not discuss this area in any depth.
65   SD stands for “super deformed.” According to the Wikipedia (2013p) entry, this style of 
‘shrinked,’ tiny representations of Gundam mobile suits is in use in parts of the franchise 
since the 1980s. It has developed from a playful parody to a highly successful sub-franchise 
which spawned several spin-off series and merchandise.
66   Traditionally set up as a future armed conflict between different fractions of humanity 
and post-humanity, Gundam features rich political themes in a science fictional setting, 
explored through an overarching narrative as well as by depicting the individual physical 
and psychological struggles of the characters caught up in the war.
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Notably, Hutcheon (2006, 14) claims that videogame adaptations not only 
have to meet the demands of a “truth-of-correspondence,” or a reference to the 
universe of the adapted text, but also that of a “truth-of-coherence,” meaning a 
plausibility of the action in the context of the game. Turned around, the fact that 
the abovementioned games fail to convince as adaptations offers an opportunity for 
taking a closer look at them as games in their own right. The next section analyses 
how Gundam games adapt elements of a major franchise into various established 
videogame genres.
5.2 Survival Training
The mix of adapted narrative elements (background, characters, mecha) and game-
play in Gundam games provides an interesting case for Hutcheon’s (2006, 121) 
claim that successful adaptations have to be equally accessibly to knowing and 
unknowing audiences. On the one hand, the abstracted, reshuffled or even lack-
ing narratives found in most of these games are hardly intelligible for unknowing 
audiences. On the other hand, the gameplay of many titles is intuitive enough to 
be grasped immediately. At times confronting the player with tough challenges, 
the rules and controls are nonetheless simple enough to be mastered to a certain 
extent, and the instructions are easy enough to understand instantly.67
In the following section, I take a look at the two most prominent videogame 
genres Gundam is adapted to, namely shooters and strategy role-playing games. 
In most cases dominated by third-person combat action on ground and in space, 
the shooters deploy the mobile suits with their enduring armour, ability to fly, 
and set of super-sized, deadly weapons as human enhancements. The titles of 
the VS. series reduce the complexity of controls, truthful to their arcade framing. 
More sophisticated examples like Climax U.C. (2006) or the A.C.E. series features 
complex manoeuvres and make use of the full range of the controller. Example 
5.2 shows how these shooters display a tendency towards fast-paced reaction 
and emphasize hand-eye coordination, which is particularly striking in the 2.5D 
shoot’em up Mobile Suit Gundam Seed (2003).
As a tendency, the action in these games converges towards decontextualized 
67   It might be interesting to test whether this is true even for players with no knowledge of 
Japanese. I suspect that many gamers would not find it difficult to play the games more or 
less successfully, particularly if they are familiar with the respective genres.
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reaction to the accelerated flow of information on the screen. Required of the 
player are analytical skills to decipher the screen quickly, and a corresponding set 
of control skills necessary to react to its signals. Hand-eye coordination is arguably 
part of many videogames to various extents, and pedagogical research has long 
highlighted its value as a skill in the contemporary world (see for example Witting 
2007, 24). Besides the sensorimotor skills, a recent study of cognitive dimension 
of first-person shooter play indicates that such games promote cognitive flexibility 
and cognitive-control skills (Colzato et al. 2010). However, at the same time, visual 
acceleration promotes a kind of ‘responsive irresponsibility’ and a double vision on 
the part of the player. One has to identify and evade the most immediate threat, be 
it projectiles, obstacles, or the enemy, while constantly searching for new targets 
elsewhere on the screen and trusting the automatic trigger to remain on the target 
until destroyed. The attention moves on to the next target as soon as one has reason 
to believe that the momentary target will be destroyed by the last fired projectile. 
However, there is no time to reflect on or even focus on either the individual 
enemy, or the moment of destruction. In a way, I believe this is an experience 
similar to Walter Benjamin’s ([1936] 2002, 119-120) well-known description of 
film-viewing as tactile, habitual “reception in distraction,” which, albeit already 
ascribed a physical quality by Benjamin, should be qualified further by adding the 
term “intense,” to account for the active, physical involvement of the player.68
In their intense reception in distraction, these shooters offer a taste of Paul 
Virilio’s  (2006) dystopic vision of an accelerated, dromological future, in which 
speed is superiority, and “to be quick means to stay alive” (70). In the contemporary 
“war of Time,” he says, knowing-power is replaced by moving-power (71), and the 
world as a field of (political) action comes to an end (152). At times of accelerated 
speed and ubiquitous accessibility to destruction, Virilio believes that the struggle 
for maintaining a certain margin of political reaction time—time for reasoned 
decisions—in order not to be replaced by automation of defence and decision is 
lost (155). In his view, “[t]he blindness of the speed of means of communicating 
destruction is not a liberation from geopolitical servitude, but the extermination of 
space as the field of freedom of political action. […] the more speed increases, the 
faster freedom decreases” (158). Ultimately, speed converges towards an 
instantaneousness of decision. The final power would thus be less one 
68   For a brief discussion of how Benjamin’s conceptualization of the “modes of perception” 
and “reception in distraction” relate to contemporary media, see Schäfer and Roth (2012).
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of imagination than of anticipation, so much so that to govern would be 
no more than to foresee, simulate, memorize the simulations; that the 
present ‘Research Institute’ could appear to be the blueprint of this final 
power, the power of utopia. (157)
In the light of Virilio’s analysis of politics in times of acceleration, the 
abovementioned shooter games and their emphasis on hand-eye coordination 
or analysis-reaction take on an ambivalent meaning. These skills could be said to 
prepare their players for behaving—or at least surviving—in a culture dominated 
by fast-paced information flows and visual representation.69 However, insofar as 
the games emphasize instantaneous decision, reaction and anticipation instead 
of reasoning, imagination and action, they do not offer any alternative to the 
contemporary tendency towards acceleration, but rather in play reflect it. As far as 
I can see, this reflection is not critical but admiring of speed.
The turn-based strategy rpg, on the other hand, interrupts the flow of time. The 
titles of the SD Gundam G Generation series feature chess-like gameplay in which 
the player takes turns with the computer in strategic role-playing fights and can 
think about the next move as long as he or she wants. In command of several units 
in bird-eye scenarios, one has to make tactical and strategic choices appropriate 
to defeat the enemy. Each unit has a specified range of movement and attacks, 
which are to be used to the player’s advantage. Gradually, one can upgrade the 
equipment, regroup soldiers and gear, and create individual teams for the battles 
to come. Given Virilio’s (2006, 156) claim that with increasing acceleration, space 
(territory) as the central contested category in war is replaced by time, these turn-
based, de-temporalized games with their strong emphasis on space and distances 
might be regarded as a counter-movement. Yet, at the same time, these games 
deploy the numerous mecha of the franchise to create high information density, 
further amplified by customization options. This turns the games into vast spaces 
of functional configuration and re-combination of the decontextualized database 
elements mentioned above.
Again, this is an ambivalent feature. On the one hand, these games promote 
skills of analysing and understanding complex information systems and databases 
in times of an ever-increasing importance and influence of such systems. As such, 
69   In a similar way, Benjamin’s (2002, 119) shock effect of the cinema, originating from 
“successive changes of scene and focus” and thus from speed. According to Benjamin (2002, 
120-121), this made film the “true training ground” for the new apperception necessary in 
times of increasing “aestheticizing of political life” by fascism.
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they confront the player with a high information density and offer an intense but 
playful experience of mastery. Volker Grassmuck (2000, no pn) discusses “otaku,” 
a Japanese term referring to passionate or ‘extreme’ fans of manga, anime, games 
and related fields of interest, as a new strategy of dealing with the information age. 
At the end of the 20th century, he observes, “[h]ardly anybody is not affected by the 
flood of information and plethora of media. The increasing flow-velocity of our life 
processes forces us to simultaneously partake in ever-more projects in ever-more 
places together with ever-more people.” In contrast to attempts of responding to 
this new information density by flexibility and multi-tasking, 
[t]he otaku are trying out a solution that goes in the opposite direction. 
Their urge to appropriate the world is motivated by the ambition to 
swap the borderlessness of the social cosmos for the microcosmos of 
collecting, of games, or of the machine. This radical limitation enables 
them to form an identity and bundle together a life story as a narrative. 
If the multiple represents opening up, then the otaku represents closing 
off. (Grassmuck 2000)
Based on my own research into the otaku culture (Roth 2011), I doubt that these 
claims can be generalized. Nevertheless, the videogames in question deploy their 
mecha to generate information density, and offer ways to master it. In this sense, 
these videogames resemble Grassmuck’s otaku world, because they offer a coher-
ent, closed computopic space and strategies for and the experience of “mastering 
the social and psychological uncertainties of our age” (Grassmuck 2000).
In this, they depend on a mechanism similar to the closure Jameson regards as 
crucial for successful utopian imaginaries. However, as in the case of the shooters, 
this closed space features characteristics similar to those of our empirical reality, 
but does not offer alternatives to it. In order to qualify this statement, I would like 
to distinguish between creative and repetitive information, and the corresponding 
strategies of engaging with data. McKenzie Wark (2006) draws such distinction in 
A Hacker Manifesto [version 4.0], albeit in the peculiar terminology of production 
vs. hacking and communication vs. information. He claims that “[w]here 
communication merely requires the repetition of this commodified difference, 
information is the production of the difference of difference” ( No. 40). A hack 
“produces a production of a new kind, which has as its result a singular and unique 
product, and a singular and unique producer” ( No. 8). Production, in turn, “takes 
place on the basis of a prior hack which gives to production its formal, social, 
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repeatable and reproducible form. Every production is a hack formalised and 
repeated on the basis of its representation. To produce is to repeat; to hack, to 
differentiate” ( No. 9).
Converting these statements into my terminology, one could say that his 
description of communication fits my notion of a repetitive engagement with 
data, because it deploys a formalized, pre-defined difference, whereas his notion 
of information matches creative engagements, because it entails a novel way of 
engaging with data. Against this background, I would argue that the potential 
for creative information in the abovementioned games is limited to their 
deconstructive function in the context of the adapted franchise, because none 
of these games features a novel strategy for producing information. Instead, 
they perpetuate the contemporary conditions and promote repetitive strategies 
of managing information rather than creating it anew. To invoke Carroll and 
Adorno (see chapter 2, p. 8), these games deploy “commonplaces” and offer 
accessible scenarios rather than confronting us with disruptive conflicts capable of 
stimulating independent, radical imagination.
In contrast to the abovementioned shooters, turn-based strategy games appear 
to offer their players what is lost in acceleration: time to think and make decisions 
about the future. Yet, a closer look reveals that these games only shift the plane, 
from accelerated reaction to strategies of managing information density and 
complexity. In sum, both cases are characterized by acceleration and density. The 
skills needed to survive their scenarios are similar to those required of us in the 
empirical reality. Since speed and data are central elements of the computopic, it 
should not surprise us that they play an important role in many games. However, 
the following sections show that they can be deployed in more radical, provocative 
ways than we encountered here.
5.3 Future War
Given the strong tendency towards agonist or competitive challenges in videog-
ames in general, and their fraternity with war simulations of all kinds70, it may 
not surprise that several successful independent works and series share the theme 
70   In his dissertation on the origins of videogames and their philosophical significance, Claus 
Pias (2000, 163-197) showed that strategy games were always strongly intertwined with 
military strategy, planning and war simulations.
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of war with the abovementioned adaptations. Developed as original videogame 
series, Front Mission, Ace Combat, and Armored Core place the action within gen-
uinely novel, sophisticated and temporally and spatially extensive science fictional 
universes (i.e. Figure 5).
Figure 5.  Front Mission world map. Source: Tenmou.net (2013c).
The turn-based strategy rpg of the Front Mission series71, for example, are set in the 
21st and 22nd century.72 In a future based on the present situation of 1995, when the 
series’ first title Front Mission was published, several supranational republics are 
formed in the early 2000s, such as the European Community (EC), the Republic of 
Zaftra (formed around Russia), the United States of the New Continent (USN), the 
Oceania Cooperative Union (OCU), as well as the instable Organization of African 
Consolidation (OAC). Due to several developments, the UN are rendered insig-
nificant in the 21st century and are replaced by the Peace Mediation Organization 
(PMO) founded by Zaftra, only to regain strength in the early 22nd century with 
the support of the USN. Despite these developments, the world remains highly 
instable, with several coups d’état and anti-state terror on the rise.73
71   For this thesis, I played Front Mission 2 (1997), front mission 3 (1999), and Front Mission 5 
(2005).
72   If not specified further, information about the game world origins in my own exploration of 
the game or the fan site tenmou.net (2013a).
73   For an overview of the Front Mission history, see the history section of tenmou.net (2013b, 
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By basing its future on real world facts the series creates a plausible future world. 
This approach is also applied to technology, as Pineda, Thompson and Tam (2011, 
1) point out: 
Game mechanics aside, Front Mission’s true strength comes from its 
design and story elements. The biggest design influence is the series’ 
grounded realism; the setting is based off of near-future trends of how 
our world will evolve. For example, the technology of the series has real-
life applications. Front Mission’s cast of characters come from all over 
the world, from Venezuela to Korea to even Iceland.
As an important element in the gameplay, the games introduce mecha called “wan-
zers”74 which the player can customize with various weapons of short, middle and 
long range and upgrade to optimize them for the enemy forces awaiting. In the 
missions or stages, which sometimes take more than one hour to complete, player 
and computer take turns in directing the attacks and movements of their wanzers.
The temporally and spatially extensive future world with its advanced 
technologies and never ceasing conflicts not only provides the basis for these 
missions or stages, but also serves as a background for discussing various political 
and philosophical problems. “In keeping with the series’ near-future roots, each 
game focuses on particular military, political, scientific, and philosophical themes 
that form the core of their stories. For example, a major recurring theme in the 
games is the struggle between globalization and nationalism” (Pineda, Thompson, 
and Tam 2011, 1). While not the most esteemed title of the series, front mission 3 
is a good example of the series’ “grounded realism” and its political commentary. 
Set in the year 2112, the player begins the game in Japan. One quickly learns 
that future Japan has maintained its non-aggression policy on the surface, while 
embarking on humanitarian aid missions and conducting weapon systems 
development beneath. During the “Emma-storyline,”75 protagonist Takemura 
Kazuki aids the foreign scientist Emma in the pursuit of a stolen new weapon of 
mass destruction called “M.I.D.A.S.,” at the same time trying to rescue his sister 
Alisa, who is abducted for her scientific knowledge about this weapon. The game 
Japanese only).
74   The term is compiled of the German words Wandern (to hike, to wander, to move around) 
and Panzer (tank).
75   Depending on a choice very early into the game, the player pursues one of two storylines in 
the game. I have only played the “Emma-Storyline” and the following remarks are based on 
this experience.
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is infused with themes like war victims, weapons technology, and violence, and 
offers diverse moments of reflection on these issues, some of which I have included 
in Example 5.376. The protagonist is not a soldier but an engineer and test pilot. 
The story touches upon individual experiences of war and killing several times, 
while nonetheless maintaining that Kazuki and the player have no choice but to 
fight against the attackers.77 In the context of the overarching story, Emma, who 
is responsible for developing M.I.D.A.S., repeatedly agonizes over her action 
and responsibility to mankind, in particular after the weapon is used by an over-
ambitious general.
However, despite the game’s absorbing pace and depth, these reflexive episodes 
remain somewhat superficial. Much more than the rudimentary and unemotional 
animation techniques used in the dialogues, this is a result of the fact that the 
gameplay itself does not reflect this critique of violence and war technologies. On 
the contrary, featuring customizable mecha and diverse weapons in a very similar 
way to the abovementioned Gundam rpgs, it immerses the player into technology 
and rewards a certain amount of admiration and enthusiasm.78 More importantly, 
the battles remain superficial in their treatment of the terrors of war and the fight 
over life and death, as Example 5.4 shows. Human beings are visible only upon 
escape from their wanzers and, most of the time, the action does not refer to the 
death or injuries of those involved in the fights. At the same time, the player has to 
kill every single opponent, even when they have left their machinery and pose no 
substantial threat any more. Yet, complete destruction of a team member’s wanzer 
does not lead to fatal injuries, and neither causes a loss of the robot: if the mission 
can still be completed, machine and pilot are restored. In general, each fight during 
the runaway starts with full specs—ammunition, armour, etc.79 This is not just an 
76   English subtitles for front mission 3 taken from Unos Hambalos’ (2007) Front Mission 3 - 
Game Script (EMMA).
77   This may be a “commonplace” in Carroll’s sense. A similar element is deployed in the 
Gundam story, in which civilian protagonist pilots agonize over their unwilling involvement 
in violent conflicts and war.
78   I will come back to this tension in a later analysis of Metal Gear Solid, where it is explored 
far more actively and with the player as target (see chapter 8, p. 142).
79   This is why Dave Connoy (2003) gives the following advice in his walkthrough: “Don’t be 
afraid of death. The HP of all the parts of all of your wanzers is fully restored at the end 
of each battle, and dead pilots are even magically resurrected!  Fight every battle to the 
bitter end, because you never know what lucky break might come your way.  Of course, an 
arduous battle of attrition will reflect badly on your ranking, so you may want to redo the 
stage anyway.” I will come back to the rather common foregrounding of score over death 
suggested here in a later chapter.
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example of the rule-based contradictions with plausibility the Half-Real (Juul) 
status of videogames (see chapter 4, p. 64) can cause. What is more important 
here is that these contradictions are counterproductive to the game’s attempt at 
delivering a critical message.
Front Mission 5: Scars of the War deals with the problem of physical, mental, 
and emotional damage inflicted by war in more sophisticated ways. Following the 
protagonist, USN soldier Walter Feng, into an armed conflict with the opposing 
OCU, the story touches upon the victims of war, including the traumatized soldiers, 
and further problematizes experiments with brain manipulation and soldier 
enhancement: A soldier in the enemy forces, Walter’s friend-of-youth Glen Duval 
is subjected to such experiments and ends up killing their mutual childhood friend 
Randy O’Neill, whom he no longer recognizes after the manipulation. However, as 
in front mission 3, these critical elements are presented almost entirely through the 
narrative, be it in scripted dialogues or cut-scenes. 
A similar divide between narrative and gameplay can be found in the Ace 
Combat series80, albeit in a very different shape. Ace Combat is a first person flight 
combat simulation.81 From Ace Combat 2 to Ace Combat 6, the series is set in the 
fictional world “Strangereal” (for more details, see wikia 2013b) shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Strangereal political map. Source: Ícaro Ghost37 (2013).
80   For this analysis, I played Ace Combat 5: The Unsung War (2004) and Ace Combat Zero: The 
Belkan War (2006).
81   If not specified further, information about the game world origin in the player’s own 
exploration of the game or the wikia online encyclopedia section “Acepedia” (2013c).
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A major event in the history of Strangereal is the so-called Belkan war, which is 
also the main subject of Ace Combat Zero: The Belkan War. After failing to avert 
a severe economic crisis, the Belkan government is replaced by a faction of the 
far right wing, which brings the country back to economic prosperity and invests 
majorly in a strong military. In 1995, the Belkans deploy their military force in 
an invasion of their neighbouring countries. The success of these expansive cam-
paigns prompts the two super-powers Osea and Yuktobania to enter the conflict 
against Belka. Forced back onto their main territory after several months of fight-
ing against an overwhelming enemy, the Belkans decide to drop seven nuclear 
bombs on their own borderlands in order to build a wall that stops the invading 
forces. The war weakens the superpowers considerably, because their forces are 
outmatched by Belkan military technology. In the aftermath, they dismantle their 
nuclear weapons and elect peaceful governments—not without first creating secret 
military elite forces (see Radford 2006, SY01).82
Whereas Ace Combat Zero presents the player with a retrospective on the 
experiences and missions of a legendary pilot in the Belkan War, Ace Combat 5 
opens with Yuktobania once again declaring open war on Osea 15 years later. Both 
games feature immersive stories83 with a set of interesting characters.84 Despite 
their difficult controls, they offer a thrilling and highly entertaining experience of 
aerial dogfighting. 
At first glance, Ace Combat 5 resembles a realistic flight simulation, since 
if features dozens of different real-world aircraft, including plenty of 
American classics like the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the F/A-18 Hornet, 
as well as Russian planes like the Su-27 and MiG-29. State-of-the-art 
fighters like the F-22 and classic jets like the F-4 and A-10 Warthog 
82   This all suggests strong similarities with our own history, albeit with certain important 
alterations. According to the entry on the “Belkan War” in the Acepedia on wikia (2013a) 
“[t]he Belkan War is based heavily on World War II, with elements of the Gulf War.” This 
interpretation is supported by the German-sounding names of Belkan companies etc. Yet, 
the appearance of nuclear weapons also suggests some influence of the Japanese history 
and the Asia-Pacific War. Unfortunately, a preliminary search could not determine the 
intentions behind the alterations made to this historical basis, particularly with regards to 
the nuclear bombs which are dropped by Belka itself.
83   “Ace Combat’s continued devotion to good storytelling is ultimately one of this game’s best 
strengths, since the presence of so much plot helps to give the missions a sense of genuine 
significance and cinematic drama. The high-quality voice acting, constant radio chatter, and 
stirring, dynamic music combine with the action very well, giving Ace Combat 5 an epic 
feel.” (Kasavin 2004)
84   According to Michael Radford (2006, CH01), this was not always the case in earlier Ace 
Combat games.
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are also represented. In real life, some of these jets handle drastically 
differently, but despite its realistic looks (complete with gorgeously 
detailed plane models and cockpits, and authentic heads-up displays), 
Ace Combat 5 is clearly not intended to be a realistic flight simulation. 
(Review by Greg Kasavin posted on Gamespot.com 2004)
Nonetheless, in its attempt to bridge real aerial combat with entertaining gameplay, 
the series does approach (the illusion of) a realistic experience in its graphics and 
gameplay deliberately—to this end, the designers for example gain expertise from 
the Japanese self-defence forces. To the extent to which Ace Combat aims to offer 
realistic experiences, the vector points towards our empirical reality—even if this is 
a reality not likely to be part of most people’s experience. Although the individual 
player may break out of his or her present in these games, this experience in itself 
does not feature any radical alternatives departing from our reality in drastic ways.
In sum, Front Mission fails to maintain science fictional plausibility in its 
contradictory gameplay, which further weakens its critique. Ace Combat fails 
to depart from reality far enough to provide a science fictional novum that 
corresponds to the theoretical potential of its alternative world. In both cases, the 
combination of narrative and gameplay fails to be science-fictionally plausible. 
Although contradictions between several elements are common in most games, 
the next section shows that some titles, more than others, succeed in deploying the 
science fictional novum more comprehensively than the abovementioned games.
5.4 The Economic Nightmare
Armored Core (hereafter AC) is a long-lasting series of third-person mecha ac-
tion games.85 Its world is ruled by global companies rather than nations or elected 
political entities. The world’s history varies within the series, but in most cases, 
the games present a post-apocalyptic present in the aftermath of a world-wide 
(nuclear) war.86 This major event changed the world’s power balance in favour of 
85   For this analysis, I played Armored Core 2 (2000), Armored Core Nexus (2004), Armored 
Core 4 (2006), and Armored Core for Answer (2008).
86   This event is referred to as the “Great Destruction (daihakai)” in the PSX and PS2 titles 
(from AC released in 1997 to AC: Last Raven released in 2005), and as the “National 
Dismantlement War” in the PS3 titles (since the 2006 release of AC4).The Japanese 
Wikipedia entry for daihakai (Wikipedia 2013f) refers to three different versions of 
this event in the series. In AC4 and AC for Answer, the Great Destruction is replaced by 
a “National Dismantlement War” waged by the leading companies in a situation where 
the national governments are unable to deal with the problems of overpopulation and the 
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the technology companies involved in these wars, which hold all political power 
ever since. Already through its setting, the AC series features a direct critique of 
(neo-liberal) capitalism and ecological destruction in its dystopic future. As the 
Japanese Wikipedia entry on the “Great Destruction”—or “Grand Slam,” as the 
entry calls it—summarizes it for the first titles, its background is 
the distortion of the maximally grown liberal economy. Rapid increase 
of slums and environmental pollution in the industrialized countries 
are paralleled by their fraud against the developing countries, disguised 
as developmental aid. An irrecoverable gap of economic inequality, 
population growth, as well as environmental damage and food 
shortage caused by the destruction of nature, resulted in distrust in 
the governments’ abilities to run the countries. (Wikipedia 2013f, my 
translation)
Beyond a narrative depiction of the consequences such world and its inhabitants 
are facing, the series puts the player in the role of a mercenary tasked with biolog-
ical and economic survival. During the course of the game, the player is offered 
numerous contracts by diverse employers, first and foremost the major companies. 
These missions require sophisticated machinery and advanced weapons technol-
ogy. Piloting a mecha called “Armored Core,” the player has to fight enemy mecha 
and other deadly war machines, both manned and unmanned. The money earned 
from these contracts can be used to purchase new parts for one’s own machine.
With its myriad parts and many interrelated layers of customization, the AC 
series is arguably one of the most complex examples of mecha customization. 
Figure 7 hints at the complexity of the Armored Core setup. With all its options, 
the AC upgrade system requires considerable comparing and research in order 
to be mastered to some extent. Above, I have criticized a similar system in the 
discussion of the Front Mission series or the Gundam strategy rpgs. In all cases, 
mecha are not only an important element of the game mechanic, but also function 
as a customizable object of fascination, targeting an audience enthusiastic about 
(war) machines and technologically savvy. Example 5.5 shows that AC shares 
such technology fetish, arguably propelling it to new heights by offering elaborate 
rise of terrorism and anarchy (Wikipedia 2013c). Whereas this later change can easily be 
explained by a different world setting, earlier games confused their players due to different 
versions of the Great Destruction (Wikipedia 2013b). Released after AC for Answer, AC V 
does not continue the storyline of the earlier titles, but can be considered as a standalone 
project in terms of its narrative and world, and will not be focused on in the following 
section (Wikipedia 2013d).
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designs and various ways of admiring the machine, whether as 3D models or in the 
opening video sequences.
Figure 7. Customization in AC.
Yet, whereas other games do not connect this dominant role of technology 
and customization directly to their science fictional world, the upgrade system in 
AC is a crucial element for conveying the series’ dark vision of an economically 
dominated future. The relation between both elements is achieved by increasing 
the definiteness of one’s actions in several interrelated ways. Among them, the 
payment system can arguably be said to be the most important. In AC, the player 
is rewarded for the actual performance during the missions, which he or she can 
fail to accomplish without having to start all over again. Figure 8 indicates that 
successful and efficient completion raises the income considerably, whereas poor 
and inefficient use of weapons, damage to the Armored Core, or failure to meet 
Tuning system in 
AC for Answer
“Armored Core Schematics 
Interface System” (ACSIS), 
in short, the shop in AC4
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the objectives lowers the reward and may even result in minus balance, since 
ammunition and repairs have to be paid in any case. Losing the ability to upgrade 
the mecha is a major problem, as missions do not get easier.
Figure 8. Two results for the same mission in Armored Core for Answer (l, m), followed by the 
choice to redo or save permanently (r).
The rewards earned in a mission are linked to the player’s performance in other 
series like Front Mission or Ace Combat as well. However, the absolute judgment 
in AC is further elevated by the games’ treatment of the saving function. What 
distinguishes titles like AC4 is that they only allow for saving the entire status upon 
leaving the game, thereby forcing the player to accept less successful missions or 
revert to the frustrating method of restarting the entire game and going through 
the loading process after each suboptimal performance.87 Albeit to a lesser degree, 
such an experience is also part of earlier games such as AC2. Here, successful 
completion, while in itself a considerable achievement for less experienced players 
like myself (see below), may, depending on the actual performance, not return 
sufficient revenues for the necessary upgrades, since ammunition and repair costs 
are generally very high.
Another way of conveying their dystopic message is the high difficulty these 
games display. The Armored Core series is not aimed at casual gamers, but targets 
hardcore fans with sophisticated data analysis and tactical skills, as well as a good 
hand-eye coordination. These requirements complicate the struggle for survival as 
a mercenary substantially. Recent titles like AC Nexus or the PS3 games AC4 and 
87   In other titles, like AC for Answer, the player can choose to redo a mission based on the 
results, accept his or her performance, or cancel the whole procedure, returning to the 
pre-mission state. On the one hand, this effectively weakens the absoluteness of one’s 
performance. On the other hand, it confronts the player with a difficult choice, since the 
earlier results are erased when opting for retrial.
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AC for Answer feature a complex set of commands, which makes use of almost 
the entire range of controller functions. For me as a player used to recent first-
person and third-person shooters, the earlier AC2 controls provided an even 
more demanding challenge, because it neither makes use of the analogue sticks, 
nor offers a key assignment system. With only two key mapping options left, the 
player is forced to master the mecha in a pre-determined, from my perspective 
counterintuitive way. Offering a frustrating initial playing experience, this 
limitation and awkwardness of the controls, however, points to the role controls 
play in the experience of gameplay in general, and the control over technology and 
mecha in particular.88
Together, these elements support and amplify the experience of a world 
dominated by companies and war technology. By deploying the nova of economic 
dominance and mecha technology in multiple elements of narrative, game system, 
and gameplay, the AC series manages to offer an involving experience of survival in 
a world which has turned into a freelance battlefield. It may not surprise the reader 
that some of the skills these games require are familiar from the earlier analysis of 
acceleration and information density in Gundam, in the context of which I have 
discussed them as an uncreative survival strategies.89 The AC series radicalizes 
this tendency almost beyond recognition, confronting the player with a dystopic 
totality in which biological survival—to the extent to which this category exists in 
videogames with their saving and retry options—is directly linked to economic 
survival and the skills necessary to prevail in battle. 
Whereas the lack of narrative context to the missions in many Gundam games 
was perceived as a failure, AC—which, by the way, does feature a vague overarching 
narrative—embeds this lack convincingly into its world view. After all, one does 
not choose to accept contracts due to their political motivation, but because they 
are lucrative and ensure survival. Interestingly, AC for Answer offers a choice 
88   From a contemporary perspective grounded in an ever more realistic and intuitive 
experience of technological control, technical (and thereby often sensual) restrictions and 
limitations in titles like AC2 or early PSX Gundam games such as Mobile Suit Gundam 
(1996) and Gyakushū no Shā [Char’s Counterattack] (1998), can offer a deeply disruptive, 
alienating experience of a ‘lack of control’ over the machine.
89   Interestingly, AC offers the player the choice not to accept a mission or to abort it. AC for 
Answer is well known for requiring of the player nothing more than a successful completion 
of the final two missions—offering enough reward for missions aborted midway to upgrade 
the Armored Core sufficiently. Here, the game departs or abstracts from its economic logic, 
because it is conceivable that companies aiming towards profit and efficiency would not 
hire an unreliable mercenary repeatedly.
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between several companies the player can join as a hired mercenary, including an 
independent faction, as shown in Figure 9. 
“The world’s largest corporation. 
It primarily operates as a defense contractor. 
Their craft proudly display military colors and 
feature excellent defense and heavy weaponry.”
“A military corporation with political might on their side.
They tend to keep their distance from both GA 
and the Interior. Their craft are standard, highly 
maneuverable Rosenthal machines.”
“An independent mercenary unaliated with 
any corporation. The only available craft is 
an older Rayleonard model, built for close 
range combat. Good luck.”
Figure 9. Ideological choices in AC for Answer. Translation taken from Ramza411sb’s (2011) 
“Interactive Let’s Play Armored Core: For Answer.”
At first glance, this might suggest some space for morally or ideologically driven 
decisions. However, betraying any such expectations, ideology is reduced to choic-
es between different machines.90 The general tendency of the series suggests that 
90   This is most aptly expressed in the following section of a walkthrough by Acid Losvaize 
(2009, ACFA03, errors in the original): “When you start the game, will be prompted about 
some options, and finally about your sponsoring company. Whatever you choose, it won’t 
affect storyline, just your initial gear and parts that will be in the shop at first. When I begun 
the game, of course chosen independent type, but I think it’s better to take Interior Union 
since Tellus legs and core are premium quality, and you will be able to buy two Altair by 
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this is not a flaw in the game design, but may well be read as a way of conveying 
the final consequence of this world: the irrelevance of ideology in the everyday 
struggle of the mercenary to survive the economic nightmare.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter examined several major tendencies in the field of relevant science 
fictional videogames defined in the last chapter. It identified some of the ways in 
which mecha are deployed in different series, ranging from means of address-
ing franchise fans or a technology-savvy audience attracted to war machinery to 
proper nova in the sf sense, which are effective not only visually but also in the 
gameplay rules and experience. The fact that these tendencies cannot be separated 
clearly makes the mecha an ambivalent device in Japanese sf games.
The analysis suggests that the most dominant franchises on the market are not 
necessarily the most promising from a political point of view. As adaptations, the 
Gundam games feature a deconstructive tendency in the context of the adapted 
universe and offer the player a new perspective on and experience of their universe. 
However, in most cases, they remain self-referential and are dominated by skinning 
practices—a tendency even stronger in hybrids like Gundam Musō or crossover 
series like A.C.E. The review of adaptations leads to the conclusion that a random 
selection of database elements does not suffice to generate disruptive conflicts. 
These results make me wonder if ‘databasification’ can offer the “piquancy of 
surprise” and “change” at all, which Hutcheon (2006, 4) regards as major potential 
of adaptations. As games in their own right, the analyzed Gundam titles have 
proven to be ambiguous cases, perpetuating the contemporary conditions on the 
one hand, and offering strategies for survival on the other. Overall, they remain 
repetitive and do not offer genuine alternatives or novel strategies of resistance.
At the same time, the above sections emphasize the importance of the novum, 
highlighting different ways in which it is deployed. Independent series like Front 
Mission, Ace Combat or Armored Core offer the player an alternative world one 
cannot but call dystopic. In all cases, the dark tenor is that the effort made towards 
selling one of the crappy samsara or medusa weapons. I strongly recommend you to do this. 
Drawback of choosing Interior instead independent… you are losing blade dragonslayer (I 
mean, you don’t have it and can not buy blades until later in the game), that is quite useful 
to kill AF’s. Besides, AALIYAH gear is more expensive than TELLUS, so economically 
you lose choosing this last one. Anyways, for me is best to have two Altair from the first 
mission.”
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living together in peace cannot prevent a fiercely fought global war about resources 
and power. Yet, Front Mission and Ace Combat proved to stop short of deploying 
a novum in their gameplay, restricting it—and with it their political message—to 
the conventional narrative layer. This does not make their universes as such less 
science-fictional or their gameplay less enjoyable, but weakens their overall appeal 
as sf games because it leads to implausible contradictions rather than plausible 
disruptive conflicts, thus working counterproductively to the critical elements 
displayed in the story or setting. 
An example of a more encompassing deployment of the novum was found in 
the sophisticated dystopia of the Armored Core series, which does not only transfer 
the player into a post-apocalyptic world, but reflects and amplifies this setting in its 
gameplay and rule set, thus offering a total, compelling and frightening experience 
of life under extreme conditions. This finding is supportive of Suvin’s (1982, 6) 
claim that in the most effective or optimal sf, 
a sufficiently large number of precisely aimed and compatible details 
draw out a sufficiently full range of logical implications from the 
central S-F novum und thus suggest a coherent universe with overall 
relationships that are—at least in respect of the thematic and semantic 
field associated with the novum—significantly different from the 
relationships assumed by the text’s addressees.
In this sense, a preliminary conclusion that informs the consecutive analysis is that 
the computopic might be politically most potent where games mobilize a wide 
spectrum of their expressive elements or combine these elements in intriguing 
ways. In the light of the strong dystopic tendency found in the first exploration, a 
major question for the following chapters is whether games can only function as 
critical and disturbing devices, because their logic is so strongly interwoven with 
our present that they remain bound to it, or whether they also offer disruptive 
and more promising visions, which point to directions of possible systemic alter-
natives. To show that this is the case, the chapters of part III focus on three areas 
of computopic expression, namely narrative, representation, and rules, which are 
particularly apt to address the political dimension of time, aesthetics, and action 
in distinct and potentially radical ways. The analysis concentrates on titles, which 
explicitly make these themes a central subject of the gameplay and deploy their 
science fictional nova on multiple aspects of their computopic universe. 
Part III  Analysis
6 Temporal Alternatives
How does it feel to be dead, Eike…? 
(Shadow of Memories, 2001, Prologue)
In the last chapter, I showed how accelerated gameplay provokes an intense and 
distracting experience in the player. The speed of play permits little to no time for 
reasoning and political action geared towards new undertakings, which shows that 
time plays a crucial role in political action. Recognizing the complex, multi-lay-
ered temporal structure of the computopic space and its contingency, the following 
chapter asks if videogames can deploy their temporality in disruptive ways, thus 
pointing to a novel understanding of time capable of reconfiguring action possi-
bilities.
6.1 Time and Politics
Videogames are characterized by a peculiar multi-layered temporal structure. 
Chapter 5 points to some of the temporal features and the rhythms of action in vid-
eogames, which can range from merciless acceleration in shooters to player-con-
trolled interruption in turn-based strategy. Narratives and the ability to “save” or 
“pause” games add further temporal layers, which are often combined or contrast-
ed playfully.
This potential for a playful engagement with time is of particular interest here 
because our perception of time influences our history, economy, society, and, most 
importantly, our politics. In the light of a recent rise of attention on history and 
historical memory, including its materialization in memorials, Itagaki, Ryūta, 
Jeong Ji Young and Iwasaki, Minoru (Itagaki, Jeong Ji Young, and Iwasaki 2011, 8-9) 
observe a “mnemonic turn” in the present. As already mentioned, Frederic Jameson 
(2007) laments a “colonization of the future,” by means of which the latter appears 
predictable, thus ruling out alternative possibilities. The repressive function of 
prediction and calculation has also been observed by thinkers like Hannah Arendt 
(1970, 6-7), who specifically criticizes the practice of “scientifically minded brain 
trusters” and their tendency to render open hypotheses and predictions into facts.
All these observations speak of the pervasiveness of a linear understanding 
of time and its influence on our present situation. Often in combination with 
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notions of progress (see Gellner 1964, 40-49), this linear time serves as a widely 
unquestioned basis for society and economy. Barbara Adam (1994, 9), for example, 
argues that “[t]he members of such [contemporary industrialised; mer] societies 
use the concept of time not merely to synthesise aspects of mind, body, nature, and 
social life, but they also employ it on a world-wide basis as a standardised principle 
for measurement, co-ordination, regulation, and control.”
Robert Hassan (2009, 16-17) claims that the present can be defined as a second 
empire of speed, which, following the first empire dominated by the clock, is 
now dominated by global capitalist economy and connected by an information 
network, demanding of its subjects flexibility, unquestioning obedience, and blind 
action. In his analysis, Hassan draws on Paul Virilio’s pessimist observations on 
our increased acceleration (see chapter 5, p. 78). Virilio (2006, 159) fears that 
with this acceleration of the contemporary war of time, “properly human political 
action will disappear.” However, it is far from self-evident that time is linear, 
although this understanding appears adequate in the biological realm. Barbara 
Adam (1994, 16), for example, claims that all time is social time, emphasizing 
its status as a social construct. Recognizing this constructed character of time, 
Virilio devotes considerable attention to identifying accidents of acceleration 
that interrupt the contemporary speed of linear time. In The Aesthetics of 
Disappearance, he discusses the disruptive effect brief “picnoleptic” absences of 
the mind in the everyday, “[t]he return being just as sudden as the departure, the 
arrested word and action are picked up again where they have been interrupted,” 
can have on our linear perception of time (Virilio 2009, 19). Inspired by Virilio, 
this chapter examines the ways in which videogames confront us with temporal 
conflicts capable of disrupting our socially constructed, linear understanding of 
time. For this, I turn to the science fictional trope of “time travel” and its capacity of 
confronting us with temporal paradoxes (see Ryan 2009). The next section shows 
how this capacity takes on different shapes in the computopic.
6.2 Computopic Temporality
Analyzing a series of time travel narratives, Marie-Laure Ryan (2009) shows how 
the flexibility of the imagination can be deployed to create temporal paradoxes, 
which contradict our “intuitive idea” that time flows in a fixed direction, that one 
cannot go back in time, that causes precede their effects, and that the past cannot 
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be changed. 
Whether temporal or not, paradoxes are the unimaginable at the heart 
of an imaginable world. We deal with them logically by putting them in 
quarantine, so that they will not infect the entire fictional world; we deal 
with them philosophically, by regarding them as thought experiments 
aimed at destabilizing common-sense conceptions of time; and we 
deal with them imaginatively, by putting ourselves in the skin of the 
characters whose life is being invaded by the irrational. (160)
Ryan identifies non-linear temporality as “unimaginable” and “irrational.” 
Paul Ricoeur (1980, 169), who devotes much effort to discussing the temporal 
structure of literary events, goes even further, arguing that our understanding 
of time is reciprocally connected to the narrative. Ricoeur (1984, 3) claims that 
“time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a 
narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features 
of temporal experience.” However this does not mean that narratives are necessarily 
linear. On the contrary, for Ricoeur (1980, 178-179), “emplotment” is a dialectic 
process between succession and configuration. More generally, he tries to identify 
the non-linear potentials of what he regards as a mimetic three-step involved in the 
poetic act, by which “a prefigured time […] becomes a refigured time through the 
mediation of a configured time” (Ricoer 1984, 54). In other words, Ricoeur aims 
to show how the movement from emplotment—the configurative practice that 
restructures the successive events authored by human action—to the act of reading 
and making sense of a configuration by linearizing it again, can entail glimpses of 
non-linear time (82-83).
How does this relation between time and narratives appear in the computopic 
space, with its aforementioned multi-layered, contingent temporality? Contingency 
and repeatability are not limited to videogames or the digital realm, but can be 
regarded as general features of media. As Fabian Schäfer (2010, 103) points out, 
media display a long history of annihilating the traditional space-time continuum 
by replacing linear narration with less determined structures. In the case of 
videogames, particular interest has been devoted to temporality, because videogames 
are not bound to material singularity. As already mentioned, Aarseth (1997, 3) 
regards videogames as “machine[s] for the production of variety of expression” 
(see chapter 2, p. 29). From this perspective, the peculiar temporal expressivity 
of the computopic space partly stems from the fact that “the experienced sequence 
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of signs does not emerge in a fixed, predetermined order decided by the instigator 
of the work, but is instead one actualization among many potential routes within 
what we may call the event space of semio-logical possibility” (Aarseth 1999, 33). 
Apart from this emergent, non-narrative potential, other authors emphasize the 
tension between fiction and rules. As Tavinor (2009, 115) observes, videogame 
fictions “have mixed uses [...] and the function as a game seems to be somewhat 
inconsistent with the function as a narrative.” In a similar sense, Galloway (2006, 
92) states that “while games have linear narratives that may appear in broad arcs 
from beginning to end, or may appear in cinematic segues and interludes, they also 
have nonlinear narratives that must unfold in algorithmic form during gameplay.”
The contingent results of player input indicate the importance of the player’s 
temporal experience. Aarseth (1999, 37) states that “ergodic time […] depends on 
the user and his actions to realize itself. There is no action without a participating 
observer. At the same time it determines the user’s sense of experienced time 
within the event space. In the clock-work world of the game, events occur when 
the controlling program enacts them, and when the user acts on the same level. 
The event time is the basic level of ergodic time.” Further observing that successful 
player input provokes in-game progression as another layer of temporality, he 
suggests that videogames feature three layers of time, namely the time of player 
actions, the time of game events clocked by the computer, and the time of game 
progression triggered by successful player action (37-38).
In a more recent approach, José Zagal and Michael Mateas (2010, 848-851) 
propose the concept of temporal frames, i.e. sets of events each featuring their 
own temporality. Granting that other frames exist or may be added in individual 
cases, the authors identify four common temporal frames, namely real-world 
time (events happening around the player), game world time (events taking place 
within the represented game world), coordination time (events that coordinate the 
actions of multiple actors), and fictive time (application of socio-cultural labels to 
a subset of events). The layer of coordination time refers to the temporal rhythm of 
action and the oscillation between multiple actors as coordinated by the computer. 
Their examples include synchronizing multiple players in a network, but also the 
temporal characteristics and rhythms of turn-based games. This frame might be 
an interesting addition where the analysis focuses on the influence technology 
plays on the game experience in depth. For the purpose of this thesis, I will ignore 
or rather subsume it under the category of game event time which it structures 
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in part, and from which it remains hard to distinguish in single-player games. 
In Figure 10, I have sketched how Aarseth’s emphasis on ergodic contingency 





























































Figure 10. The temporal structure of videogames.
In this model, any gameplay session, symbolized by the large arrows, involves at 
least three different temporal frames. Multiple sessions (either by different players, 
or the same player) may contribute to a specific successively unfolding computopic 
world, in which the player follows a story to the end, or may generate different 
worlds altogether, in which different stories or events take place. In the following 
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exploration, I focus on the ways in which the expressivity of the computopic 
space can be deployed deliberately to create disruptive temporal experiences. 
Interestingly, Zagal and Mateas (2010, 854) mention a potential friction between 
these multiple frames of temporality: “The relationships between different, often 
coexisting, temporal frames within one game can result in a sense of temporality 
that is inconsistent, contradictory, or dissonant with our experience of real-world 
time. We call these relationships temporal anomalies.”
While not elaborated on by the authors, this notion of the anomaly is a helpful 
starting point in for the analysis, because it points to nothing else than potential 
temporal conflicts disruptive of our ‘normal’ or common temporal understanding—
as their choice of the term anomaly suggests. Against the background of Ricoeur’s 
emphasis on the event, its narrative structuring, and the actors involved in the 
process, the following sections examine several sites of disruptive temporal 
conflicts, focusing on the two time travel games Chrono Trigger (1999) and Shadow 
of Memories (2001). 
6.3 Playing at the End of Time
Time and time travel are central themes in the rpg Chrono Trigger (herafter CT). 91 
In the game, the player has to save the earth from its future destruction, travelling 
back and forth between times as distant as 6500000 B.C. and 2300 A.C. Follow-
ing the example of other Japanese rpgs, the game features several areas—the more 
common spatial separation is replaced by a temporal one—which have to be visited 
in a more or less predetermined order to proceed. All areas offer various quests at 
various stages of the overarching narrative and have to be revisited several times. 
The game world events are strongly pre-structured in the beginning, leading the 
player through several introductory stages that set up the story and familiarize him 
or her with the gameplay. Later chapters are more open and, in lack of guidance, 
require more intensive detective work.
While travelling, the player has to combine the strength of multiple characters 
to solve quests and fight mighty enemies, employing both brute force and magic. 
91   Chrono Trigger was created and released by Squaresoft (today Square Enix) in 1995 for 
Nintendo’s Super NES and in the version used here ported by Tose for the Sony Playstation 
in 1999. Outside of Japan, the game was first released for the Nintendo DS in 2008. If not 
stated otherwise, knowledge about the game originates from my own gameplay or the 
“Chrono Trigger” section of the Chronopedia on wikia (2013d).
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In this sense, the game can be said to be an example of the tendency towards sf-
fantasy hybrids, which I have rejected above. However, I have nonetheless included 
it in the selection because in the context of time travel, this ambiguity is actively 
reflected on in a side-narrative about scientific progress. The first of a series of 
time gates is opened accidentally when a princess’ pendant reacts to a scientific 
demonstration of a teleporter at the Millenial Fair in the game’s present. Other 
gates follow and are revealed to respond to magical forces, but at the same time, 
the game features a scientifically constructed time machine called “Epoch,” which 
frees the player from the restrictions the locally bound time gates imposed. This 
scientific achievement affords an openness and contingency, which contributes to 
the genuine quality of the widely acclaimed feature of multiple endings in CT (see 
Figure 11).
Figure 11. Multiple endings in CT. Compiled based on Haunter 120 (2004), McFadden 
(2003), nemiminijam (2009), Pringle (2009), wikia (2013e).
These endings, or rather the entry points to them, emphasize the successive 
character of the game event time, which is linearized in online walkthroughs by the 
frequent use of “after” and “before.” Departure from the path of the conventional 
ending “Beyond Time” not only requires specific actions during certain spans of 
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For example, ending 3 is frequently referred to as the most difficult one to achieve, 
because the player has to defeat the last boss moments after entering the game, 
with only two characters and without the additional supplies one can built up 
later during the game. Due to this structure, the command over game world time 
through player choice—insofar as events can be delayed or hastened—seems to be 
reintegrated into a mechanism of acceleration, which rewards higher skills with 
shorter completion times.
Yet, several objections complicate this conclusion. First, the ‘quick and skillful’ 
solution to the game not only takes away large portions of the experience—which 
seems counterproductive considering that the game is supposed to be entertaining. 
It should also be mentioned that some of the endings, like ending 3, are only 
accessible after the first successful conclusion. Thus, rather than pointing to short-
cuts in a linear narrative, the structure of multiple endings in CT encourages 
repetitive gameplay and extensive skill development. Rather than accelerating or 
contracting, this structure prolongs the player’s experience of the game, in which 
each ending can be regarded as a puzzle piece needed for ‘completely completing’ 
the game. In a sense then, the multiple endings do not only expand the experience 
beyond the initial completion, they also render narrative time spatial, with player 
choice as the factor relating the computopic worlds—challenging the player to 
explore the CT universe by straying from the obvious paths.
The number of endings available limits this potential. Yet, this limitation 
should not be regarded as restriction per se. On the contrary, if the number of 
endings were in fact unlimited, their pursuit would become random, arbitrary, 
and meaningless.92 The spatialization of narrative multiplicity is only effective as 
long as it stays in touch with defined narrative structures and thus generates a 
tension between limitation and openness. This suggests that the player not only 
influences the outcome of the game (its narrative path and ending), but also is able 
to reconfigure the events individually. At the same time, online walkthroughs show 
how multiplicity and temporal complexity in CT prompt cooperation between 
92   As HIRYUU (2006) puts it on rpgclassics.com: “Ah, Endings. They give games life. What 
a great advent for the gaming community. Sure, Pac-Man can be fun, but is it really fun to 
just keep playing until the game simply crashes on you? We, as a society, yearn for closure, 
and the endings provided in the games give us satisfaction, and they allow us to reflect back 
on our accomplishment, and realize that we have become the masters of our domain. We 
have taken this untamed beast of a game, and completed it, and the ending for the game is 
our great reward. Often, games may disappoint with their endings. A simple showing of the 
credits and little else (or that stupid ‘That’s Benjamin, you nut!’ line in FF: Mystic Quest). 
Luckily for us, Chrono Trigger features a multitude of endings for our greedy selves.”
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various individuals, who all contribute to the goal of understanding the game 
inside-out, completely completing it even in respect to details not directly relevant 
for the gameplay.93 
In its openness, contingency, and multiplicity of endings, CT appears as a model 
case for the ergodic cybertext and the tension between lasting pleasure and skill-
based abruptness. However, it remains coherent even in its contingency. The 
different temporalities are historically continuous, and the ending variations leave 
the linear cause-effects relation intact. 94 A similar tendency can be observed in 
other games, like Final Fantasy X, of which Dennis Washburn (2009, 160) argues 
that it “serves as an analogue to Japan’s experience of modernity. A linear perception 
of history that stressed the concept of progress through the development of 
technology and the rise of the corporate state led to the intense production of sites 
of collective memory as a way to simulate the sense of possessing a shared identity, 
history, and culture.”
In contrast to the consistent contingency in CT, Shadow of Memories (hereafter 
SoM)95 disrupts such overall compatibility with linear time radically. A third person 
adventure, SoM centres on the protagonist Eike Kush, who is assassinated in the 
prologue. Eike wakes up in a strangely disordered space, where the mysterious 
creature Homunculus offers him assistance in his struggle for survival. Accepting, 
he is presented with a time travel device called “digipad.” In a total of 10 chapters, 
each of which starts with a new successful attempt on Eike’s life, the player has to 
navigate the protagonist back and forth between four time zones, 1580, 1902, 1980, 
and 2001, and, using the revived Eike, alter the already known future by changing 
the past. Through Eike, the player can explore his environment and engage in 
conversations with the inhabitants. All actions take a specific amount of time, and 
if the player fails to rearrange the past successfully after a certain span, he fails to 
prevent Eike’s death and the game ends.
Like CT, the game features several endings depending on certain player choices. 
93   See for example the credit sections of “A” Tadeo’s (2001) or KoritheMan’s (2008) walkthrough. 
This kind of voluntary, intense cooperation is quite common in videogames and deserves 
more attention from the perspective of community studies—attention this thesis cannot 
grant it.
94   Whereas some of these appear rather unmotivated, most can be explained logically from 
the earlier gameplay, such as the appearance (or absence) of several characters the player 
can choose to rescue, spare, or kill during the adventure. 
95   Lead designer of SoM is Kawano Junko. The game was released by Konami for the PS2 in 
2001, and later ported to the XBOX, the PC, as well as recently to the Playstation Portable. 
In the U.S., it is published as Shadow of Destiny.
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A closer look at the relation between the multiple endings and the overarching 
narrative in SoM shows, however, that this game experiments far more radically 
with the player’s sense of time than CT does. The player starts SoM without much 
information about the protagonist or his world. Throughout the chapters, he or 
she finds more and more hints about the connections between the inhabitants 
of the different times, their relation to Eike, and the reasons why he is targeted 
in the first place. However, the epilogue reveals that the culprit is in fact another 
character who obtained the ability to travel through time, and who targets Eike 
for something he did during his travels to the past—a journey to the past which 
he embarked on only to avert the threat to his life. To the extent to which this 
‘conclusion’ involves a temporal paradox, it suggests the logical impossibility of its 
narrative, disappointing any expectation of clarity on the part of the player. The 
multiple endings featured in SoM shown in Figure 12 amplify this effect.
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Unlike the coherent picture in CT, they confront the player with contradictory 
conclusions. These conclusions range from eternal life for Eike or the logical im-
possibility of his existence due to the death of the Homunculus in the past, to Eike’s 
ironical death by accident in the present after the threat is already averted. Thus, 
the epilogue appears as a stage for the playful, paradoxical and often deliberate-
ly inconsistent treatment of the overarching narrative. While somewhat parodist, 
these endings do not lose touch with the vague overarching plot, thus tempting 
the player to engage with their content. In other words, the overarching narrative 
and the paradoxical, subversive conclusions are related reasonably enough—and 
linked by the fictive game history strongly enough—to challenge the player into 
pursuing them. Yet, ultimately revealing their incoherence, they create what could 
be called an experience of ontological anxiety. In Ricoeur’s terms one might say 
that the game offers a glimpse of a non-human time, to the extent to which the 
poetic act confronts the player with a disruptive conflict, because he or she is un-
able to emplot or narrate the paradoxical events, but can neither easily dismiss the 
connections between the events and regard the overarching narrative as postmod-
ern—that is, fragmented and decontextualized. 
Without an overarching narrative in place, the effect of these contradictions 
would not be experienced as disruptive. However, by means of temporal paradoxes 
and narrative inconsistencies, the game confronts the player with the impossibility 
of narrating its events in any coherent way. As with the example of CT, the 
effectiveness of this strategy is made possible and at the same time restricted by the 
limited number of endings, pointing the player towards collecting versions instead 
of aiming for a narrative totality. As Figure 12 indicates, such collecting is promoted 
by the designer, who rewards the successful collector with an additional ending 
(EX) only accessible once all other endings have been experienced. However, here, 
the desire for collecting or mastering the game completely is deliberately played 
out against the impossibility to narrate the game. As long as the player does not 
abandon the narrative layer entirely, this conflict between ending collection and 
narrative closure can have a disruptive effect on our sense of linear temporality.
6.4 Death as a Solution
The computopic universe of SoM offers an alternative to such narrative engage-
ment. Each chapter features several events and cut-scenes unrelated to either the 
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pursuit of the initially proclaimed game goal of survival, or a deeper understanding 
of the game world history. In chapter 5, for example, Eike promises the little girl 
Sybilla a kitten in 1902 (see Example 6.2). The player can choose to travel back to 
2001 to fetch the kitten or not, or might decide to skip the meeting with Sybilla 
overall in favour of a faster pursuit of the chapter goal. Neither choice has any 
impact on the outcome of the chapter (Eike’s survival) or provides more informa-
tion about the overarching narrative. However, completing the kitten side-quest 
contributes to raising the player’s achievement in the chapter, as a screen after the 
ending of the game reveals (see Figure 13).
Figure 13. Achievements first author attempt at SoM.
As with the multiple endings, this feature attracts repetitive play, this time 
targeting the game system. Contrary to the initial impression of linearity and a lack 
of choice, each chapter offers many more scenes to discover, many more kittens to 
give, so to speak, each contributing to player achievement.96 While again pointing 
to the structure of limited prolongation and complete completion mentioned 
96   Tavinor (2009, 126-127) argues that the gameplay in SoM is too inert and limited in its 
choices and its interactivity. In his view, SoM provides “only very superficial authorial 
control on the part of the player”—and, he adds, necessarily so, since “definiteness” is a 
crucial factor for narrative success. I have made similar claims about the importance of 
closure and finiteness above, and agree with Tavinor that SoM offers less contingency than 
open-world games. However, unable to exhaust the game in my explorations on either the 
narrative or the systematic level, I have to admit that I do not agree with his claim about the 
lack of choices. 
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earlier, the player is confronted with a far more vague 
system, which demands more extensive, calculated and 
planned exploration and collection. The Percentage 
FAQ by JackSpade (2002, see Appendix A) is not only 
based on repetitive, interrogative play, but also shows 
that the complexity of the system prompts multiple 
theories about its nature, as put forward by JackSpade 
and Roberto Corsaro (see parts highlighted in grey in 
Appendix A).
Such approximation of the inaccessible, non-
disclosed elements of the computopic through what 
could be called a playful process of falsification is a 
common methodology for playing—and in my case, 
analysing—videogames. In SoM this exploration of 
the system’s boundaries can be profoundly disruptive, 
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Figure 14. Multiple death 
scenes in chapter 2.
Arguably the strongest expression of such conflicts 
can be found in what JackSpade refers to as “multiple 
death scenes” (hereafter “mds”). Figure 14 shows a map 
of the mds in the second chapter of the game, which 
I have documented in Example 6.1. Mds are scenes 
that add to the achievement and have to be collected 
by triggering the protagonist’s death deliberately. After 
the repeated introductory dialogue (i1) following the 
first death, the player can either choose to depart to the 
past immediately—the move suggested by the blinking 
digipad and the anticipated assassination—or try to 
walk away from Dana. The second, initially counter-
intuitive move results in a different conversation with 
Dana (d1 & d2), followed by another death. After the 
second assassination, the Homunculus tries to teach 
Eike how to use the digipad (H2). 
Following this, the player witnesses a different 
version of the introduction (i2). Walking away from 
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Dana once more unlocks another dialogue (d3) and a blunter hint from the 
Homunculus (H3) after the third death. This strategy works one more time (i3 and 
d4), until the events start repeating themselves after the fourth assassination.
In this way, mds explicitly create a conflict between systematic completion and 
the original narrative structure and game goal of survival, prompting an active 
departure from it. Importantly, their disruptive character is not simply a way 
of enacting an Other reality, in which death is not the end—the latter is quite 
common in videogames. Rather, its disruptive power is derived from the fact that 
it is in open contradiction with the reasonable narrative game goal of survival 
and thus the player’s earlier experience of the game. This tension negotiates our 
understanding of time, actively confronting the dominance of linear narratives and 
biological time.
In a strange way, the system-oriented play reverses Paul Virilio’s (2006, 46) 
dictum that “[e]verything in this new warfare [of the contemporary war of time; 
mer] becomes a question of time won by man over the fatal projectiles towards 
which his path throws him. Speed is Time saved in the most absolute sense of the 
word, since it becomes human Time directly torn from Death.” In the assault on 
the game system and its interest in percentage, the player uses the ‘immortality’ of 
the protagonist in the computopic space as a probe, subjecting time and even death 
to the aim of total numerical domination. In the absence of any emphasis on player 
skills, progression is achieved by repetition and death. 
This structure is, again, not unique to SoM. However, because the game deals 
with time explicitly, these moments become temporally disruptive, whereas 
they are simply part of the rules in other cases. The designer indicates that she 
deliberately aims to trigger reflections and thinking about time, both in an 
abstract philosophical sense, with themes like destiny, memory, time travel, the 
Homunculus, or eternal life, and in a practical sense related to the player’s everyday 
experience: when visiting the library in chapter 5 (see Example 6.2), the player 
may pick up a fictive book from the shelf, which asks in its title Is being busy being 
happy?97 While engaged with narrative play, this appears as a reflexive, almost 
parodist moment, because the player is busy ensuring Eike’s survival and would 
not stop in order to read the book, even if that was possible. Yet, the game system 
provides precisely this kind of disruptive escape from narrative linearity and speed 
at the expense of death.
97   I am grateful to Harold Hays (Leiden University) for pointing this out.
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6.5 Paradoxical Action
Both CT and SoM explore the science fictional trope of time travel, albeit in very 
different ways. CT positions time travel (the “End of Time”, the “time gates”, and 
the time machine “Epoch”) between magic and technology, deploying it to create 
narrative coherence and to relate diverse game spaces meaningfully. On the level 
of rules and game system, time travel serves to justify the limitation of the number 
of active characters at one time, 98 as the OLD MAN explains when the protagonist 
first reaches the “End of Time” in the game:
OLD MAN: Why, this is “The End of Time,” of course! All lost travelers 
in time wind up here! […] It is pretty bleak here… But not to worry. 
All time periods connect here… You can visit your friends whenever 
you wish! But you can never travel in groups greater than 3… (Chrono 
Trigger 1999, translation taken from WaterExodus 2011)
One might say that, by referring to time specifically, the game draws our attention 
to the question how rule-based structures can be translated into a temporal frame-
work. At the End of Time, all potentialities (non-active characters) wait to be called 
up by the player. Against the background of the time travel narrative, this might 
challenge us to imagine a timeless space connected to all moments in history, in 
which all discarded characters and potentialities in general dwell until further 
notice. This ‘timelessness’ of space is, in a way, technically adapted to the Epoch, 
which allows the player to access any time available in the game at any time. Where 
Virilio’s dromology suggests a reduction of space to temporal immediacy, CT re-
duces historical time to instant accessibility.99 At the same time, the game events 
put the player in charge of speed and rhythm to the extent to which they have to be 
triggered by his or her input. However, in CT, this command over the emplotment 
and the restructuring of time and history it implies, is limited to flânerie and lev-
elling-up before turning to the next task, thus leaving the temporal linearity intact.
In contrast, SoM deliberately deploys time-travel to create paradoxical situations. 
What is more, the player can actively cause and explore them. Frequently, the 
98   As with most single-player role-playing games, CT features multiple characters who are 
different from each other in appearance, skills, and function within the group. Given 
the limited number of characters allowed in the fights, the player has to decide on which 
characters make the best combination, rearranging them according to the upcoming tasks 
and adversaries.
99   To the extent to which this temporal multiplicity can be translated into a spatial multiplicity, 
a similar structure can be found in most rpg, in which the player traverses great distances in 
the beginning—only to be presented with accelerated or even instant transportation means 
later on in the game. Themability appears also on this level.
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player enters so-called causal loops. Ryan (2009, 150-151) asserts that “you cannot 
travel back in time,” pointing out the potential conflicts time travel causes for the 
common one-directional cause-effects relation and the impossibility of changing 
history. Example 6.2 shows a contracted version of chapter 5, the major events 
of which can be ordered (configured) as in Figure 15. The figure includes the 
successive player time (pt2), the configurative game event time (gt2), and two 
versions of the fictional time, one referring to the configurative (in-game) and one 
to the successive (overarching historical) ordering of time. As in other chapters, the 
player can alter the past in chapter 5 in ways that effect the present. The red emphasis 
in the figure shows the paradoxical effects of some of these changes. Eike receives a 
kitten from Eckart Brum in the museum in 2001. As soon as the player uses him to 
change the past by recommending a library in the conversation with Alfred Brum, 
the event in the museum cannot be possible if we conceptualize historical or world 
time as a linear flow. That is, if the past and the future are connected in the way 
in which they are commonly perceived, the alteration in 1902 should also have an 
effect on the present, which follows it even if the player has experienced it at an 
earlier point in his or her time. This example of a causal loop is an effective use 
of the multi-layered temporality in videogames, insofar as it contrasts the player’s 
successive experience of the gameplay (pt2)—his knowledge of earlier events and 
chapters—with the configurative and highly selective character of the events that 
define the rhythm of the game world time (gt2) but, referring to a fictive layer of 
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Figure 15. The temporal structure of the main events in SoM, chapter 5.
The references to a successive history throughout the game are deployed in a 
disruptive and ontologically threatening way, because the fictive history (ft2) 
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contradicts the player’s successive experience (pt2) of the SoM universe and its 
events (gt2). The only way to explain the events is by translating the configurative 
game world time into a successive story of progress with regards to the task of 
surviving. Such linearized game world time marks the difference between what 
Ryan (2009, 154) distinguishes as a pragmatic sense of time based on our everyday 
experience and a purely temporal sense of time. She argues that backward causation 
only appears reversed in a pragmatic sense, whereas in a strictly temporal sense, 
one might say that time runs in one direction but some causal relations run in 
the other. With this distinction in mind, one could say that some events of the 
game world time in SoM are diagonally opposed in their causal direction to its 
fictive time. This not only provides an explanation for the temporal structure 
itself, but also indicates that from the perspective of player experience and his or 
her pragmatic sense of time, this reversal can appear disruptive precisely because 
it goes against intuition, prompting him or her to make sense of the conflict or 
anomie between the temporal frames.
Philosopher David Lewis discusses the paradoxical nature of time travel in 
the second volume of his Philosophical Papers. Lewis (1986, 69-70) distinguishes 
external time or “time itself ” from personal time, the latter functionally understood 
as “that which occupies a certain role in the pattern of events that comprise the 
time traveler’s life.” In order to solve the problem of diverging temporalities, he 
suggests that “whereas a common person is connected and continuous with respect 
to external time, the time traveler is connected and continuous only with respect 
to his own personal time” (72). Based on this distinction, Lewis proposes to solve 
the paradox of “inexplicable causal loops”—instances where a time traveller erases 
the cause of his own existence—by replacing the concept of successive time with 
that of a “branching time,” the branches of which would have to be separated “not 
in time, and not in space, but in some other way” (80).
From this perspective, each event potentially marks the beginning of a new 
branch from the traveller’s point of view—who does not return to an altered future, 
but to an alternative one on a different branch. In the context of videogames, one 
could identify the player’s actions as the link between different temporal branches, 
which is frequently discussed in terms of labyrinths and tree structures. The 
structure of the multiple endings in CT and SoM (Figure 11, p. 102; Figure 12, p. 
105) can be regarded as examples in this respect. Likewise, one can conceptualize 
the alterations made during time travel as bifurcation of temporal branches in the 
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game world time (with Lewis, “time itself ”), which remain linear in the successive 
experience of player time (“personal time”).100 This observation highlights both 
the importance of action for relating the worlds of a computopic universe, and the 
crucial contribution the successive frame of player time makes to our experience of 
videogame time. Yet, a closer look at chapter 5 reveals that the temporal structure 
of SoM is even more complicated, once we take the mysterious—somewhat 
magical—creature Homunculus and his dwellings into account as an additional 
novum next to the digipad. In Figure 16, I have related the game events and the 
successive player experience of the introduction to chapter 5 with the fictional time 
of the protagonist.
Figure 16. Temporal multiplicity in chapter 5 of SoM.
100   The implications of this claim cannot be fully explored here. The myriad ways in which 
the player can actively influence a game world reality could suggest that, on a theoretical 
level, even the metaphor of branches cannot cover the situation comprehensively. This 
problem seems to be closely related to Lewis’ differentiation between actualization—here 
the choice of a path somewhat predefined by the designer—and actual change—something 
not intended in the game system. “You cannot change a present or future event from what it 
was originally to what it is after you change it. What you can do is to change the present or 
the future from the unactualized way they would have been without some action of yours 
to the way they actually are. But that is not an actual change: not a difference between two 
successive actualities” (Lewis 1986, 76). This suggests that the character of the action and 
its relation to the game world might be framed as ranging from meaningfully-actualizing 
to radically-meaningless and unpredicted. It would be interesting to discuss these issues in 
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The figure shows how SoM creates an intricate multi-layered temporality by reviv-
ing the protagonist after death. The game presents the player with the successive ex-
perience (pt1 + pt2) of two alternative configurations of events, gt1 and gt2, which 
are both related to the fictive in-game time ft1. During gt1, the fictive duration of 
the dinner sequence or Eike’s death cannot be determined. Considering that Eike 
is outside on the street at the beginning of gt2, when the player takes command, 
it seems safe to assume that he has already had his deadly meal. However, given 
that it takes only 1:45 minutes for the poison to take effect during gt1—the time 
dialogues take is reflected fairly accurately on the progression of fictive time of the 
game—the amount of time the player has to solve the puzzle in gt2 contradicts this 
hypothesis. If, on the contrary, Eike has not been poisoned yet, one might wonder 
when the attack is committed, given that the player controls Eike during gt2. Yet, 
when we travel back to 10 PM in 2001 after obtaining the antidote, the same Eike 
is already intoxicated and has only 10 seconds to live—this span is fix regardless of 
how long the player takes to solve the riddle.
If the strange “doppelgänger” is not ascribed to the mysterious, magical powers 
of the Homunculus, this paradox can only be explained if we accept that Eike has 
in fact split for some time and merged again (hence the two fictional timelines in 
the figure), combining both experiences/histories again as soon as the quest for the 
antidote is completed. Thus, while SoM suggests some coherence on the surface, 
a closer look reveals that time travel is deployed here in a vague, not necessarily 
logical way. This is not entirely surprising, given that the game sets off with the 
resurrection of a dead protagonist. However, it nonetheless provokes the player 
to think about its temporality and question its possibility, to the extent that even 
branching time cannot cover. The player, who experiences both gt1 and gt2, is left 
with a strange uncertainty caused by the fact that the structure of each chapter 
makes enough sense to be enacted successfully with ease, but at the same time 
appears logically and ontologically impossible. By presenting us with a conflict 
between the clear sense of time applied when solving the puzzles and a radical, 
impossible temporal structure, the game confronts us with the question, if not the 
everyday practice of reducing temporal complexity to a functionally framed, linear 
set of events that obscures our own temporal complexity.
To the extent to which the temporality generated in this conflict does not follow 
common sense or logical considerations, the effects of a player’s actions are not 
fully predictable and can only be justified on the basis of the game system and its 
| 6 Temporal Alternatives |
requirements. In its repetitive and tentative attempts in trial-and-error fashion, 
SoM allows us to play with and experience its temporal complexity beyond logical 
or imaginative engagements. In addition to Marie-Laure Ryan’s list of logical, 
philosophical, and imaginative ways to deal with temporal paradoxes and fictional 
irrationality (see section 2, p. 97) SoM offers the player a computopic universe 
for experimenting with such paradoxes in action.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the ways in which Chrono Trigger and Shadow of Mem-
ories deploy time travel to facilitate narrative coherence or to create disruptive 
temporal conflicts. Added to the initial figure of videogame temporalities, these 















































































Figure 17. Temporal disruption in SoM.
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Based on a rough characterization of temporality in videogames, I showed how 
the multiple, paradoxical and contradictory endings in SoM create a tension in 
the context of an expected narrative closure, disrupting our sense of linear history. 
On another level, the narrative goal of survival and its underlying assumption of 
linear, biological time is contrasted with a systemic goal of collecting scenes and 
raising achievements, at times by actively departing from the narrative and thus 
from linear time. A last, profoundly disruptive conflict was shown to exist in the 
tension between linearity and action itself. Here, the player is the source of conflict, 
because he can not only enact paradoxes of time travel, but also proceed despite 
the contradictory or inconsistent temporal character of the world. In this, SoM 
shows that videogames have the potential to confront the player with a paradoxical 
temporality that can be enacted even if it cannot be emploted with sufficient 
coherence.
For Ricoeur (1984, xi), the plots we invent are “the priviledged means by 
which we re-configure our confused, unformed, and at the limit mute temporal 
experience.” The conflicts that arise between different plots and temporal layers 
in SoM in turn confront us with temporal uncertainty. Here, understanding, in 
Ricoeur’s sense of grasping the operation that unifies events into one whole and 
complete action (x), is not possible. This impossibility leaves the player puzzled, 
and maybe curious. In the instances discussed above, repeated, contingent player 
action and its related temporality seems to make a crucial contribution, be it due 
to the memories of successive experiences of multiple game worlds, due to the 
potential to change the past in various ways, or due to intuitive action in lack 
of a comprehensive understanding of the presented world. This highlights the 
importance of player memories and the linear progression of player time. Michel 
Nitsche (2007, 149) observes that reversal and repetition in videogames have a 
distinct expressive quality because they are experienced as different due to the 
knowledge the player gained in each attempt. Drawing on these observations 
in his discussion of memory in videogames, Souvik Mukherjee (2011, 8) argues 
that “[w]hen the gamer revisits and replays a certain part of the videogame many 
times, the actions might look the same and the remembered instances might all 
be seen as copies of each other. However, these remembered instances vary and 
paradoxically, although they might represent the same event, they are different.” 
Here, difference is a function of the accumulated memories of the player, which 
change the perspective on a scene with each repetition. SoM turns this effect upside 
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down by consciously disrupting our sense of continuity and rejecting our attempts 
to connect the events experienced during the player’s successive experience of 
multiple playing sessions.
Insofar as videogame play not necessarily depends on interpretation, but more 
directly on action, Ricoeur’s model of the successive mimetic three-step might 
have to be revised in a sequential study. The player is not only in part responsible 
for configuring or “emploting” the computopic through configurative gameplay 
(mimesis 2, targeting game world events), this emplotment is also immediately 
experienced, interpreted (mimesis 3) and can in turn be adjusted. This suggests a 
partial coexistence of the second and third mimesis. Furthermore, in the absence 
of certainty, the “worldly” actions (mimesis 1) which serve as the basis for the 
poetic act (mimesis 2), are in part actions the player has to carry out in order to 
make sense of the world and its plot. In other words, in the closure of computopic 
spaces of Otherness, the player contributes to all three mimetic steps, albeit in 
a limited sense insofar as it is pre-structured by the designer (emplotment). In 
this sense, videogame temporality may be regarded as contraction of the mimetic 
three-step described by Ricoeur, and a merging of its protagonists.
In all cases, the disruptive conflicts risk being ignored. In this respect, the 
science fictional novum of time travel, and that of the Homunculus, appear as a 
particularly direct, deliberate, and explicit way of both achieving such a tension, 
and resolving it—after all, their existence can be blamed for all inconsistencies if 
necessary. However, I maintain that SoM succeeds in confronting the player with 
disruptive temporal conflicts. Deliberately combining the structural potentials of 
videogames with the plausible but potentially vague character of the novum, the 
game offers a universe particularly rich with peculiar, “anomal” temporal moments 
and challenges the player to think about the nature of time and its mechanisms.101 
In the extreme case, this includes the failure to structure gameplay experiences 
in SoM in narrative terms. Against the background of Ricoeur’s insistence on the 
reciprocal relation between the narrative and human time, this can be interpreted 
as a sign of radical, non-human temporal Otherness.
Videogames like SoM might not offer a concrete alternative conceptualization 
of time—given the long-noticed difficulty of explaining time in general, this is not 
surprising. However, the disruptive conflicts identified arguably have a similar, 
101   I would go as far as to claim that, such contradictions cause a vague feeling of disruption 
even if the player does not attempt to find reasonable explanations in every instance.
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if not stronger effect as Virilio’s “picnoleptic” absences of the mind, of which he 
claims that
[i]f you admit that picnolepsy is a phenomenon that effects the 
conscious duration of everyone, […] anyone would now live a duration 
which would be his own and no one else’s, by way of what you could call 
the uncertain conformation of his intermediate times, and the picnoleptic 
onset would be something that could make us think of human liberty, in 
the sense that it would be a latitude given to each man to invent his own 
relations to time. (Virilio 2009, 31-32)
To the extent to which SoM allows us to reconfigure, restructure, and play with 
time beyond linearity and even beyond logics, it confronts us with temporal liberty 
in a distinct, radically experiential way. In literary fiction,
[n]arrative paradoxes are like the holes in a Swiss cheese: they only 
exist as holes because they are surrounded by a solid texture of rational 
events. They differ from what is commonly regarded as “plot holes” in 
that they are an integral part of the plot and a source of meaning, rather 
than an inadvertent contradiction or insufficiently justified motivation 
that the reader either oversees, forgives, or regards as a defect. (Ryan 
2009, 160). 
In games, the player can configure time on multiple levels, and repeatedly so. 
Whereas narratives involve a disruption of linear time only in the emplotment of 
actual events, the disruptive potential of SoM is grounded in the fact that the player 
can configure events already on the level of the events that serve as the basis for the 
emplotment. This includes repetitive play and the possibility to experience different 
temporal configurations within the same universe, juxtaposing the pursuit of 
survival with the deadly systemic achievements. Contrary to my initial assumption, 
the disruptive temporal conflicts in SoM are not based on non-narrative qualities 
alone, but rather depend on a powerful narrative and a suggested successive, linear 
temporality for their tension. On a very general level, the disruptive, experimental 
quality of repetition and playful exploration is possible to the extent to which it 
is limited: Ricoeur’s insistence on the reciprocal relation between narrative and 
human time here appears as the condition for temporal disruption, with the human 
player as the agent of a successive experience. How else could the shifts and breaks 
be meaningful? 
7 Alien Aesthetics
Ultimately perhaps, […] the alien, fully assimilated, its Difference 
transmuted into Identity, will simply become a capitalist like the rest of 
us. (Jameson 2007, 141) 
Sensual expression is an important element of the computopic space. To the ex-
tent to which it involves visual, sonic, or haptic signals, gameplay is also accompa-
nied by an aesthetic experience. The term aesthetic experience is at the centre of 
a vivid discourse about the possibility of novelty; a discourse which is concerned 
with whether we can literally imagine or experience something new. The following 
chapter asks if and how the computopic space can contribute to novel aesthetic 
expression and experience. In doing so, I am not asking whether videogames are 
beautiful or artistic. This question has been addressed by several recent inquiries, 
which discuss videogames as art.102 Rather, the analysis focuses primarily on the 
sensorial experience of gameplay and the interaction of the player with the com-
putopic world and its inhabitants, asking what conflicts arise from it and how they 
might influence and stimulate our political ideas, thoughts and visions.
7.1 Aesthetics and Politics
The aesthetic experience itself is characterized by a paradoxical relationship be-
tween immediate sensual perception and mediate aesthetic judgment about what 
is perceived. Thomas Munro and Roger Scruton (2010, no pn) summarize this par-
adox in an entry on “Aesthetics” in the Encyclopædia Britannica Online as follows:
[T]he expression aesthetic judgment seems to be a contradiction in 
terms, denying in the first term precisely that reference to rational 
considerations that it affirms in the second. […] On the one hand, 
aesthetic experience is rooted in the immediate sensory enjoyment of 
its object through an act of perception. On the other, it seems to reach 
beyond enjoyment toward a meaning that is addressed to our reasoning 
powers and that seeks judgment from them.
102   For a general discussion of videogames as art, see Tavinor (2009). For other approaches on 
videogame aesthetics, see for example Phillip D. Deen (2011), who applies John Dewey’s 
aesthetics to videogame play, or Michael Burden and Sean Gouglas (2012), who examine 
the aesthetics of algorithmic play in the game Portal.
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As the entry explains, this contradiction has attracted the attention of many phi-
losophers. Some have, for example, attempted to bridge the two by invoking the 
imagination. The difficulty, vagueness and complexity of the issue is hinted at in 
the evaluation the entry offers of such attempts: “[E]ven if we find this general in-
vocation of imagination, as the ‘synthesizing force’ within perception, vacuous or 
unilluminating, we may yet feel that the imagination has some special role to play 
in aesthetic experience.”
This chapter does not intend to offer an account of the theoretical relation 
between the aesthetic experience and the imagination in general. Rather, it limits 
its attention to those moments in which the aesthetic experience can be a site of 
disruptive conflicts and novelty. Aesthetic conflicts or aesthetic novelty are not 
only stimuli for political imagination in an abstract sense. Jacques Rancière points 
out that aesthetics is also a direct condition and limitation for political action. 
Rancière (2008, 34) regards politics as a conflict about the nature and demarcation 
of a common space, about defining common objects and identifying those who 
possess the ability to a common language, in a general sense of the word. He 
calls this division of space “distribution of the sensible,” meaning “the system of 
self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence 
of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts 
and positions within it” (Rancière 2004, 12). In his view, our concept of aesthetics 
is such a distribution, “a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the 
invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the 
stakes of politics as a form of experience. Politics revolves around what is seen and 
what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, 
around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (13).
For Rancière, both politics and art aim to (re)define the boundaries of this 
common space. “Politics and art, like forms of knowledge, construct ‘fictions’, 
that is to say material rearrangements of signs and images, relationships between 
what is seen and what is said, between what is done and what can be done” 
(Rancière 2004, 39, see also Rancière 2008, 35). In plain terms, the distribution of 
the sensible influences the common space we perceive as field of political action, 
as well as the action we perceive as possible in this space. Political action and 
aesthetic experience, in turn, have an effect on this distribution and may shift it 
towards formerly politically irrelevant or even unknown realms. The question is, 
whether aesthetic conflicts in the computopic space can contribute to such shifts 
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in the boundaries of what is perceived as common, thus stimulating novel, radical 
imagination and respective action.
Once again, the underlying question is, if and how novelty or, in this case, 
‘aesthetic Otherness’ is possible. Rancière emphasizes the discriminatory function 
of the aesthetic distribution of the sensible, but does, as far as I can see, not give 
a clear answer to the question if the invisible is non-existent or only not relevant. 
In other words, he remains vague about the possibility of absolute Otherness. As 
already mentioned (see chapter 2, p. 11), Jameson expresses doubts about the 
possibility of absolute Otherness more explicitly. In the context of aesthetics, he 
reiterates these doubts, stating that “a new quality already begins to demand a new 
kind of perception, and that new perception in turn a new organ of perception, and 
thus ultimately a new kind of body” (Jameson 2007, 120). His introductory quote 
questions our ability to imagine the Other in the first place. With this sceptical 
challenge in mind, the following sections examine a series of potentially novel 
aesthetic experiences in videogames. More specifically, I turn to representations of 
the alien as one of the most radical and, as Goto-Jones (2010, 22) observes, literal 
encounters with science fictional Otherness.
7.2 The Alien in Computopic Space
Discussing the possibility of radical Otherness in Stanislaw Lem’s science fiction, 
Jameson (2007, 116-117) concludes that radically alien life can only be contacted, 
perceived and imagined at the cost of replacing its unknowability and absolute, 
non-communicable Otherness with anthropocentrism. In order to make sense of 
the unintelligible alien covering Solaris, we have to apply known categories like 
friend/enemy. Even “in imagining ourselves to be attempting contact with the 
radically Other, we are in reality merely looking in a mirror” (111). In Lem’s The 
Invincible, on the other hand, we are confronted with a seemingly radical combi-
nation of “intelligent non-organic” crystals. Yet, a closer look reveals that they are, 
in some way, also a product and thus connected to human ideas of production and 
the limitation of our imagination to human artifice (113-115). The only successful 
strategy against the impossibility of knowing and representing the alien Jameson 
(140) refers to explicitly, is a consequently partial representation, as found in the 
film Alien, in which the audience never sees more than parts of the creature.
Adam Roberts (2006) does not reject the possibility of radical Otherness as 
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vehemently as Jameson and at the same time puts a stronger emphasis on the 
emotional quality of the alien. Discussing the film Blade Runner, he claims that the 
“combination of human, childlike innocence and ingenuousness with a machine-
like strength and ruthlessness […] provides the replicants with their uncanny 
metaphoric potency,” Roberts identifies a more extreme example in the Borg of 
the Star Trek universe, which “represent everything the Federation is not, focusing 
our attention on the way their mode of being is literally beyond our ability to 
comprehend” (118). For him, the Borg represent “the true nature of ‘otherness’; an 
alien […] radically and totally unlike you or me or anything we can conceive. […] 
It is impossible for us to enter imaginatively into the world of the Borg because 
certain key values we hold, values like individuality, life/death and so on, are too 
centrally part of us, whereas for the Borg they are neither good nor bad but simply 
irrelevant” (121-123).
Both authors thus express the idea that the alien as a radical Other is only 
possible in the impossibility of representation, intelligibility, or imagination. This 
negative existence of the alien points to a central tension in the idea of disruptive 
conflicts. In his Alien Autopsy, Goto-Jones (2010) argues that science fiction, as 
a reflexive, critical genre in Suvin’s and Jameson’s sense, requires the alien to be 
cognitively estranging, but familiar enough to ensure continuity and to serve as a 
mirror for critical self-reflection that points toward innovation. “SF aliens should 
not be so very alien after all: we should recognize ourselves (and the possibilities of 
ourselves) in them, otherwise they do not estrange us they simply alienate us” (23). 
On the one hand, this points to the requirement of some kind of familiarity, or, 
what I have referred to as plausibility. On the other hand, it points to the limitations 
of the familiar to estrangement and critique. I have identified the question, if these 
limitations can be overcome, as a question of the possibility of novelty generated 
by disruptive conflicts. The problem for the analysis of the alien then is, how and 
how far disruption can reach into the realm of novel alienation without losing its 
plausibility, and how much it is ‘confined’ to critical estrangement. 
The alien itself remains a vague term, beyond its appearance as a “literal” site 
of the tension between sensual immediacy and aesthetic judgment. In this sense, 
once could be tempted to regard it as equivalent with the term Otherness, with 
which I generally refer to novel differences from our known empirical reality. 
However, this abstract feature is an element of all computopic spaces to a certain 
extent, because they offer us worlds detached from our common experience. The 
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alien is used here as a more specific case of Otherness. As such, it combines the 
aesthetic dimension of sensuous experience and interaction that interests me 
in this chapter, with the element of life as a common denominator in all above-
mentioned discussions and arguably the most promising source of disruption. As 
such, the alien embodies the tension between familiarity and alienation: plausible 
to the extent to which it appears as life, and disruptive to the extent to which its 
‘living’ is utterly different from ours. In my subjective evaluation of the alien and 
its difference in the following sections, I am guided by my own experience and the 
few vague indicators Jameson and Roberts offer, namely contact or interaction, 
intelligibility, imagination, and emotional impact.
A brief look at the potentials and limitations of the computopic for expressing 
alien life helps to focus the exploration. In the computopic space, objects are 
enacted by the computer. In the sense that many objects feature some kind of action 
in the shape of routines, a formal distinction between a door and an attacking 
enemy is quite difficult. This does, however, not imply that one needs to invoke 
the perspective of “object-oriented ontology” (OOO), which regards all objects as 
equal on an ontological level (for a short description, see a post by Ian Bogost on 
his blog from December 8 Bogost 2009). Instead, the notion of disruption demands 
for inquiring how this action is experienced as living. 
Beyond action and movement in general, many designers have been concerned 
with the responsiveness of the videogame world and its inhabitants. Whether based 
on rigid routines and algorithms, or on an ever more complex and sophisticated 
artificial intelligence, designers often attempt to simulate life in games.103 Real-
time strategy games and first-person shooters show the evolution of variable and 
procedural elements in videogames most explicitly, confronting the player with 
seemingly intelligent, human-like opponents and realistic environments.104 Given 
103   For Japan, Tane Kiyoshi (2011, 23-24) observes how Otherness [tashasei] and its 
representation was already an important aspect of games at an early stage. He traces its first 
evolution to the transition between Breakout and Space Invader, showing how the latter 
turned the fix block obstacles of the former into an ‘actively’ attacking [nōdōteki ni kōgeki 
shite kuru] enemy who thinks for itself. A similar evolution can probably be observed in the 
history of videogame design elsewhere as well. This desire for intelligent Otherness later 
focused much attention on the growing field of artificial intelligence.
104   In a talk about “The Future of Game, AI, and Computer Graphics” at the annual meeting 
of the Digital Games Research Association Japan (DIGRA Japan) in Kyōto on February 
25, 2012, Square Enix’ lead A.I. researcher Miyake Yōichiro (2012) discussed recent trends 
in game A.I., pointing out that in the pursuit of realism that characterizes a share of the 
contemporary first-person shooters, artificial intelligence is more and more ‘humanized’ by 
adding accidental mistake routines. At the same time, he showed how the environment is 
| 124 |
| Part III  Analysis |
the absolute superiority so-called “bots” theoretically have in videogame worlds 
over the human player, the ways in which the A.I. systems are restricted in order 
to make them human-like, and to provide a challenging but manageable task for 
the inferior human player, can certainly be a very interesting field for philosophical 
inquiries. However, this is not the place for such endeavour, because this thesis is 
more interested in the concrete ways in which the responsiveness and Otherness 
A.I. systems and videogame objects in general facilitate alienate us and question 
our common experience of human behaviour. In other words, the focus of this 
analysis has to be on the disruptive qualities the alien has in its ‘non-humanness.’
As argued above, expressions of movement, rules or routines, and action 
cannot be divorced from their representation. This means that we need to take 
a closer look at the representation of the alien. As mentioned above (see chapter 
2, p. 26), computopic representation is partial and transformative, because it 
shows only a part of the entire world at once, and reduces the data to a humanly 
perceivable amount. With regards to the latter, Manovich (2002, no pn) argues that 
the transformation maps phenomena that are beyond the limits of human senses 
and reasoning into a representation “whose scale is comparable to the scales of 
human perception and cognition.” It remains to be seen whether this potential for 
partial or non-representation can have similar effects to the partial representation 
in Alien referred to by Jameson. It seems at least theoretically possible that the 
alien is comprised of complex data beyond our comprehension of life, only pointed 
to vaguely by its representation.105 More so, since I have argued that computopic 
worlds and their representations are also partly unimagined—that is, not predicted 
by the designer in every detail in advance (see chapter 2, p. 32)
Lastly, against the background of Jameson’s emphasis on the impossibility of 
contacting the alien, the analysis has to pay attention to the ways in which the 
computopic facilitates interaction with such life. Frequently, gameplay is described 
with reference to cybernetics and Donna Haraway’s (1991, 150) influential 
Cyborg Manifesto, in which she develops a the idea of the hybrid “cyborg as a 
fiction mapping our social and bodily reality and as an imaginative resource 
increasingly enhanced by intelligent behaviour of animals and plants. 
105   Manovich’s reference to life may not be a coincidence. In his conclusion, he claims that “the 
real challenge of data art is not about how to map some abstract and impersonal data into 
something meaningful and beautiful – economists, graphic designers, and scientists are 
already doing this quite well. The more interesting and at the end maybe more important 
challenge is how to represent the personal subjective experience of a person living in a data 
society.” (Manovich 2002)
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suggesting some very fruitful couplings.”106 Jon Dovey and Helen Kennedy (2006, 
109), for example, claim that “[i]n the lived enactment of gameplay, there is no 
player separate to the interface and game world; there is a fusion of the two into 
a cyborigan subjectivity – composed of wires, machines, code and flesh.” In their 
view, the avatar is a cyborgian representation of the player character and the player 
actions, the sonic, haptic, and visual experience of which is communicated to the 
player (112). 
This claim has to be re-examined carefully. Firstly, because it presupposes the 
empirical validity of Haraway’s cyborg—a claim Haraway (1991, 149) herself 
does not make about her self-declared “ironic dream” or “ironic political myth.” 
Secondly, because it could imply that the player is not aware of his or her separation 
from the computopic. Both theoretically and based on my own experience as a 
player, such generalization is problematic and questionable. Games can certainly 
offer an intense experience that makes the player forget his or her surroundings.107 
However, this focus on the events in the game does not imply that the player 
(subjectivity) has merged with the avatar in any psychological or emotional way, let 
alone materially. This thesis is not the right forum to discuss these issues in depth, 
because their empirical analysis would require a decisively different methodology. 
Given my focus on aesthetic experiences as stimuli to our radical imagination, 
my main interest rather lies in the possibilities of aesthetic Otherness in the 
computopic space. This brief discussion highlighted several important dimensions 
of the alien and its computopic possibility, and pointed to a series of possible 
directions and questions for the analysis. With these in mind, and with the necessary 
scepticism about Otherness, I would like to turn to the games Rez (2001), The 
106   For Haraway (1991, 149), the cybernetic organism is a symbol for the hybridity of human 
being and technology in fiction and lived experience “that changes what counts as women’s 
experience in the late twentieth century.” Its hybridity stems from its resolute commitment 
to “partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely 
without innocence. No longer structured by the polarity of public and private, the cyborg 
defines a technological polis based partly on a revolution of social relations in the oikos, the 
household” (151).
107   This is generally discussed by terms like immersion and “flow.” According to the influential 
work of psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1996, 110), flow refers to an “optimal 
experience” in an “almost automatic, effortless, yet highly focused state of consciousness,” 
which is experienced by diverse people in diverse activities such as sports, art, or work. 
Games and videogames appear highly compatible with flow, because they share many of its 
core conditions or elements listed by Csikszentmihalyi, for example clear goals, immediate 
feedback, a balance between challenges and skills, a merging of action and awareness, the 
exclusion of distractions from consciousness, no worry of failure, the disappearance of self-
consciousness, a distortion of the sense of time, and that the activity becomes autotelic 
(111-113).
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Chikyūbōeigun [The Earth Defense Force] (2003) and Shinseiki Evangelion 2 [Neon 
Genesis Evangelion 2] (2003), which confront us with various kinds of disruptive 
and even alienating life.
7.3 Minimal Response and Uncanny Indifference
A particularly uncanny expression of the alien can be found in the low-budget 
production The Earth Defense Force (hereafter EDF).108 According to Inoue Akito 
(2012, 159-160), the game is a masterpiece of game design because it is easy to 
learn due to its simple rules, involves an impressive enemy, and offers a rewarding 
experience.
Shortly after starting up EDF, the player character is attacked by a herd 
of giant ants which cover the screen completely. This in itself already 
makes the game a masterpiece, but in addition, the confused player can 
easily succeed in fighting off the enemies by pressing random buttons, 
and is commended to do this via radio. Before knowing what is going 
on, the player starts to feel like the protagonist in a monster movie. […] 
In the first five minutes, one learns how to play and gets a taste of the 
core attractiveness of the game.” (160, my translation)
As Example 7.1 shows, EDF is a minimalist game that confronts the player 
with an uncanny enemy invader and requires scarcely more than to move and pull 
the trigger. The uncanny effect of the ants is first of all created by their size and 
number, by which they literally penetrate our sight, sometimes covering all the 
world from the player’s eyes. Compared to the properly UFO-like space ships the 
game features, the ants are by far the most alien objects present, although they 
are modelled after a well-known life-form in our environment. This is not only 
a result of the appearance, but to a greater extent stems from their seemingly 
uncoordinated, insect-like movement and their unintelligible mind-set, which, 
despite their invasive intentions, seems to be programmed for random aggression, 
as Example 7.2 shows. 
The ants are an invading force, which cannot be reasoned with. At the same time, 
108   EDF is a low-budget sf game developed by SANDLOT and published by D3 Publisher as 
volume 31 of its “Simple 2000 Series” for the PS2. According to its Nico Nico Pedia (2013) 
entry, the game sold more than 100000 copies. This success prompted several sequels up to 
today, and the EDF-series is reported to have sold a worldwide total of 1.5 million copies, 
making it considerably successful (Wikipedia 2013e).
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they appear strangely disoriented and disinterested and may attack the player from 
far away, run him over or simply pass him by. This internal contradiction in the 
artificial alien intelligence between the signalled intension of invading earth and 
the disinterested, seemingly random movement, is the main source of much of the 
disruption experienced in the gameplay. It is emphasized by the lack of choice on 
the side of the player, for whom effective extinction is the only meaningful action 
in the game. In order to proceed to the next stage, the player has to eradicate the 
enemy to the last ant—while the invading insects sometimes seem quite content 
with aimlessly crawling through the empty streets of Tokyo.109 In addition, they 
move more freely through the environment than the player and occupy it more 
totally, due to their agility, size, and numbers. The destruction to man-made 
architecture is mostly caused by the player and the  collateral or intentional damage 
he inflicts. By confronting us with this kind of imbalance, EDF not only amplifies 
the uncanny experience of the alien, but also disrupts the player, who is—deprived 
of any alternatives to shooting—alienated from the openness and emergent quality 
of human life in an entertaining way. 
A similar minimalist tendency is at work in a different, arguably more radical 
way in Rez.110 The on-rail shooter charges the player with hacking the cyberbrain 
space [dennō kūkan] of a futuristic computer system called “Project-K,” in order 
to re-active its A.I. “eden.” According to the designer’s description, eden went to 
sleep to escape from the overwhelming information in the overpopulated and 
uncontrollable size of the network society the management of which it was created 
for (game manual for Rez, 2-3). A critically acclaimed game on the border to 
responsive videogame art, the music-infused shooter “blurs the line between user 
input and audio/visual feedback, creating a unique sensory experience” (Giant 
Bomb Wiki 2013). Rez features a distinctive artistic style based on responsive 
polygon and wireframe representations and sound effects triggered by the player’s 
109   Where else should the last stand of humanity in a Japanese game take place? Still, EDF 
shows how the implicit or explicit nationalism in many videogames—which is not limited 
to Japanese productions—takes on a rather parodist notion. Such (possibly unintended) 
effect is even stronger in other titles of the Simple2000 Series, such as THE Saigo no 
Nihonhei: Utsukushiki Kokudo Dakkan Sakusen [The last Japanese Soldier: taking back the 
beautiful home land] (2007), in which the player has to reclaim the Japanese prefectures one 
by one against an overwhelming number of enemy soldiers—with each prefecture offering 
regional food specialties to collect in the way to victory.
110   Rez was developed by SEGA’s United Game Artists and released by SEGA for the Dreamcast 
and the PS2. In 2008, lead producer Mizuguchi Tetsuya released an HD version for the 
XBOX 360.
| 128 |
| Part III  Analysis |
actions, along with a trance soundtrack that grows complex with each new “layer” 
the player accesses in an area. “All of the environments move and fluctuate with 
the beat, adding to the synaesthesic effect of the game” (Giant Bomb Wiki 2013, 
see also Wark 2007, or Wikipedia 2013n). The game manual itself advertises this 
experience as follows: 
Gentlemen, open your senses. Go to Synaesthesia. You can transform 
the world into your original Sounds, Lights and Vibrations just by 
locking and shooting the enemies. You will discover the [sic] brand new 
time full of rhythm as well as ecstasy. The instinct “Rez” is now finally 
being released. Can you really tear yourself from this sense of trance? 
(game manual for Rez, Coverpage)111
Example 7.3 shows that Rez goes beyond deploying abstract, minimalist art112 
in order to represent the computer network. This alone would hardly be innovative 
in times where, as Manovich (2002) puts it, the fact that in computer media 
anything can be mapped to anything makes specific choices appear arbitrary.113 
Rather, despite its rigid patterns and on-rails character, Rez is emergent in its 
responsiveness to player input, which is mapped dynamically onto the sensual 
expression of the game world. This is a distinct feature widely acclaimed. “[W]hat 
sets this game apart from all others of its ilk is that with every lock on, every shot 
fired, and every missile deployed, a sound is made that is tonally aligned with the 
music and synched up with the beat. In addition to the enemies all having these 
attributes, this creates the effect of the user essentially improvising the song as they 
play” (Giant Bomb Wiki 2013). In other words, the synaesthetic quality of Rez is 
derived from its dynamic representation of contingent player input. 
In addition, the game features a numerical element based on a hidden rule-set. 
Contrary to the initial impression, the game world is vast and offers long-time 
engagement, if the player is willing to play repetitively.114 It includes several hidden 
111   According to the Wikipedia (2013t) entry on “synaesthesia,” the term refers to a perceptual 
variety, due to which someone experiences a sensory or cognitive stimulation involuntarily 
in a second sensory or cognitive pathway. Artistically, synaesthesia is used to refer to multi-
sensory experiments or the simultaneous perception of multiple stimuli.
112   The game’s designer acknowledges the influence of Wassily Kandinsky (see Sotenga et al. 
2012), who is known for his experiments with synaesthetic art.
113   The world in Rez does not at all appear arbitrary—rather, the “synaesthetic” is a result of a 
conscious combination of highly compatible styles (trance music, abstract polygon visuals, 
wireframe environments).
114   Wark (2007, 138) claims that “[t]he only real problem with Rez is that it does not have 
enough levels. Victory is temporary, or rather temporal. You can defeat time in the game, 
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stages and modes, which are only accessible after outstanding performances in 
other areas (see Appendix B and C). Such achievement becomes increasingly 
difficult and requires training and concentration. Thus, it is in stark contrast to 
the experience of effortless action or “flow” the game offers in an early stage. 
However, this oscillation between a rigorous regime of numerical data, calculation, 
and precision, and a playfulness of sensual aesthetics is a powerful and arguably 
unmatched representation of the computopic and its Otherness.
In the gameplay, “analysis” is not only a part of the score displayed after each 
level, but literally the way the player approaches the sensual explosion on the 
screen: one permanently tries to distinguish threat levels and to identify power-
up items on time. I have referred to this kind of analytic but strangely unfocused 
gameplay in an earlier chapter as intense reception in distraction (see chapter 5, p. 
78). However, by generating a tension between the analytic gameplay and the 
synaesthetic pleasures of its responsive environment, Rez offers a direct opposition 
between the two elements of aesthetic experience and generates a distinct 
representation of the unknowable inside of a computer network. This tension is 
amplified and at the same time resolved—one is tempted to say synthesizes—in 
the so-called “Trance Mission,” which has to be unlocked with considerable effort. 
As Example 7.4 shows, the Trance Mission abandons the game itself, confronting 
the player with a never-ending cyber-space in which neither goal nor death exists. 
Deprived of the avatar, the player plays without aim, risking to be trapped in the 
experience, as Axem Rangers (2002) remarks in his review of the game:
Quite possibly the coolest, most original of these unlockables is the 
hidden area Trance Mission. It’s an endless, repeating mode where the 
enemies fly in very simple patterns and don’t attack. It sounds boring, 
and it is for a few minutes. But after a few repeats of all the enemy patters, 
you literally begin to fall into a trance. You zone out. You play without 
thinking. Your eyelids become heavy. Play Trance Mission for too long, 
and it’s hard to stop...
In a leap into absolute Otherness, both the player and the usually threatening en-
emies abandon any intentionality and engage in a synaesthetic dance in a space 
beyond. In experimenting with the boundary between games and art, Rez offers 
but only for a time. And having won all there is to win, boredom looms…” After several 
hours of intense play which brought me nowhere near mastery, I have to admit that I do not 
share this critique.
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an enclave for the experience of play as “to-and-fro movement without aim” (see 
Gadamer in chapter 2, p. 17). For Adorno (2001a, 116), the “uselessness” of art 
is in itself already a political critique in a world defined by functional purpose (see 
also Geuss 1998, 302). In the context of this chapter, I propose to refine this general 
statement by arguing that the uselessness of this experience is only meaningful in 
the context of the tense computopic universe in which it is situated. This meaning 
is amplified not only by the general tension between experience and analysis, but 
also by the vocabulary of nature and evolution deployed in other areas and partic-
ularly in area 5, in which not only the sound becomes more complex, but also the 
landscape grows, as Figure 18 shows.
Figure 18. Emergent nature in Rez area 5.
Here, the game comes close to “Artificial Life art,” which is marked by “[a] 
general desire […] to capture, harness or simulate the generative and ‘emergent’ 
qualities of ‘nature’—of evolution, co-evolution and adaptation” (Penny 2010, 197). 
Against the background of these references to biological life and the hostile nature 
of the computer network in most areas, the Trance Mission not only disrupts our 
sense of purpose usually applied to everyday life. Presenting its players with a 
disinterested, rigid, non-responsive alien life, it also alienates them from the game 
itself, risking to bore them immediately with its playfulness. Contrary to this risk, 
Axem Rangers’ above-cited description of the experience points to the fact that this 
space can successfully invite the player to become part of it. 
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7.4 Absolute Terror and Uncanny Love
A very different kind of alienation is generated by the numerical representations of 
the mental and emotional condition of characters in Shinseiki Evangelion 2 (here-
after Eva2).115 Roughly adapting the hybridity of its source anime, the game offers 
a total of 11 scenarios, most of which explore perspectives not focused on in the 
anime, or expand on it, as well as several endings depending on the player’s actions. 
Most scenarios consist of multiple chapters, each of which is divided into a “com-
bat turn” and a “free turn.” The combat turn features the fights between the huge, 
manned “artificial human Evangelion” (hereafter Eva) and the attacking “angels” 
which threaten to extinguish humanity.116 
Whereas the combat-turn offers a rather conventional gameplay-experience, the 
free turn allows the player to navigate the scenario’s protagonist in third-person 
perspective through the space of the futuristic stronghold city Tokyo-3. Eva2 
features a variety of places familiar from the anime, such as NERV officer Katsuragi 
Misato’s mansion, pilot Ayanami Rei’s apartment, the school all pilots attend, a 
convenience store, and several rooms within the NERV headquarters.117 The player 
can explore and use these facilities in order to satisfy basic needs like food and an 
occasional bath, purchase various items in the convenience store, study for school 
or hack the computers of the military headquarter NERV in search for confidential 
data. More than anything, the environment is a social space, populated by human-
like non-player characters (hereafter npc)—characters controlled by the computer. 
Interactions with and among these characters range from looking and small talk 
115   Eva2 is a PS2 adaptation of the successful anime Shinseiki Evangelion [Neon Genesis 
Evangelion] directed by Anno Hidaki, which aired between 1995 and 1996 in Japan. The 
game is produced by AlfaSystem, BANDAI and GAINAX, in collaboration with the anime’s 
director Anno Hideaki. According to Anno, the game allows each player “to create his or her 
own, individual Evangelion 2” (Funatsu 2003, my translation). By granting a large variety of 
choices the social interactions in the free turn, the game’s “sandbox-like” system allegedly 
allows the players to fulfill their desire and to set their own goal freely or alternately to 
abandon the notion of a specific goal overall (see Shibamura 2003, AlfaSystem 2011). A fan 
site by suba (2005b, my translation) describes the game as being “much more a simulation 
than a game. You cannot only play Shinji, but also side characters (even Aoba! [A minor 
“computer technician” character in the franchise; mer]). 2000 hours of play guaranteed. 
The speed is awful, but at the same time, it features a high degree of freedom. You can for 
example fight Angels in Eva, run berserk, assassinate whomever you despise, stalk or be 
stalked, create a harem, get cheated on, go fishing with dad, etc.”
116   Depending on the scenario’s protagonist, the role the player takes during the combat turn 
varies. As one of the pilots, he or she is directly responsible for piloting the Eva. In most 
other roles, the player is restricted to tactical support or spectatorship.
117   NERV is a paramilitary organization entrusted with the research on and the deployment of 
the Eva against the attacking angels.
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to hugging and kissing.
Contrary to the initial expectation, the alien in Eva2 is not encountered in 
the fights against the angels, but in the uncanny interactions with non-player 
characters, in which the player is confronted with a tension between the characters’ 
human-like appearance and their abstracted numerical character. This tension is 
present in many games, but in Eva2, it appears particularly uncanny and alienating. 
In order to explain the disruptive quality of these interactions, I would like to give 
a brief overview of their most important elements. A first of these elements is 
that the characters feature numerical variables, which represent their momentary 
emotional state, their feelings towards and their evaluation of other characters. 
The most important of these variables is the so-called “Absolute Terror” (hereafter 
A.T.) value, which, in contrast to the anime and manga118, is described as a kind of 
tension barometer by the game (game manual for Eva2, 6).119
The A.T. is an important factor in the combat turn, where it influences the Eva’s 
fighting strength, but also in the free turn, where it affects the interaction with other 
characters. Generally speaking, the A.T. changes with the character’s well-being 
(hunger, thirst, sleepiness, toilet, and shower), the course and outcome of the fights, 
and, most importantly, the social interactions. For easier understanding, Example 
7.5 presents some general interactions. Over time, it tends towards a neutral value, 
which itself decreases with passivity and increases if the A.T. is kept high over 
longer periods. In other words, in order to raise the A.T., the player has to fulfil his 
characters needs and participate in social life continuously. Such participation also 
provides opportunities to raise the npcs’ A.T. as well (see Nakajima, Kariya, and 
Miyazaki 2004, 26-27).
These numerical variables are directly linked to a second novum, namely the 
multiple-choice system called “Intelligent Material” (hereafter I.M.), which serves 
as the basis for the interactions with npcs (but also between them). Neon Genesis 
Evangelions: The Complete Guide (Nakajima, Kariya, and Miyazaki 2004, 188-251, 
my translation) lists 732 distinct I.M. commands, including anything from “look 
at XX” and “kiss XX” to “go to the toilet,” “hack the computer,” or “stop being 
a pilot.” Interaction with npcs or between them is generally conducted in an 
118   For a comparison with the manga and the anime, see Li, Nakamura and Roth (2013).
119   In guidebooks it is also referred to as an indicator for the character’s general attitude and 
behaviour, ranging roughly between passive and active (Nakajima, Kariya, and Miyazaki 
2004, 26-27) or “something like the confidence for leading a life in society” (Katō and 
Tamura 2003, 30, my translation).
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oscillating fashion, each character having a choice between up to four commands 
per turn. This choice is made by the game system based on several factors. Firstly, 
the distance between the characters influences the range of possible interactions. 
As I have visualized in Figure 19, this distance is divided into far, middle and close 
range, delimited against anything out of range (like very far, not in sight or busy 
characters).
Figure 19. Distances in Eva2. Adapted from the Complete Guide (Nakajima, Kariya, and 
Miyazaki 2004, 16).
The shorter the distance, the more ‘physical’ the interaction can become. Second-
ly, the numerous variables the characters are equipped with, such as the A.T. and 
npcs’ opinion of the protagonist [jinbutsuhyōka], which consist of the three vari-
ables friendship [yūjō], love [aijō] and affection [shin’ai], have a major influence on 
the I.M.
Another influential element is the respective characters’ bodily condition. In 
the case of the protagonist, unfulfilled basic needs might limit the interaction 
possibilities, in extreme cases lead to complete inability to do anything but eat, 
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interrupted in fulfilling their own basic needs. Forth, the “emotional state” of the 
player character has an influence on the interaction possibilities. In contrast to the 
evaluation of the protagonist by other characters, which can be accessed from the 
I.M. menu, his or her own emotional state is not visible to the player and can only 
be guessed from earlier interactions. 
Likewise, the npc responses to the player character’s actions or communication 
depend on their set of conditions, variables and evaluations, including all of the 
above, but also a short- and long-term memory of earlier encounters. The quality 
of the interaction is dynamically reflected in the variables. Roughly speaking, one 
might say that dislike of the player character or a bad emotional state of the npc 
lower the chance of ‘successful’ interactions—success meaning either a raise in the 
A.T. or a strengthening of the personal relationship with an npc.120 Although the 
general evaluation of the player character varies among the npcs and depending 
on the scenario selected, all npcs can be potential targets to both aims.121 In 
either case, these various factors that influence the success and progression of 
an interaction hint at the difficulty of choosing action and reaction, which have 
to be carefully weighed against the known and suspected condition of the npc, 
the momentary situation, and their potential reaction to certain approaches. The 
numerous, partially hidden variables and the computer-controlled I.M. turn the 
universe of Eva2 into a playing field for calculated, but never fully predictable 
social interactions.122 
In their numerical, calculated way, these interactions are an uncanny experience. 
120   The A.T. value influences the overall chances to win against the invading angels. Even 
non-pilots have direct or indirect influence on the battle. Katsuragi Misato, for example 
is responsible for strategic and tactical decisions. Akagi Ritsuko develops new weapon 
systems and other helpful technologies if her A.T. stays above a certain limit. However, 
fan-based discussions of the game reveal that raising the A.T. in preparation for battle is 
only one possible approach to the free turn. Engaging in romantic relationships with npcs 
is arguably an equally if not more popular aim among players (suba 2005a). 
121   Notably, some factors diversify the characters with regards to their ‘numerical behaviour.’ 
For example, it is more difficult to influence the A.T. and other variables of older characters 
like Ikari Gendō and Fuyutsuki Kōzō (Nakajima, Kariya, and Miyazaki 2004, 178). The 
same goes for the start values of the ‘desires’ of the npcs, some of which vary (37).
122   This is a stark contrast to the anime, of which Japanese science fiction writer and feminist 
critic Kotani Mari (1997, 28-29) argues that the characters carefully play or enact a 
paternalistic family in what she calls a “family game.” In the free turn, the videogame 
employs central elements of dating simulation games. The free turn (more or less) abandons 
gender-boundaries, leaving only some difference between same-gender and cross-gender 
opposites in the factor that influences the npcs behaviour (Nakajima, Kariya, and Miyazaki 
2004, 43). When compared to the anime, the game also serves as a parody, replacing the 
seemingly inescapable psychological struggle and tensions between the characters with a 
set of numerical values at mercy of the player.
| 135 |
| 7 Alien Aesthetics |
In her analysis of Yumeno Kyūsaku’s novel Dogura magura from 1935, Miri 
Nakamura (2002, 369, 377) argues that, in problematizing the question whether 
human beings can be reduced to “statistical beings,” Yumeno confronts the reader 
with a “mechanical uncanny,” or, “a mode of fear that stems from the mechanization 
of the human body.” The existence of such beings “threatens what we perceive to 
be ‘natural,’ including personal memories and personal identities as a whole. The 
idea of a coherent self comes under attack, as bodies become both divisible and 
mechanical, and as characters are duplicated and become reduced to statistical 
beings.” 
A similar mechanical uncanny is at work in Eva2. Where Adam Roberts identifies 
the uncanny of the replicants in Blade Runner as a result of the combination of 
machine-like strength and ruthlessness and childlike innocence, the uncanny 
in Eva2 may be said to result from the combination of numerical variables and 
emotional, affective interactions. What is more, playing Eva2 for a while, the 
player learns to predict some of the tendencies in these interactions and develops 
a ‘feel’ for the situation and the most promising course of action. Guidebooks and 
websites provide hints or ‘recipes’ that are likely to lead to an increase of the A.T. or 
other expected outcomes, like the one I have translated in Figure 20. 
...




R: Return look S: Blush
S: BlushR: Smile
R: Smile S: Draw closer
Figure 20. Dating tactics in Eva2. Source: suba (2005a, my translation).
This tension is not new in science fiction and can hardly be regarded as radical 
in the context of videogames, which necessarily reduce any kind of complexity to 
numerical, functional and winnable scenarios. However, the uncanny experience 
in Eva2 is amplified beyond literary or filmic practice, because the game makes it 
accessible to a playful exploration during which the player experiences his or her 
own gradual shift towards numerical and functional emotions. Furthermore, as 
| 136 |
| Part III  Analysis |
opposed to most videogames, Eva2 is particularly alienating because it defies our 
expectations about the numerical as a realm that can be mastered and controlled 
by the player. Complexity creates a kind of alien character neither fully compatible 
with human emotions, nor numerically transparent enough to be intelligible.123 
Although some guiding principles for the interaction can be established, precise 
predictions of the outcome is impossible in most cases. This unpredictability is 
elevated by the third, arguably most radical novum of the game, namely the npc 
A.I., which I examine in the next section.
7.5 Unreasonable Intelligence
According to the game’s creator AlfaSystem (2003), the A.I. “Kareru3” that controls 
the npcs in Eva2 is the rebuilt and enhanced successor to the AI system “Kareru2,” 
which was used in their earlier game Gunparade March. AlfaSystem describes the 
game system as an attempt to facilitate a non-contradictory depiction of the game 
world and to leave most of the responsiveness to flexible algorithms rather than to 
determine it by a pre-scripted scenario. In addition to the features already familiar 
from Kareru2, the new system is aimed to allow for “natural depiction (representa-
tion) of behaviour” [shizen na kōdōbyōshanōryoku] by focusing on “flow” [nagare] 
rather than on “momentary depiction (representation)” [isshun no byōsha]. Kare-
ru3 allows the npcs to move through the game world independently and pursue 
their own respective interests and interactions with other characters.
The Complete Guide (Nakajima, Kariya, and Miyazaki 2004, 34-45) reveals 
that the npc A.I. is a complex system in which determining the course of action 
is influenced by a three layered memory (short, middle, long term) and a total 
of 16 different desires based on this memory or on bodily needs. These factors 
are in turn influenced by the npcs’ other variable values (condition, mood, A.T., 
momentary feeling, evaluation of other characters), but also by time and place. 
With more information about the internal algorithms of the A.I., it might be 
possible to determine its logic and explain the npc actions in the game.124 However, 
123   It would be a worthy sub-project to examine the normative and moral underpinnings that 
serve as the basis for the calculation and change of the characters numerical values in games 
like Eva2.
124   Such information is, however, not available. Even the Complete Guide speaks mostly of 
possibilities and tendencies when referring to the npc interactions and their effects on each 
party.
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in the context of this chapter, I am more interested in the disruptive experience the 
encounter with autonomous npcs creates.
This effect of the A.I. can mainly be traced to the ways in which it deviates from 
our expectation towards human-like, or, in the terms of the developers, natural 
behaviour. Example 7.6 shows that the npcs are strangely unintelligible in their 
actions and interactions, often appearing repetitive, aimless and counterintuitive. 
Whether it is nightly visits to the (sleeping) player character’s home without 
purpose, or the frequent instances of sitting down only to get up again repeatedly 
or entering a room and leaving it again immediately—the npcs seem unimpressed 
with day and night rhythms, with their own A.T. values, or with the enemy threat 
in general. Frequently, the player character’s existence is plainly ignored, even if he 
or she is the only one present in a given space.
These traits of the npc A.I. contribute to a profoundly uncanny, alienating 
scenery, in which the protagonist is at times degraded to an observing background 
actor or even treated as an obstacle in the environment. Rather than offering 
human-like, ‘natural’ behaviour, Kareru3 confronts the player with something that 
at least approaches the alien. As complex, non-transparent numerical beings in 
human appearance, the npcs are subject to the player’s experiments, calculations 
and playful engagements in a similar way in which Penny (2013, 152) describes his 
robotic art Petit Mal: an Autonomous Robotic Artwork: 
The primary goal of Petit Mal was to build a behaving machine that 
while entirely non-anthropomorphic and nonzoomorphic, elicits play 
behavior among people. Interaction is driven by curiosity and seemingly, 
a desire to pretend that the thing is more clever than it is. People willingly 
and quickly adjust their behavior and pacing to extract as much action 
from the device as possible, motivated entirely by pleasure and curiosity. 
(Interestingly, the only demographic who were unwilling to interact 
were adolescents). I saw the device, technically, as a demonstration of 
the viability of a reactive robotics strategy.
A similar playful approach characterizes the interaction with the npcs in Eva2.125 
125   This playfulness is also described in player guides. Beyond the ‘conventional’ approaches 
to the freedom of the game world suggested in the Complete Guide (Nakajima, Kariya, 
and Miyazaki 2004, 164-179), which include raising or lowering the A.T. as far as possible, 
enjoying school life, or aiming for a romantic relationship with a senior staff member of 
NERV, such gameplay includes “not to talk to anybody/only to talk to PenPen” (a penguin 
Katsuragi Misato keeps as a pet) “create a harem,” “homosexual pairing,” “how many people 
can I assassinate,” “refuse to work when playing Misato,” “move in with Rei as Shinji,” etc. 
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Yet, at the same time the uncanny of the non-transparent numerical processes, 
which escape calculated dominance and are sometimes the basis for behaviour be-
yond reason, turn the npcs into a radical alien almost comparable to the Borg—in 
my opinion, the disinterested, seemingly aimless and un-emphatic movement of 
the npcs remind of the scenes on Borg spaceships and might even prompt a some-
what similar emotional response. 
In an already alien computopic universe that, regardless of its freedom, demands 
for some, at least temporary intentionality of the player even in the most playful 
engagement, the experienced lack of any consistency or intention on the part of 
the npcs has a powerful, alienating effect. Surprisingly, Eva2 highlights this in a 
similar way as Rez. In the scenario “Another World,” Tokyo-3 is a utopic enclave. 
Neither NERV nor the angels exist, and the free turn lasts for as long as we choose, 
focusing on protagonist Shinji’s home and the school all children attend.126 Here, 
the uncanny social interaction with the alien is the only occupation, and while the 
state of trance might not be reached, the player is likewise invited to become part 
of its alien sociality.
7.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have analysed the disruptive potential the aesthetic experience 
of Otherness in the computopic offers its players in the literal shape of the alien. 
A rough overview of the discourse on aliens in science fiction studies helped to 
identify several important problems related to the notion of radical Otherness and 
the alien, and resulted in a general understanding of the alien as a plausible but ex-
perientially disruptive life. Against the background of several subjective indicators 
for such life, like the impossibility of representation, knowability, and imagination, 
I have identified some ways in which the computopic space might host the alien. 
Based on this, I have analysed several videogames for disruptive, aesthetic con-
flicts.
Such conflicts were shown to emerge majorly in two interrelated ways, namely the 
contrast between the player and the alien in action and ability, and the contradiction 
between regular gameplay and its abandonment, or between judgment (analysis) 
(suba 2005a, my translation).
126   The complete guide recommends to use this scenario for experimenting with how to 
increase the A.T. most effectively (Nakajima, Kariya, and Miyazaki 2004, 143).
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and enjoyment (sensual experience). In EDF, the alien ants were not only uncanny 
in their appearance and indifference, but also in tension with the player’s lack 
of choice in the game. In Rez, the tension between synaesthetic experience and 
analytic play reached its climax in the Trance Mission, which lured the player into 
abandoning the game and its purpose altogether. In Eva2, the tension between 
numerical, calculated play and emotional content on the one side, and the uncanny, 
alienating disinterestedness of the unintelligible npcs in contrast to the intentional 
behaviour of the player on the other, was identified as the source of disruption.
An immediate question might be whether some of these disruptions are caused 
by a weakness in the software or are a result of intentional design, and if this has 
an impact on the player’s evaluation of the experience. After all, my alienation in 
the above-mentioned games could simply stem from faulty design—at least the 
designer’s claims about “natural behaviour” in Eva2, compared to the alienating 
results, may suggest such objection. Yet, I wonder if this argument does not imply 
that our judgment of an aesthetic experience depends entirely on our expectations. 
Such conclusion would suggest that we are incapable of experiencing novelty, 
because we can only judge our experience based on pre-defined categories. The 
examples above, on the contrary, show that aesthetic conflicts arise from a tension 
between the known and the radically Other in the experience itself, in moments 
where our expectations are disappointed. 
To be sure, Rez and Eva2 also show that alienation runs the risk of being boring. 
Yet, within the game world, maybe it is this boredom that prompts us to imagine 
and invent new tasks, and to act accordingly. What is more, the question whether a 
certain design is intended in the way in which it is experienced is hard to determine 
and I would even argue irrelevant for the immediate player experience. This does 
not mean that one cannot distinguish between good and bad game design. It rather 
means that, at times when what is perceived as ‘good’ game design seems to tend 
towards realism, aesthetic disruption may have to be found elsewhere. I hope to 
have contributed to such search. The question of intentionality remains important 
in a reversed sense. The analysis shows that some of the alienating effects in EDF 
and Eva2 result from the unimagined quality of the computopic space and its 
complexity and contingency. This suggests that the more difficult problem might 
be if the alien and its disruptive effects can be produced with full intentionality at 
all.
On a more abstract level, the analysis suggests that some of the most alienating 
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experiences are afforded by the tension or conflict between intentional gaming and 
playfulness. Playing with the basic aesthetic tension between analytic and sensual 
engagement, Rez offered a synaesthetic synthesis by abandoning the task-structure 
of the game overall. In “Another World,” the player of Eva2 doesn’t find much to do. 
In these cases, the player could experience a kind of self-alienation specific to play. 
As already mentioned, Gadamer (2004, 107) argues that human play always requires 
a task it can be directed towards. In both examples, the player cannot make sense 
of the aimless npcs—unless he or she stops playing humanly all together, abandons 
the game goal, and becomes one of them. I doubt that this brings us closer to the 
computopic inhabitants. However, it achieves a kind of aesthetic autonomy that 
frees us from our common experiences and affords aesthetic novelty. 
In this sense, both games prove Rancière’s (2008, 43) claim that autonomous 
aesthetic experience can be the beginning of a new humanity, of a new individual 
and collective form of life. This is not surprising, given that Rancière develops 
his understanding of aesthetic autonomy by discussing Schiller’s concept of “free 
play,” which he regards as a suspension of common experience (40-42). However, 
the extent to which videogames like Eva2 and Rez approximate ideal play is as 
intriguing as the way in which they do so. Both games offer aesthetic novelty or 
free play in their abandonment of the conventional, goal-directed game. Yet, they 
never abandon the link to human play completely. Their free play experience is only 
meaningful in the context of the overarching task structure of the games, which 
turns even these spaces into potential training grounds. At this risk, however, they 
not only present us with a space of radical Otherness but—almost in reversal of 
Jameson’s fear expressed in the initial quote—equip us with the skills to experience 
it and let us enter. In this space, the hand-eye coordination crucial in Rez is solely 
deployed synaesthetically, and the social skills in Eva2 are not directed towards 
anything but interaction. 
Both in this extreme playfulness, and in the unintelligibility of the alien, these 
games add something to our aesthetic experience and arguably have an effect on 
what Rancière calls aesthetic distribution of the sensible. Rez, EDF, and Eva2 may 
not invent a new colour or a new kind of perception, to concur with Jameson. Given 
recent developments towards biometric passports and databasified administration, 
Eva2’s relatively concrete sense of alternative community based on numerical 
quantification of all humanly characteristics and interactions rather appears as 
a radicalization and potential critique of the status quo rather than a potential 
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alternative to it. However, at the same time, all three games generate novel and 
decisively disruptive experiences of radical Otherness. In their tension between the 
known and the alien, they point to a new terrain of aesthetic experience and thus a 
potential redistribution of the sensible. 
Jameson (2007) concludes his initial inquiry of science fictional aliens with a 
question: “What […] if the alien body were little more than a distorted expression 
of Utopian possibilities? If its otherness were unknowable because it signified a 
radical otherness latent in human history and human praxis, rather than the not-I 
of a physical nature?” In both abstract and immediate conflicts, the analysed 
games shift our attention towards such latent utopian possibilities by expanding 
our sense of what is perceived and experienced as common, what can be said and 
done. In this sense they are aesthetic interventions in the political sphere, capable 
of stimulating our radical political imagination of alternatives. By confronting us 
with uncanny, unintelligible Others, which require a different mode of perception, 
communication, and judgment, the computopic space points to novel concepts of 
community and ‘social’ interaction, stimulating our imagination, and posing the 
question how a different sociality or community could look and feel.
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8 Technologies of Violence
The most radical change in the human condition we can imagine would 
be an emigration of men from the earth to some other planet. Such an 
event, no longer totally impossible, would imply that man would have 
to live under man-made conditions, radically different from those the 
earth offers him. (Arendt 1998, 10)
The computopic is a rule-based space of action. In the theory section, I have already 
referred to the peculiar tension between videogames as programmed reifications 
of play with their pre-determined character on the one hand, and the potential 
for creative action they facilitate on the other. Despite its rigidity, the computopic 
space may offer creative moments at play in its repetitive, exploratory, and often 
unguided character, and due to the complexity of its rules. This chapter asks what 
potentials and limitations these abstract characteristics of rules and action have for 
disruptive conflicts in concrete cases.
8.1 Action and Politics
Action is a central political term for many theorists and thinkers, because it is 
the way in which we can influence society most directly and deliberately—with 
Hannah Arendt, the way in which we embark on something new. While Raymond 
Geuss (see chapter 2, p. 31) favours a broad understanding of political action as 
action capable of creating a new situation, Arendt (1998, 175-176, 190-192) de-
fines it more narrowly as characterized by novelty, “boundlessness” and “inherent 
unpredictability” and based on human equality in plurality. She distinguishes this 
sharply from behaviour as the dominant mode of human relationship in moderni-
ty, conditioned by bureaucracy and the dominance of the standardizing, equalizing 
“society” and its conformism. The victory of the conforming social over the plural-
ist political means that 
men have become entirely private, that is, they have been deprived of 
seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being heard by them. They 
are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, 
which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied 
innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is 
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seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one 
perspective. (58)
Equally threatening to political action is the dominance of bureaucracy and a pseu-
do-science or computerized, calculated predictions of the future in the political 
landscape (Arendt 1970, 6-7, 29-30). 
In a fully developed bureaucracy there is nobody left with whom one can 
argue, to whom one can present grievances, on whom the pressures of 
power can be exerted. Bureaucracy is the form of government in which 
everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act; for the 
rule of Nobody is not no-rule, and where all are equally powerless we 
have a tyranny without a tyrant. (81)
Arendt (1998, 168-169) denies art a political potential on the grounds that it is 
always reified, dead thought turned into tangible, and a finite product rather than 
open-ended action. I believe Arendt’s claims about art in The Human Condition, in 
particular her argument that works of art are finite and do not reveal the author (a 
criteria she regards as crucial for action), to be questionable in general. However, 
this is not the place to deal with these fundamental questions about the potential 
and nature of artworks. Instead, I would like to take up her challenge specifically 
in the context of private (single-player) videogame (works) with their totality of 
rules, and examine the character of action found there. Arendt gives at least some 
reason to believe that even in her own account, videogames might have a potential 
for action when she regards theatre as “the political art par excellence,” because it is 
capable of imitating action (187-188). On a more abstract level, Arendt’s description 
of political action suggests that such action shares several characteristics with what 
I have referred to as ideal play.
The following sections examine the ways in which videogames might offer 
man-made environments for political action, to use Arendt’s terms from the 
introductory quote. As before, this potential is tied to the existence of disruptive 
conflicts, which confront us with situations in which we have to enact novelty. To 
examine the relation between rules and action within the computopic structure, I 
focus specifically on violence, which is a central theme in videogames and science 
fiction, and arguably the most controversial discourse in the context of political 
action. In preparation for the analysis, the next section introduces this controversy, 
relating it to the computopic space. 
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8.2 Dimensions of Violence
Violence is an important factor in many political theories. In his review of the vari-
ous concepts of violence applied in academic writing, Vittorio Bufacchi (2005, 193) 
goes as far as to claim that “violence is, and has always been, the essence of politics.” 
Most prominently, Thomas Hobbes derives the necessity of a social contract from 
its dominance in the state of nature. Carl Schmitt’s (1933, 7) famous definition of 
the political as a distinction between friend and enemy is based on a commitment 
to eradicate the enemy by means of physical violence. Frantz Fanon ([1961] 2004, 
2-3) argues that disorganizing society in order to decolonize it is always a violent 
process. “The colonized, who have made up their mind to make such an agenda 
into a driving force, have been prepared for violence from time immemorial” (3).
Like Fanon, many influential thinkers have regarded violence as political 
action because it seems to share with political action the effect of transgressing or 
interrupting “what otherwise would have proceeded automatically and therefore 
predictably” (Arendt 1970, 31). For thinkers like Georges Sorel ([1908] 1976)127, 
Frantz Fanon (2004), or Jean-Paul Sartre ([1961] 2004), this turns violence into a 
potential factor or even a legitimate requirement for radical change. Such notions 
of revolutionary violence have been promoted repeatedly as a promising or even 
the only possible answer to structural, systematic, or individual violence. Homi K. 
Bhabha (2004, ix-x) points out that Fanon’s insistence on national consciousness 
and homogeneity as necessary elements for the revolution of ‘the people’ is highly 
problematic in its denial of difference and cultural diversity.128 At the same time, he 
recognizes the influence Fanon’s ideas had, not only on movements like the Black 
Panthers, the IRA, but also in U.S. attempts to understand the enemy after the 
horrible events of September 11, 2001 .
Bhabha emphasizes Fanon’s insistence on the “psycho-affective” dimension of 
violence, a realm which for him is “neither subjective nor objective, but a place 
of social and psychic mediation,” and which involves “the body, dreams, psychic 
inversion and displacements, phantasmatic political identifications” all alike (xix). 
A psycho-affective relation or response has the semblance of universality 
and timelessness because it involves the emotions, the imagination 
or psychic life, but it is only ever mobilized into social meaning and 
127   See also John L. Stanley’s (1976) introduction to From Georges Sorel.
128   Fanon (2004, 10) believes that “[d]ecolonization unifies this world by a radical decision to 
remove its heterogeneity, by unifying it on the grounds of nation and sometimes race.”
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historical effect through an embodied and embedded action, an 
engagement with (or resistance to) a given reality, or a performance of 
agency in the present tense.” (xix)
The term psycho-affective refers to Fanon’s (2004) framing of violence as a way of 
psychological and emotional resistance. In order to cope with being “dehuman-
ized” and “reduced to the state of an animal” by the colonizer (7), the colonized 
dream “muscular dreams, dreams of action, dreams of aggressive vitality” to free 
themselves at least during the night (15). For Fanon the naked violence of colonial-
ism “only gives in when confronted with greater violence” (23).
In contrast, Hannah Arendt rejects any kind of violence.129 She contrasts 
violence, understood as instrumentally enhanced natural strength, with properly 
political power, understood as the ability to act in concert (Arendt 1970, 44-46). In 
The Human Condition, Arendt (1998, 200) claims that “[p]ower is what keeps the 
public realm, the political space of appearance between acting and speaking men, 
in existence.” Violence, in her understanding, can destroy power but never become 
a substitute for it (202). Ultimately, it results in impotence (Arendt 1970, 53-54). 
In his Foreword to the 2004 English edition of Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, 
Bhabha (2004, xxxvi) summarizes some of the existing positions and points out the 
complexity of the discourse: 
For Arendt, Fanon’s violence leads to the death of politics; for Sartre, 
it draws the fiery, first breath of human freedom. I propose a different 
reading. Fanonian violence, in my view, is part of a struggle for psycho-
affective survival and a search for human agency in the midst of the 
agony of oppression. It does not offer a clear choice between life and 
death or slavery and freedom, because it confronts the colonial condition 
of life-in-death.
It is not the aim of this chapter to rewrite this discourse or to aim for a synthesis 
of these opposing views and multiple dimensions pointed to here. Yet, in order to 
position violent action in the computopic space, it seems helpful to sketch some of 
the central characteristics and dimensions of violence. 
Bufacchi (2005, 194) begins his review of violence with the observation that the 
etymologically correct meaning of violence, namely “passionate and uncontrolled 
force” is often combined with that of “violation” or infringement, “because acts 
129   Bhabha (2004, xxi) points out that Arendt’s (1970) rejection of violence was a direct 
response to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth and Sartre’s pro-violent preface to it.
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of excessive force frequently result in the violation of norms, rights or rules.” 
Consecutively, he identifies these two dimensions in literature, most of which 
either defends a narrow definition of violence as force, or a broad definition of 
violence as violation. In his discussion, Bufacchi points out that the narrow 
definition ignores important aspects such as structural and institutional violence, 
while the broad definition tends to be too inclusive to be distinct from any kind of 
misery, alienation, or repression (197-199). 
Although Bufacchi concludes from this that “the concept of violence remains 
elusive” (199), this distinction helps to phrase some initial questions for the 
analysis of the computopic space. In the context of videogames, violence is 
frequently referred to in a discourse of negative psychological effects on children, 
at times even linked to tragic events like the school shootings in the United States 
or Europe. While this discourse, along with the research conducted in this field, 
more or less exclusively focuses on the psychological effects of videogame violence 
on the playing children and adolescents, this thesis aims to examine the political 
significance of action and violence within the framework of the rule-based, 
ideational computopic space. This does not mean that such connection between the 
psychological and the structural is not important. However, given the complexity 
of media effects discussions and the strong bias in much of the research done in 
this field, this discussion requires more expertise than I have and more space than 
I can grant it here. 
This does not mean that I wish to ignore the physical and psychological 
dimension of violent action within these games. This might sound contradictory, 
given my emphasis on the virtual character of videogames. As spaces detached 
from physical materiality, how can they feature physical violence? I myself have 
expressed doubt about the possibility of videogames to express physical experiences 
(see chapter 2, p. 39). Yet, their virtual character does not mean that violent acts 
are not recognized as such in games, as they are recognized in film, even while 
knowing that actors only play. To the extent to which violence is carried out by the 
player, the situation appears even more complex, because it might carry with it an 
emotional, psychological aspect, identified by Bufacchi with the terms “passionate, 
uncontrolled,” and by Bhabha as “psycho-affective.” Neil Roberts (2004) examines 
this dimension in his analysis of Fanon’s (and Sartre’s) understanding of violence 
in more detail. He observes that for Sartre 
[v]iolence is fundamentally an activity emerging from the category 
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of agency. Agency here refers to one’s ability to act. Beyond simply 
questions of acquiring control or potency, it involves a person’s ability 
to make decisions. The capacity for agency, therefore, represents an 
important dimension of freedom and freedom’s connection to anti-
colonial violence. Those lacking subjectivity perform violence in order 
to gain agency. (143-144)
In order to grasp the significance and character of violence pointed to by 
Sartre, and Fanon himself, Roberts distinguishes between instrumental violence 
and intrinsic violence—the latter encompasses Fanon’s framing of violence (144-
147). Whereas instrumental violence refers to violence as a means to an end, acts 
of intrinsic violence contain inherent value and operate outside the means-ends 
continuum (145-146). I find it difficult to evaluate either Roberts’ claim that 
“[f]or Fanon, violence is a necessary process for colonial subjects to achieve their 
own state of self-determination, decolonization, agency, and freedom in order to 
make this absence from colonial domination a reality” (155), or its consequences. 
Sartre’s (2004) preface to The Wretched of the Earth helps to make sense of this 
difficulty, because he points out that Fanon does not write for those who are not 
oppressed. Addressing his fellow Frenchmen, he states that Fanon’s book “often 
talks about you, but never to you” (xlv). However, Roberts’ distinction between 
instrumental and intrinsic violence does nonetheless prove helpful for the analysis 
of the computopic space, because it raises the question of the emotional-affective 
character of action and the possibility of an intrinsic meaning within the rule-
based, goal-directed space of the computopic, shifting the attention to the problem 
of whether such action can go beyond the means-ends continuum.
In its character as a rule-dominated, virtual space, the computopic seems 
to threaten not only the possibility of any action in Arendt’s sense, but also the 
immediacy of physical and structural violence. After all, ‘it’s just a game.’ Switching 
off the console solves all problems and violence is never immediate, never a 
physical threat to the player. It would be mockery to compare voluntary gameplay 
with the situation of the physically, psychologically, or structurally oppressed, 
on the grounds of its strictly rule-bound character alone. However, this does not 
mean that violence in videogames cannot be significant from the perspective of 
political philosophy. My aim is not to argue that violent videogames are able to 
convey the experience of the oppressed or of violent acts in our empirical reality. 
On the contrary, the analysis inquires the status of action in videogames against 
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the background of a stifling of political action in the everyday, focusing on the 
pervasive and controversial theme of violence precisely because it does not allow 
for simplified answers. Violence, here, is not a given, but rather an element the 
significance and position of which have to be established and embedded anew in 
this novel context of the computopic space.
I would also like to point out that, in line with the remarks on emotions in 
videogames made earlier (see chapter 2, p. 38), I do believe that videogames 
feature emotional or psycho-affective experiences like tension, horror, helplessness, 
or joy, and can convey violence, either in player acts or by other agents, on a 
cognitive level. Put differently, the player does recognize violence on the screen 
when he or she sees it, including its virtual consequences. The fact that such action 
does not come with the severe consequences it would have in our empirical reality 
and can be repeated endlessly might be seen as an invitation to trivialize, mock, or 
glorify violence—as is sometimes the case in the mecha games analysed in chapter 
5. However, the following analysis of Metal Gear Solid shows how games can 
deploy the distinct qualities of the computopic space to reconfigure and restructure 
the various aspects of violence in critical and reflexive ways. Doing so, videogames 
can contribute to a novel, stimulating perspective on political action.
8.3 Structural and Instrumental Violence
In most videogames, violence is, first and foremost, instrumental. In other words, 
it is a more or less glorified means to an end—often the only possible way of pro-
ceeding in the game and reaching its goal. In Lost Planet 2 (2010), the player does 
not ‘discover’ the planet, but ‘conquers’ it. In the popular horror-series Biohazard 
[Resident Evil], the player fights undead creatures infected with a highly contagious 
virus. Traversing barren lands and seemingly abandoned villages in Biohazard 4 
[Resident Evil 4] (2005), one is suddenly confronted with an assault from all direc-
tions. But despite the seeming inferiority of the player character, who, at least in 
terms of quantity, stands alone against an army, victory is possible thanks to supe-
rior abilities, firepower, and healing skills. While offering the player the terrifying 
horror of unexpected, ruthless attacks from behind, the game nevertheless makes 
him or her the intruder.
In these games, meaningful obstacles are created through the difference 
between the player character’s abilities and the enemy. The player has to conquer 
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the environment, often by destroying all enemy forces. A similar difference is 
also central to the Metal Gear Solid (hereafter MGS) series.130 However, here it is 
deployed in a slightly different way that prompts critics to regard it as a critique of 
violence (Miller 2006) and a counterexample to conventional shooters. As Derek 
Noon and Nick Dyer-Witheford (2010, 78) observe, MGS “emphasizes unobserved 
movement, subterfuge, camouflage, evasion, trickery, and out-smarting enemies, 
not just shooting everything that moves.” In the first section, I would like to examine 
in more detail this characteristic gameplay, which the designer has dubbed “tactical 
espionage action.”
MGS presents the player with a consistent world and an ongoing narrative about 
great conspiracies during and after the cold war, putting him or her in control 
of a genetically and technologically enhanced protagonist, who has to help avert 
a terrorist threat to global security in a one-man, covert operation.131 A hybrid 
between shooter and adventure, the series emphasizes sneaking and invisibility. 
The player has to direct the protagonist through hostile terrain, evading enemy 
soldiers, traps, as well as the vicious nature he is surrounded by. As Example 8.1 
shows, MGS creates the gap between player character and enemy abilities mainly 
on two planes, namely sensual perception and action capabilities. 
In terms of sensual perception, the player character, simply put, sees and hears 
more than the enemy. Part of this advantage originates from the combination of the 
various viewpoints the player can assume, like third person, first person, and limited 
birds-eye view, and his ability to use the environment as cover.132 The other part of 
130   MGS is a globally successful series of videogames developed under the direction of Kojima 
Hideo and released by Konami from 1998 (Metal Gear Solid 1, hereafter MGS1) onwards, 
with the most recent major release in 2008 (Metal Gear Solid 4, hereafter MGS4). Although 
the series is based on two earlier games called Metal Gear and Metal Gear 2: Solid Snake, 
this chapter focuses on the most important installments of the MGS series, namely Metal 
Gear Solid (1998, hereafter MGS1), Metal Gear Solid 2: Sons of Liberty (hereafter MGS2) and 
Metal Gear Solid 3: Snake Eater (hereafter MGS3), both played mostly in the HD Edition 
(2011), as well as Metal Gear Solid 4: Guns of the Patriots (2008, hereafter MGS4). I refer 
to the HD edition of MGS2 and MGS3, although I have also played the regular version of 
MGS3—the differences between the two versions are ignored below, in favor of clarity.
131   Naked Snake in MGS3, his son Solid Snake in MGS1, MGS2, and MGS4. MGS2 introduces 
another operative called Raiden, whom the player controls through large parts of the game.
132   Whereas the visual field in third-person view is fixed in MGS1 and MGS2, the player 
has control over it in MGS3, and MGS4. The higher degree of freedom achieved here, is 
carefully balanced by the designer as to not make the games too easy. Whereas the enemy 
forces could be displayed on the map in MGS1 and MGS2, this feature is not available in 
MGS3, where it is replaced by a number of temporarily available sensors, and reappears 
only in form of a vague threat detector in MGS4. The tension created in MGS2 while the 
player cannot access the map and thus does not see what is behind the next corner, gives 
way to a widening of the playing field and the introduction of more obstacles to the visual 
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the superiority stems from enhancements of technological and science fictional 
nature, like a map on which the enemy positions can be monitored in real time 
(MGS1 and MGS2), several types of goggles (MGS3) and other visual enhancements 
(MGS4), as well as active radar and a directional microphone (MGS3). Such 
enhancements also include the famous card-boxes the player-character can carry 
and ‘put on’ when in need of disguise in warehouses and storage rooms, as well 
as means of impersonation and camouflage in the form of a wide range of “suits” 
and “face paints” in MGS3. In MGS4, the camouflage is realized science-fictionally 
in a body suit called “octocamo,” which blends with the environment after a few 
seconds of idleness. These sensual aspects are complemented with a difference in 
action abilities and behaviour. In general, the enemies follow pre-defined routines 
and are astonishingly noisy, lazy and relaxed, given the circumstances. The player-
character is by far more flexible and agile, and is able to traverse the environment 
silently and sneakily. In addition, a considerable part of his capabilities of forceful 
action are silent and can be executed from a distance and without being spotted.
Generally, MGS confronts the player with a series of more or less contained areas 
controlled and patrolled by human and robot enemies, which have to be traversed 
in order to proceed. To understand the significance of stealthy movement for the 
gameplay, it is important to know that discovery is a painful, time-consuming and 
often deadly experience. Example 8.1 shows that discovery is more or less likely 
to result in player-character death, or in time-consuming shoot-outs and extended 
run-and-hide, depending on the title and the situation. The player-character is 
spotted when crossing an enemy’s path or line of sight, or making suspicious noises 
at close range. To avoid detection, the games challenge the player to move carefully, 
to use the environment as cover, to perceive more than the enemies, to recognize 
their routines, and to know when to move and when to hide. 133 Although the player 
has superior means and often the benefit of the doubt, the gameplay is nevertheless 
field. Whereas the earlier games hide the enemies from the screen, the latter hide them from 
the player’s eyes. 
133   Although sensitivity is not limited to visuals, but further, increasingly in the later titles, 
includes audio-information, the latter seems to follow parallel patterns and will thus not 
be focused in the analysis. This omission should not detract from the fact that the audio-
elements of the game are crucial and contribute to its experience beyond mere additions. 
In several moments during the games the importance the designer has attached to sound 
becomes apparent, for examples when a naked Raven sneezes due to the cold in a warehouse 
and thus gives away his position in MGS2, through the rumbling stomach that betrays 
Naked Snake in MGS3 once his food supplies run low, or through the awkward but noise-
less crawling style in MGS4.
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a thrilling experience, because in most cases, one can never be sure of all potential 
threats.
In all titles of the series, conventional gameplay is characterized by an almost 
tactile progression through the environment based on careful observation. Putting 
the opposing forces on rails—more limited than those of the protagonist—the 
games task the player with spotting and reading enemy routines correctly and 
finding tactical solutions for traversing an environment full of enemy sentinels, 
traps, and other obstacles. In this sense, MGS may be said to offer an experience 
of bureaucratic tyranny and its totality of rules. The player cannot but learn to 
understand the system, ‘behave’ according to its norms and rules, and adjust to its 
dynamics. 
However, at the same time, MGS is an example of the potential of what Galloway 
(Galloway 2006), based on a short Postscript on the Societies of Control by Gilles 
Deleuze134, calls “allegories of control.” He believes that “what Deleuze defines 
as control is key to understanding how computerized information societies 
function” (88). For Galloway “video games are, at their structural core, in direct 
synchronization with the political realities of the informatic age” (91). Such 
“allegories of control” signify universal standardization because they substitute 
ideological critique by the logic of informatics control, identified as numerical 
representation, modularity, automation, variability and transcoding (99-102). 
While pointing to the similarity between the logics of videogames and social 
control, he also claims that, due to this proximity, they can make transparent the 
otherwise hidden “boring minutiae of discipline and confinement that constitute 
the various apparatuses of control in contemporary societies” (89). For Galloway, 
games like MGS—among other exceptional works he mentions—stand out 
because here, “to play the game means to play the code of the game. To win means 
to know the system. And thus to interpret a game means to interpret its algorithm 
(to discover its parallel ‘allegorithm’)” (90-91). Such games epitomize “the flatness 
134   In the short essay, Deleuze (1992) carves out the difference between spatially bound, 
disciplinary societies and free-floating, flexible societies of control. He claims that “[i]n 
the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from 
the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never finished with 
anything—the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable 
states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation” 
(5). “Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without 
limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and discontinuous” (6). As far as I 
understand Deleuze, in societies of control, one is free to move through space but under 
constant, computer-enhanced control, which registers, limits, and remembers every move.
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of control allegory by unifying the act of playing the game with an immediate 
political experience” (103).
This rather abstract statement may be best understood in the context of 
the gameplay analysed here. The MGS games confront the player with a rigid 
system of rules that could be interpreted as similar to the bureaucratic control 
in contemporary societies. Equipping the player-character with a more flexible, 
stealthy set of abilities, it suggests that rule-based systems can be challenged 
covertly. As long as they are not confronted, the enemies do not turn hostile and 
might best be regarded as ‘requisites,’ strictly following the algorithmic rules. With 
the help of careful observation, their rigid and predictable routines can be turned 
against them. In this case, both structural and physical violence are circumvented. 
Against the background of Arendt’s conceptualization of action, one may say that 
although the player is not free, his or her limited possibilities of resisting against 
the structural violence of the opposing rules stems from the fact that, within this 
computopic world, the system and its sentinels obey the even more rigid rules of 
Arendt’s tyrannical Nobody.
This motive of resisting against structural violence by a standardizing social 
system (Arendt) or the society of control (Deleuze, Galloway) can be identified as 
a central concern of the designer, expressed most explicitly in MGS2 and MGS4. In 
MGS2, the world is under the control of a mysterious group called the “Patriots” 
[aikokushatachi], who have long implemented systematic, computer-based control 
and information censorship over society. In the final showdown, the protagonist 
and player-character Raven confronts the genetically manipulated Solidas, who 
threatens society in the attempt to free himself of the grip of these ubiquitous 
powers and change his genetically pre-designed fate. In MGS4, this motive is 
repeated. The game portraits a future world dominated by and dependent on a 
global war economy, sustained by a ubiquitous computer system that controls and 
monitors all human soldiers and their access to weapons. Private contract armies 
under the surveillance of the system are waging small-scale wars in many areas of 
the world. Controlling a rapidly aging Solid Snake, the protagonist known from 
MGS1, the player tries to avert his genetic brother Liquid’s revolutionary plans to 
take over the system, thus indirectly supporting the status quo.
This ambivalence of the player-character’s role is amplified by the conspiracy 
plot of the games, which keep the player in uncertainty over the meaning and 
status of his or her own actions in the world of MGS (although some kind of heroic 
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undertone is never abandoned completely). More than once, the player is directly 
confronted with this uncertainly and asked to reflect on it. Arguably the most 
direct address can be found in MGS2, as Example 8.2135 shows. In the last parts of 
the game, the entire mission of the protagonist Raven is revealed as an orchestrated 
“play” [enshū] aimed at generating an “extreme situation.” The scenario is explained 
to be the last test-run for a new training method for the creation of super soldiers. 
This message has a double meaning, because its content describes the design recipe 
for all MGS titles before and later. If one wants to enjoy the game, one has to play 
the protagonist’s role to the end [yakuwari o hatasu]—an unquestioning obedience, 
which is commended as a major contribution to the success of the test, and which 
is a necessary condition for playing the game in the first place.
In this way, the designer confronts the players with their own ‘behaviour’ in 
a total, rule-based structure and confronts them with the fact that there is no 
alternative to playing, even in the face of obvious betrayal. Yet, when reflecting 
his lack of own will in the epilogue, Raiden, whom the designer sets up as a 
representation of his target audience of masculine videogame players (Noon and 
Dyer-Witheford 2010, 87) decides to take things in his own hands and find a better 
way to live than by merely obeying rules, encouraged by nobody else than Snake, 
the veteran soldier of MGS1, who has experienced such powerlessness reduction 
to an obedient tool himself.
This initial analysis shows that the technologically enhanced difference between 
player-character abilities and the system offers a limited potential for resistance 
against a rule-based, rigid system—limited, because the player-character is also 
part of the overarching computopic universe and bound to its rules. From a similar 
perspective, Burden and Gouglas (2012, no pn) argue that the game Portal can 
be regarded as “an algorithmic exploration of human struggle against algorithmic 
processes” that increasingly shape our everyday. They claim that “the procedural 
nature of games provides a unique opportunity to explore the increasingly 
procedural nature of such increasingly prevalent technology.” MGS can be regarded 
as a successful example of such exploration. From Arendt’s perspective, this might 
still amount to no more than a behavioural engagement. However, by highlighting 
this fact and consciously confronting the player with his or her limitation in 
the game and in society, the designer turns the rigidity and conformism of the 
135   English subtitles for MGS2 taken from El Greco’s (2005) Metal Gear Solid 2: Sons of Liberty 
Game Script.
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computopic space into a reflexive moment geared towards disrupting the player. 
The games do not stop there. The following sections show that, beyond such 
elements of critique, MGS points to a more radical perspective on action in its 
treatment of violence.
8.4 Intrinsic and Physical Violence
In most violent videogames, violence is, first and foremost, a means to win the 
game. The player is often confronted with an existential enemy in Carl Schmitt’s 
(1933, 8) sense, who negates the player’s existence and has to be eradicated because 
he prevents progression in the game. Thus, as Koster (2005, 68) pointedly states, 
“[m]ost games encourage demonizing the opponent, teaching a sort of ruthless-
ness that is a proven survival trait.” Among many others, this is the case in Front 
Mission or EDF, where the player has to occupy the arena or stage totally in order 
to proceed. In the Front Mission series, enemy pilots have to be killed even if they 
abandon their wanzers and do not pose a real threat any more. In conventional 
first-person shooters, enemies can be ignored temporarily, but remain active at-
tackers, at all times in pursuit of the player. As argued above, MGS can be regarded 
as a partial critique of such unavoidable violence, promoting non-violent solutions 
during large parts of the games. However, on another level, the range of means in 
MGS is also deployed to highlight non-instrumental aspects of violence.
While promoting non-violent evasion, the thrill of the covert operations is 
amplified by the availability of a broad range of ways to deal with a situation. 
Both with regards to long-term strategy and situation-based tactics, the player 
can choose between evading the enemy, applying non-lethal force, or disposing 
of the enemy by lethal means. Depending on the game, the balance between these 
methods shifts. During large parts of MGS1, lethal force is more or less the only 
possibility to solve situations where sneaking is not an option, like in the end boss 
fights. This changes from MGS2 onwards, where even upon enemy encounter, non-
lethal force like knocking enemies out or anaesthetizing them is available to the 
player. As Example 8.1 shows, such action may cause suspicion upon discovery 
of the unconscious bodies but remains without severe consequences. In contrast, 
lethal force, if spotted, results in reinforcements and alert status, making it difficult 
to move for a painfully long period of time. During crucial parts of MGS2, in which 
the enemies are on guard and report to base frequently, lethal force (or direct 
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discovery) leads to immediate suspicion and if not covered up successfully, to an 
almost invincible reinforcement of enemies, making it even more difficult for the 
player to navigate through the environment. The game also rewards a non-lethal 
play-though with the ironic code name “pigeon” (Hamamura 2012, 249).
MGS3 and MGS4 most actively promote non-lethal gameplay as a difficult 
achievement, rewarding successful non-lethal play-through within the limits of 
several other restrictions not only with a special rank, but also with additional 
items at the end of each game.136 At the same time, both games make escaping 
the enemy in alert phases easier, due to the vastness of the environment and the 
relative sufficiency of ammunition and weapons. Given the time-consuming and 
frustrating experience of discovery, it is fair to say that the preference still is on 
sneaky, non-lethal solutions.137 However, the overall readjustments to the balance 
between all three possibilities puts a stronger emphasis on forceful and lethal 
action, more than before offering a real choice between almost equal alternatives, 
with advantages changing according to each particular situation.
This tendency towards an equality of means seems to reinstate violence as 
a central element in the gameplay. As such, it might be said to converge with 
conventional shooters. The forum-post quoted in footnote 137 points this out, 
136   An online discussion between Malumbrus, NeoSarinatan, and Mr_Big_Boss (2011) about 
“non-lethal playthrough” on the Metal Gear Solid 2 board of GameFAQs.com suggests 
that such strategy is at least theoretically possible, although not rewarded. In contrast to 
the rather limited discussions of non-lethal gameplay in MGS1 and MGS2, there exist 
numerous forum threads and guides to non-lethal gameplay for MGS3 and MGS4 (see for 
example goldeneye86 2004, Hellicar 2008).
137   This general tendency is also pointed out in a post on the IGN forum by riesenkartoffel 
(2012) from May 29, 2012 (errors in the original). “I always play MGS games on a hardest 
available difficulty. I came into to series with MGS3, which I first played at first on easy 
and I must say I hated the game (I’d punch my younger-self if it would be possible. I didn’t 
understand anything about stealth and just blasted my way through the game (of course 
I skipped all cutscenes [sic] and codex sequences). Only problem was that MGS3 wasn’t 
designed to be a shooter, so I just found it clunky. I put the game on a hold for a while, but 
somehow got around to it once and decided to give it another chance. I selected Hard for 
a difficulty and the curve raised so high, that it literally forced me to learn the sneaking 
mechanics and complex controls. I also desided  to pay attention to the story, since by 
then I had grown and was ready for more complex story. It took a while to get into the 
controls, but after that I found a whole different game. I just loved it so much, MGS3 stands 
there as my favourite game even today. But now back to the original message, I choose to 
play on hardest because it is what really forces you to play these games the way they were 
meant to be played. People complained that MGS4 could be just blasted through. Yeah, on 
normal maybe, try that shit on extreme.” As this post points out, there is a huge difference 
between normal and hard difficulties in all MGS games—the latter emphasize tactical skills 
and stealth maneuvers to a far greater extent. While I am aware of the possible difference in 
experience this entails, this dimension has to be granted more attention than I can give it in 
this experimental project. Thus, the analysis refers to my gameplay on normal difficulty.
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remarking that “[p]eople complained that MGS4 could be just blasted through.” 
However, by offering a choice, MGS also adds meaning to violent action beyond 
its reduction to an instrumental level. By making violence avoidable, the series 
foregrounds its psychological, intrinsic aspects and the destructive physical effects 
violence has. In other words, the choice of means creates an awareness of the 
content of these means, confronting the player with the fact that any action taken 
is, at least in part, not only behavioural but—within the limits of the computopic—
also either deliberate and intrinsic, or a result of a lack of control (skills) and power 
on the part of the player.
In overwhelming, confusing situations, which escape the player’s control, 
reverting to lethal violence and its lasting, predictable effects is a tempting option—a 
fact that reminds us of Arendt’s dictum that a loss of power makes us revert to 
violent means. However, the existence of other ways foregrounds the violent acts 
committed as the player’s choice. Miller (2006) supports this impression in her 
analysis of MGS. Observing the gradual shift in balance and the opening of the 
game towards more “meaningful” or “real choices” from MGS1 to MGS3, she 
claims that Kojima is able to communicate his critique of violence particularly well 
because
MGS3 managed to use the elements of player choice to set the medium of 
a videogame apart from, say, books and movies. In a sense, Kojima gave 
you a portion of the game entirely, and somewhat perversely, player-
created - that is, a product of nothing more than the player’s earlier 
choices - and derived a meaningful message from it. […] Books and 
movies, as passive media, relate a message to the reader by presenting 
a story where the reader sees the consequences of the protagonist’s 
decisions and interprets from there. Videogames, as MGS3 would have 
us understand, can be aimed directly at the player. 
Such reflexivity is further amplified by the fact that often, violent solutions to over-
whelming situations lead to discovery and, as a result, extended periods of inactiv-
ity on the part of the player—here, the designer almost appears to mock the player 
for resorting to violence.138 In other cases, most notably the boss fights, non-lethal 
solutions are by far more difficult to achieve than lethal disposal. 
In MGS4, this tension reaches a maximal level. In the boss fights against the 
138   Making violence inefficient and “waiting” a central motive of a videogame in our accelerated 
times may, in itself, be interpreted as a strong political statement.
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four members of the “Beauty and Beast unit,” the player confronts psychologically 
distorted, technologically enhanced, existential enemies. As Example 8.3139 shows, 
victory over a technologically enhanced “Beast” is followed by an encounter with 
the respective “Beauty,” who—although defeated—still attacks Snake bare-handed. 
Although these scenes are also examples of the designer’s erotic fantasies present 
in all titles—in this case, holding up the camera at specific moments makes the 
Beauty pose for the player—the Beauty’s embrace remains deadly, putting the 
player into the position of running away from a weakened enemy who deserves 
pity more than hostility. Here, the use of force is instrumentally logical, but at the 
same time deeply disturbing.140
But whereas violence as a last resort in lack of other options can still be explained 
instrumentally, there is also a dimension of videogame violence as entertainment 
in the games. At times, one just pulls the trigger instead of crawling past. Especially 
the later titles do not restrict violent action through game mechanics and always 
carry a certain admiration for weapons and war with them—the broad arsenal of 
deadly firearms available and the general setup of the protagonist as a one-man 
army attest to this. This intrinsic quality of violence is not comparable to the kind 
of intrinsic violence Fanon and Sartre describe. The player is never physically 
oppressed or abused. Likewise, violent action does not cause physical consequences 
outside of the computopic universe and its virtual, detached Otherness. In other 
words, such violence has a different quality than structural or physical violence 
in the everyday, and, even if executed for the sake of carnage and destruction, 
remains playful and entertaining.141 This does, however, not erase its cognitive and 
139   English subtitles for MGS4 taken from SamuraiX-’s (2008) Metal Gear Solid 4: Guns of the 
Patriots - Game Script.
140   Despite their functional dimension, moral choices in games frequently invite commentary 
by scholars, critics, and gamers. Tavinor (2009, 130), for example, discusses the experience 
of moral choices in Bioshock from 2007, in which the player may or may not kill defenceless 
characters called Little Sisters. In 2009, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 has generated 
worldwide discussions amongst gamers and in mass media, because one of the stages 
enables the player to kill innocent civilians as a covert operative in an airport taken control 
of by a terrorist group.
141   I am aware that this is a controversial phrasing in the context of a discourse on violent 
videogames and their effects. As mentioned before, this is not the place to engage with the 
complexities of this discourse and its numerous, often contradictory studies. What meaning 
or function this violence has in the context of the individual player’s everyday cannot be 
answered here. Instead, this use of “playful” is, first and foremost intended as a qualification 
of the action within the computopic universe, foregrounding its difference from physical or 
structural violence in the everyday—a difference I believe the players to be aware of to the 
same extent they are aware of it in other media. 
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psychological meaning, and it is this dual structure that the designer, once again, 
deploys in his ambivalent engagement with playful violence, both on the level of 
player choice and in various commentaries on violence.
Example 8.3 also showed that the four Beauty and Beast bosses of MGS4 are 
victims of psychological damage inflicted in war and violent conflicts. In Example 
8.4142 I have compiled several instances, in which the games comment on the 
player’s violence. During the fight with The Sorrow in MGS3, the player has to lead 
the protagonist through a river, in which the dead bodies he or she has produced so 
far in the game float past, screaming in agony. Here and elsewhere, commentary on 
violence and violent action not only target the instrumental, necessary aspect, but 
also a more affective, intrinsic, playful dimension. Thereby, it emphasizes the stark 
contrast between the terrifying physical and psychological effects of the violence 
depicted and described in the game, and the player’s playful acts of violence. In 
MGS2, protagonist Raiden asks Snake if he ever enjoyed the killing. Snake’s forceful 
denial only amplifies the disruption on the part of the player, who is aware of the 
dual nature of his or her own action, at the same time playful and violent.
The designer’s creativity in addressing the player in this ambivalent, dual way is 
an important aspect of MGS. While offering a broad arsenal of deadly weapons and 
combat actions, the designer infuses the games with comments on violence, which 
are intended to disrupt the player. The protagonist of MGS2, Raiden, is mocked by 
Snake for his virtual experience of war and criticized for his seeming fascination 
for violence and killing—later, the player finds out that Raiden was a child soldier 
and a merciless killing machine in the past. Often, this commentary addresses the 
player directly, as in the end of MGS1, where Liquid accuses him of having enjoyed 
the killing throughout the game. 
For the player, it is hard to deny this, since violence in MGS is, to a great extent, 
frivolous entertainment. This may be said for most videogames. However, most 
games do not discuss this status actively or locate this discussion entirely on the 
instrumental level, like I have shown in the case of front mission 3, where violence 
is justified by the situation and the need to proceed in the game (see chapter 5, p. 
84). When combined with the variety of means available in MGS, the critical 
comments on violence in these games gain a disruptive force, confronting the 
player with the ambivalence of his and her actions. It is important to understand 
142   English subtitles for MGS1 are taken from El Greco’s (2004) Metal Gear Solid Game Script. 
For MGS3, I draw on MHamlin’s (2006) Metal Gear Solid 3: Snake Eater Game Script.
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that the games nonetheless allow such violence and risk that their commentary 
is ignored. However, this might be the only way to turn playful violence into an 
element of a disruptive conflict. 
Although far from offering simple answers to the problem of violence, MGS 
illustrates the physical and psychological effects of violence and questions it. This 
is possible because the series deploys technological enhancements to create a broad 
range of action possibilities beyond instrumental violence, where most games 
merely enhance the player’s capacity to violent acts and unquestioned carnage. 
This level of reflexivity is significant because it opens a perspective on violence 
not limited to its instrumental character, but at the same time neither idealizing 
nor rejecting its intrinsic dimension. Where Arendt largely ignores this intrinsic 
dimension of violence in her focus on its “instrumental” aspect (see Roberts 2004, 
145), MGS makes it a central focus of critique. Importantly, this critique depends 
on the possibility of playful violence and can, in this sense, only be explored in 
this way because the virtual and voluntary computopic space offers the active 
experience of violence without consequences in our empirical reality. Yet, like the 
treatment of instrumental violence analysed in the last section, it remains on the 
level of critical reflection. In the following section I examine the ways in MGS goes 
beyond such critique, potentially prompting the player to novel action.
8.5 Violent Action
In several moments during the games, the difference between systematic and play-
er-character abilities is turned upside down both sensually and with respect to 
action. For example, the fights in MGS3 are characterized by a seeming reversal 
of ability—while the player can rely on the invisibility, the long-range sensorium 
of the player-character, and his sophisticated close combat techniques, opponents 
like The Fear, The End, or The Boss are hard to beat precisely because they appear 
superior in these categories. Sensually, the player is deprived of his or her usu-
al advantage over the enemy, confronted with (seemingly) invisible enemies who 
surpass his or her senses. The tension between seeing and being seen is most effec-
tively reversed in the last fight against The Boss, where the usual “crawling” causes 
complete blindness, as the fight commences in a field of flowers. 
In other instances, endless repetition prompts the player to question the 
possibility to proceed in the game. For example, in MGS1, the protagonist is 
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captured and repeatedly tortured by Ocelot, not certain how and when to escape 
this threat, which is repeated until the player cannot keep up with the increasing 
speed of button-mashing required to survive the torture any more. In MGS2, boss 
fights with opponents like the RAYs, or a painfully long period of time during 
which the (naked) player is seemingly trapped in a room with all doors locked, 
cause anxiety and extreme insecurity, because these situations lack a (conceivable) 
end. While most of the above-mentioned situations maintain a link with the 
knowledge and skills obtained in regular gameplay, the games also manage to enter 
an uncontrollable sphere beyond common sense in other instances, as Example 
8.5 shows. The fight against The Sorrow can only be won by accessing the items 
menu after the protagonist’s death, and reviving him with the “revival pill.” Against 
Psycho-Mantis in MGS1, who directly reacts to controller input, only switching 
controller ports has an effect, and the victory over his reincarnation in MGS4 
likewise depends on methods that are far from self-explicatory. 
As the example shows, the fight against Psycho-Mantis also contains some of the 
most significant demonstrations of sensual deprivation in the series. Mantis is not 
only invisible and steals the players eyes (activating first person mode allows the 
player to experience the perspective of Psycho Mantis, which becomes the only way 
to spot the enemy in the second half of the fight), but also has the ability to generate 
what at first glance looks like the black “video” screen familiar to videogame players 
in the 1990s.143 MGS2 offers several additional visual exceptions, in which the 
designer demonstrates his dominance over the game world and its rules. During 
an action-intense sequence towards the end of the game, the screen is suddenly 
scaled-down in a fashion familiar from moments of “game over,” accompanied by 
the respective sound. For an instance, this event may successfully trick the player 
into believing that the protagonist has died from enemy fire. However, a closer look 
reveals that the usual “Mission Failed” statement reads “Fission Mailed,” and that 
Raiden is still alive, now only visible in miniature but nonetheless controlled by the 
player. Noon and Dyer-Witheford (2010, 87) regard this example as an instance of 
Brechtian “estrangement” and a break through the fourth wall that furthers self-
reflexivity. However, one can also regard these moments as demonstrations of the 
143   This screen appeared when a gaming console or other peripheral were switched off or had 
lost the signal from the console, which was usually attached to the video-in port of the 
television screen. In MGS1, the message reads “Hideo” instead of “video.” Whereas this 
appears significantly different in English, the difference in Japanese is harder to spot, 
consisting only in the omission of two small dots (dakuten) over the first character, due to 
which ビデオ (video) becomesヒデオ (Hideo).
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designer’s superiority over the computopic universe of MGS, which confronts the 
player with the fact that the rules are man-made and can change at any time.
What these examples have in common is that they confront the player with 
extreme situations in which common sense, knowledge, and prior experience 
fail. Both the overpowering enemies in the boss fights, during which the hunter 
becomes the prey, and the moments in which the rules seemingly change, replace 
the usual feeling of mastery with anxiety, psychological thrill, and pressure. Based 
on the work of Giorgio Agamben, I propose to understand these situations as 
computopic “states of exception” invoked by the designer.144 Agamben (2005, 50) 
defines the state of exception as “a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which 
all legal determinations—and above all the very distinction between public and 
private—are deactivated.” As such, the state of exception becomes an increasingly 
common political practice in modernity, which blurs the boundaries between 
exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, zōḗ [bare life] and bios [qualified life] 
(Agamben 2002, 19).
The state of exception is marked by ambiguity and an undecidability, in which 
factum (life) and ius (norm) fade into each other (Agamben 2005, 29). This 
blurring has decisive effects on the character of action within its boundaries. The 
state of exception “defines a ‘state of the law’ in which, on the one hand, the norm 
is in force [vige] but is not applied (it has no ‘force’ [forza]) and, on the other hand, 
acts that do not have the value [valore] of law acquire its ‘force’” (38). This problem 
of the status of action in the state of exception is explained in more detail in the 
context of the iustitium145, which, for Agamben, is the archetype of the state of 
exception. 
The crucial problem connected to the suspension of the law is that of 
the acts committed during the iustitium, the nature of which seems 
to escape all legal definition. Because neither transgressive, executive, 
nor legislative, they seem to be situated in an absolute non-place with 
respect to the law. […] The idea of a force-of-law is a response to this 
144   Despite his influence, Agamben remains a controversial thinker, both with regards to his 
theory, and with regards to his polemic writing, which polarizes at times without intrinsic 
necessity (Geulen 2005, 118). However, the aim of this chapter is not to add to the large 
existing body of works about the philosopher. Despite his problematic claims, the emphasis 
on ambiguity in the state of exception is useful for describing the blurring of rules and the 
non-centered status (Derrida, see chapter 3, p. 43) of the experience.
145   According to Agamben (2005, 41), the term literally means “stillstand” or “suspension of 
the law.”
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undefinability and this non-place. […] Force of law that is separate from 
the law, floating imperium, being in force [vigenza] without application, 
and, more generally, the idea of a sort of “degree zero” of the law—all 
these are fictions through which law attempts to encompass its own 
absence and to appropriate the state of exception, or at least to assure 
itself a relation with it. (51)146
In simple terms, the state of exception is radical because it abolishes any rules that 
pre-structure action in the regular, normal situation. Here, action loses its direc-
tionality and becomes a force in the absence of any evaluative criteria or laws. For 
Agamben, any attempt to describe the state of exception in relation to the law is 
a fictive way in which the law and its proponents attempt to secure its superiori-
ty over the exception. The examples mentioned above show that MGS confronts 
the player with such state of exception, in which known rules are abandoned and 
the norm cannot be applied. While it would be too far-fetched to call the design-
er-sovereign’s control over the computopic in this specific case a fiction, it is none-
theless surprising how many structural similarities the extreme situations in MGS 
described above share with Agamben’s account. They all depart from common 
rules and earlier experience in some sense and create situations in which neither 
acquired skills nor logical deduction guarantee success. In this, they show the ar-
bitrariness of the computopic universe and reveal the sovereign’s control over it, 
conveying the impression that anything is possible within its realm. The player 
has to find ways out of these exceptional situations, which sometimes proves very 
difficult and physically intense. For example, depending on the player’s skills, the 
sharp-shooting showdown against The End in MGS3 might bind the highly alert 
player to the screen for more than one hour. 
This does not mean that the computopic state of exception in MGS is divorced 
from the regular rules entirely. Moreover, the player still requires considerable 
skills—attained during regular gameplay—to prevail. However, even this relation 
to the regular experience is reversed. For example, the chances of success in the 
encounters with Solidas (MGS2) or The Boss (MGS3) are much higher if the player 
ignores the reflex of keeping his or her distance to the opponent, and counters 
attacks rather than carrying them out.147 Other situations, such as the fight against 
146   In the English edition, the term “force-of-law” is expressed by crossing out the word law. 
For convenience reasons, I have used single strike-through.
147   These situations highlight the active quality the seemingly passive gameplay (sneaking, 
avoiding contact, camouflage) has: prompting the right attack from the opponent by 
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The Sorrow or Psycho-Mantis are less straightforward. My own attempts often 
oscillated between extreme frustration and liberated arbitrariness, frequently 
ending in laughter: where nothing is certain, anything—even the most illogical 
acts—may have equal chances of success. 
In this sense, the states of exception function as a kind of non-place (Agamben) 
or a utopic enclave (see Jameson in chapter 2, p. 19) within the computopic 
Otherness, forcing the player to adapt to new situations, observe the opponent 
carefully despite the extreme pressure and intimidation, and think and experiment 
with the environment repeatedly and beyond conventional knowledge of the game 
(system)—provided he or she does not give up and seek help in walkthroughs 
and guidebooks. Rather frequently, this tricks the player into attempting all kinds 
of absurd actions, which one would normally know to be out of the question. At 
the cost of uncountable continues, the player is invited to abandon any sense of 
systematic rules and do the seemingly impossible, illogical, and irresponsible. 
Against the state of exception and its structural violence, repetition and death 
become the only valid currency, and experimental action and playful violence 
the only means likely to yield any effect. Here, the boundary between intrinsic 
playfulness and instrumental violence becomes blurred. Again, this playfulness 
is only possible due to the broad range of possible actions within the contingent 
computopic universes of MGS, which allow the player to experience multiple 
versions.
8.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have examined the disruptive potential of rules and action in the 
computopic space, focusing on the controversial dimension of violence in Metal 
Gear Solid. A brief overview of some existing currents in the discourse on violence 
has helped to identify some of the major dimensions of the concept and pointed to 
several questions that emerge with respect to the status and significance of violence 
in videogames. The subsequent analysis focused on several ways in which violence 
is deployed critically and reconfigured playfully in the MGS series. 
In the first analytic section, I showed how the rigidity of systematic violence is set 
positioning the protagonist in the right distance turns the spatial position itself into a kind 
of weapon against the system. They also reveal the tactile character of the game, which 
requires the player to link the sensual information with movement and ‘feel’ his or her way 
through the system and its sentinels.
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up against a more flexible player, affording tactics of resistance against the system. 
In contrast to other games, MGS included and often promoted non-violent evasion 
based on observation and an understanding of the systematic algorithms, rather 
than violent, open conflict. In this, the series offers an intriguing combination of 
time and space in the context of my earlier emphasis on acceleration and speed. Paul 
Virilio (2006, 149-152) claims that the negation of space due to the development 
of means for instantaneous action at a distance leads to the possibility of a “direct 
encounter of every surface on the globe.” MGS instead offers a spatial visualization 
of the blind spots every complex system has due to its rigid rules, and proposes to 
use the advantage of agility and technology to identify and exploit them, often in a 
time-consuming fashion. Although these strategies remain behavioural, to speak 
with Arendt, because they rely on the rules of engagement, the designer offers 
a disruptive experience in those moments where he exploits this limitation in a 
critique of obedience in contemporary society.
In the second section, I examined the relation between instrumental and 
intrinsic action, arguing that the equal choice between non-violent and violent 
means is necessary to make the dimension of intrinsic violence available to 
critique. Deliberately contrasting the player’s playful, voluntary, and intentional 
acts of violence in the virtual computopic space of MGS with references to the 
physical and psychological terrors of war, the designer confronts the player with a 
disruptive conflict between his or her own actions and their meaning. This direct 
addressing of the intrinsic dimension of violence in action is only possible due 
to the virtual, voluntary character of the computopic space and the separation 
between the cognitive meaning of an action and its physical effects that dominates 
it. In this sense, the computopic space allows for a serious treatment of playful 
violence, prompting us to think about our own position to violence in games and 
outside them, beyond instrumental justifications. In the third section, I showed 
that MGS confronts the player with computopic states of exception. In these 
unpredictable enclaves within the games’ rule-based space, conventional rules 
are abandoned. This results in an exceptional space for experimental action. In 
lack of guiding principles, these situations blur the boundaries between intrinsic 
and instrumental action, turning playful violence into one possible choice among 
others. Importantly, this enclave is not detached from the computopic universe, 
but depends on it and maintains a link to it—if only in the sense that the player 
knows that there is a solution, that the game can be won.
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Just as important, it seems to me, is the fact that this openness and variability of 
means not only challenges the player to experiment with the system at all times, but 
also generates an environment in which very different skill sets on the part of the 
player may be equally successful. In a strange way, then, the openness of the system 
that affords violent acts generates a condition of equality in diversity, regarded as 
crucial for political action by Arendt. As mentioned, Arendt (1998, 190-192) regards 
political action as novel, “boundless” and “inherently unpredictable.” Particularly 
the first of these categories is explicitly narrowly defined. “The new always happens 
against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability, which for 
all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the new therefore always 
appears in the guise of a miracle. The fact that man is capable of action means 
that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is 
infinitely improbable” (Arendt 1998, 178). 
The playful explorations of the state of exception in MGS do not offer such 
novelty, because the player cannot transgress the actions that were all along 
available to him or her in the computopic universe. However, if compared to the 
conventional gameplay, I believe these instances nevertheless stimulate novel action 
in the sense of creative reconfigurations and combinations of existing strategies, 
the outcome of which cannot be predicted. Thereby, the games manage to convey 
a kind of boundlessness of the system and the player. Within these limits, I argue 
that MGS in fact succeeds in offering a non-place, in which, just as Arendt predicts 
in the introductory quote of this chapter, a radically different life under man-made 
conditions offers what the human condition bound to our earth could not allow: 
playful violence as a kind of action in Arendt’s sense of the word. 
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9 Conclusion
Can we imagine a society or world radically different from ours? This was the 
question I posed at the beginning of this dissertation, and with which I turned to 
Japanese sf videogames. Arguing that the radical political imagination necessary 
today can be stimulated by disruptive conflicts, I located the theoretical potentials 
of videogame expression, or what I identified as the computopic space, in its con-
tingent, partly unimagined, action-based, expressively combinatory and detached 
character. In order to deal with the challenges of this theoretical framing, I de-
veloped a flexible methodology, which emphasizes flexibility and repeated playful 
invasion as the preferable mode of engagement. Crucially, this included drawing 
on “non-academic” information and exploring alternative channels for presenting 
the results of the analysis. With the help of these additional sources and the viable 
video examples, which proved an important complement to the textual analysis, I 
showed that Japanese sf videogames can present us with disruptive conflicts that 
stimulate our radical political imagination.
The analysis shows that videogames can deploy their expressive means in 
innovative engagements with science fictional tropes like robots, time travel, the 
alien, or war technology and violence. Whether in the shape of the dystopic mecha-
dominated futures of chapter 5, or in the more constructive engagements with 
time, aesthetic novelty, and political action discussed in part III, the multifarious 
combinations of narratives, representations, rules, and action offer rich playing 
fields for critical commentaries on the status quo, and confront the player with 
disruptive conflicts capable of stimulating radical imagination in central areas of 
political philosophy. I showed that Shadow of Memories is capable of disrupting 
our common sense of linear time, which is dominant contemporary society and 
capitalist economy, thus pointing towards alternative temporalities. Games like The 
Earth Defense Force, Rez, and Shinseiki Evangelion 2 confront us with uncanny, 
unintelligible aesthetic aliens and broaden our perception of what is in common, 
and what serves as the basis of our political community. The Metal Gear Solid 
games confront us with exceptional situations and offer us a virtual environment 
for experimenting with novel actions beyond behaviour. In all cases, the conflicts 
disrupt different pillars of the status quo, which shape the contemporary possibilities 
of political imagination and political action.
The active, contingent, and partly unimagined computopic spaces videogames 
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offer, show that Virilio’s initial pessimism about the loss of imagination due to 
the pre-defined game space referred to in the introduction is not justified. On the 
contrary, the examples show that, despite its pre-structured, rule-based nature, the 
computopic space can deploy their multifarious expressive elements dynamically 
to confront us with issues or problems we can experiment with. In this, they 
allow for playful engagements that Virilio would welcome. In the aforementioned 
interview with Sans, he demands of us to “[p]lay at being a critic. Deconstruct the 
game in order to play with it. Instead of accepting the rules, challenge and modify 
them. Without the freedom to critique and reconstruct, there is no truly free 
game: we are addicts and nothing more” (1999). Games facilitate these playfully 
critical engagements with their structure and content. In sum, they offer rich, non-
predetermined, partly unimagined spaces for active and innovative engagements 
with radical political ideas and stimulate our political imagination of alternatives. 
In this, I believe that they can reach beyond what Arendt (1998, 168-169) calls 
“tangible” or “dead” works of art. 
The analysis shows that the most radical and most effective moments of 
disruption emerge where computopic universes offer an internal tension and set up 
an enclave within their Otherness; one that stands in contrast to it. In the analysis of 
time, this was the case in the systematic negation of the already confused narrative 
and its goal of survival. In the analysis of alien aesthetics, it was generated in the 
experience of a radical negation of intention and game goals in the playful spaces 
of Rez and Eva2. In the discussion of violent technology, it was identified as a state 
of exception that negates the conventional gameplay and confronts the player 
with situations in which unpredictable solutions have to be found playfully. In all 
these cases, the computopic space revealed its potential to approach ideal play, at 
the same time showing and sometimes deliberately playing with the limits of this 
approach. None of the enclaves would be as effective as they are if they weren’t set 
up against a reverse current of the games.
These tensions prompt an unexpected answer to the question, whether 
Otherness is possible in videogames—a question I have identified as crucial 
problem in the theoretical exploration. Given the limits of our imagination (which 
is grounded in our knowledge), our perception (which is based on our senses) and 
our action (which requires direction), I remained sceptical about such Otherness 
throughout the project. Despite this sceptical attitude, the analysis shows that 
computopic Otherness is in fact possible, but dependent on the extent to which 
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games can create an experiential tension within their computopic universes. The 
abovementioned examples of negated narratives, aimless free play or frivolous 
experiments with violence in situations that escape common sense and knowledge 
offer such instances of radical Otherness. Strikingly, all these instances involve 
a distinct, somehow distorted treatment of death: in SoM and MGS, the player 
negates or deploys it actively, whereas in Eva2 and Rez the game world abandons 
the threat to life entirely. That death takes on a very different quality in videogames 
is hardly surprising. However, I did not expect it thus closely related to ideal play.
This relation between Otherness, play, and death is not the only promising field 
for future research that emerged in the course of this exploration. The limited 
number of games covered in the analysis calls for a broadening of the scope in terms 
of titles, genres, and regional constraints. Sf has proven a fruitful starting point to 
test the theory and methodology, and remains a rich field for plausible experiences 
of Otherness. Yet, given the discrepancies in genre treatment between literature 
and videogames, which are more readily categorized into shooters, adventures, and 
role-playing games, I wonder if the computopic could serve as a framework for 
more expansive explorations beyond genre-boundaries. In addition to broadening 
the scope, I hope to be able to pay more attention to the ways in which disruptive 
conflicts are experienced among players. Apart from a more extensive engagement 
with online sources, this could involve qualitative research with gamers in Europe 
or Japan. In the future, I hope to adapt the framework to multiplayer games and 
pay more attention to disruption that arises from acting in virtual communities. 
I believe that accepting the challenge of significant adjustments to theory and 
methodology, might be rewarded with an entirely different set of disruptive 
experiences and alternatives to the status quo.
Technically and philosophically, all these steps could be paralleled with a more 
intensive engagement with several of the issues the thesis raised but could not 
attend to. This concerns for example the role of the computer as performer in 
general and the idea of artificial intelligence in particular. This leads back to the 
earlier discussion of intentionality on the part of the designer, and the possibility 
and status of intentionality in contemporary media in general—particularly in 
times when media work and media culture is considered to be increasingly ‘playful.’ 
Furthermore, I wonder if Henri Bergson’s understanding of matter, action, time, 
and memory—four terms that appeared at several points during this thesis—might 
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not have more to contribute to a theory of the computopic space and videogame 
play than my initial brief excursus to his work could discover. However, a further 
engagement with Bergson might involve a more direct reference to contemporary 
cognitive science.
A third, slightly different field of interest emerged more clearly from the 
engagement with games and the perspective I adopted in this thesis. My exploration 
shows that games can be an expressive medium exploring, or presenting open, 
contingent ideas. The fact that the video examples succeed in complementing the 
written analysis, even if they do not succeed in conveying the gameplay experience 
first-hand, makes me wonder if videogames could not become a more active part 
of philosophical and political thought experiments, beyond what serious and 
persuasive games already achieve today. This thesis shows that games can offer 
disruptive open-ended ideational and experiential playgrounds. I believe it is time 
to explore them more actively as such.
In sum, I hope to have shown that academically grounded inquiries into 
videogame content from a political philosophy perspective are important and 
rewarding. Videogames are a rich medium of experience and offer vast possibilities 
for critical, disruptive expression worth further active exploration by designers, 
players, and scholars. The theoretical, methodical, and practical impulses and 




A Excerpts of JackSpade’s (2002) SoM Percentage FAQ
This FAQ is list of scenes I and some friends have found out in the game to share it with the 
people who want a full 100% percentage, thus they need ALL the cut-scenes from each chapter. 
[…]I wish to give Extra Special thanks to Yunakitty for helping me check the validity of this FAQ 
and supporting me with it, you are great yunakitty! Please read her Character List FAQ as well!
Another special thanks to Curty who helped me find some hard to get scenes.
Special credits to ichmari for finding the elusive scene in chapter 7 that everyone was looking for!”
[...]
From [14/08/01] to [19/08/01]
I finished the game at least 10 times.., recorded about 263 scenes or more..a lot of questions 
popped into play, about scenes and the fact that you can do them in different chapters..where do 
these scene belong? For example: You can give Sybila the kitten in 3 different chapters, start a tab 
in different chapters too..but they only count towards 1..hmm..Also, I’m 92% sure that all scenes 
in the list counts towards a 100% Total Achievement percentage but I won’t be sure until I check 
them out with the new procedure..”
[…]
[26/08/01]->7:45
My worst fear has come true!
I just finished Chapter 8 with 100%...and I have uncovered that the scenes are not tied with a fixed 
% number! Oh man, how can I explain this to you..I will try..
You see, before today, I thought that a particular scene was worth a fixed % number. Like seeing 
Eike dying for the 2nd time in Chapter 4 was worth 4%...but it is not so! You see, there are a 
certain number of scenes in each chapter, and everytime you do one, the percentage goes up, for 
example:
012  .- Talk with boy: “Will you save my grandpa?”  Worth 4%
013  .- Eike: “Sorry kid.”    Worth 3%
014  .- Talk with boy: “Are you gonna help my grandpa?”   Worth 3%
015  .- The bar on fire(Inside).                           Worth 4%
If you delete the game and change a little of those scenes order like this:
012  .- Talk with boy: “Will you save my grandpa?”        Worth 4%
013  .- Eike: “Sorry kid.”                                 Worth 3%
014  .- Performer cut-scene: Getting the egg               Worth 3%
015  .- Meeting the dogs..again                            Worth 4%
016  .- Talk with boy: “Are you gonna help my grandpa?”   Worth 4%
017  .- The bar on fire(Inside).                           Worth 3%
As you can see, Scene 014 is worth 3%, no matter which scene it is. I hope someone has enough 
explaining skill so they can figure this out and send me a mail telling me how to explain this 
concept..oi... well anyway.
I won’t reformat my FAQ, but I will put up a note that the numbers show there are for my game 
and may vary from game to game.
*Roberto Corsaro has a different and very interesting theory about this, read onward to read his 




Logged into Gamefaq’s board and saw PS2 4 life post about the idea ichmari had about the elusive 
scene, and it worked! Chapter 7 is at 100%! I’ll  submit the update soon and afterwards.
[…]
Here’s Roberto’s Theory on scene’s percentages:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
“I think they are not integer values, but that there’s a hidden decimal that might lead to apparent 
incongruence in scoring when the scenes are played in a different order (“if for instance, and this 
is just an example” ^_^ we have two scenes worth 3.5 point and the game approximates 0.5 to 0 
*when displaying scores*, the first played would be 3 points worth and the second one would be 
4 points worth).
Now, let’s come to the Prologue.
When you have unlocked the Extra game, you have to play the normal
game once more (by answering “am I dead” and “who’s there?”) to unlock a scene worth 3 point 
(and this should lead you to reach 100% in Total Achievement too). Then this:
************************************MDS****************************************
-Curty -[2] .- Time runs out with the stone: “You’ll have to work harder”
*****************+*****************+*****************+*****************+
This only occurs when time runs out twice.
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B Excerpts from Gene’s (2002) Rez Secrets FAQ v1.2
3) Unlocking Secrets
--------------------
There are many secrets to be unlocked over time.  Most of them require that you complete a cer-
tain task.  However, some of them are unlocked over time.
3.1) Completing the game
------------------------
There are five areas in the basic game.  Only four areas are selectable at the start.  You must unlock 
the fifth area.  After completing the first four areas, you will unlock Score Attack for each area. 
After completing the fifth area, you will unlock Beyond Mode (Lost Area), Beyond Mode (Direct 
Assault) and Score Attack Area 5.
3.2) Unlocking Secrets
----------------------
Here is the list of the secrets and how to unlock them.  Each one must be played in a certain 
mode.  Play mode means the regular Play mode accessed from the main menu.  Other secrets are 
unlocked from Score Attack and Direct Assault.
Play Mode
---------
Unlock Area 2 Clear Area 1 (Play mode)
Unlock Area 3 Clear Area 2
Unlock Area 4 Clear Area 3
Unlock Area 5 Clear Area 1-4 (100% Clear)
Score Attack Mode
-----------------
Unlock Area 1 Clear Area 1 (Play mode)
Unlock Area 2   Clear Area 2 
Unlock Area 3  Clear Area 3
Unlock Area 4 Clear Area 4
Unlock Area 5   Clear Area 5
Beyond Mode
-----------
Unlock Direct Assault - Normal Clear Area 5 (Play mode)
Unlock Direct Assault - Ambient Clear Direct Assault - Normal (or once)
Unlock Direct Assault - Punk Clear Direct Assault - Ambient (or twice)
Unlock Direct Assault - Oldschool Clear Direct Assault - Punk (or 3x)
Unlock Direct Assault - Psychedelic Clear Direct Assault - Oldschool (or 4x)
Unlock Direct Assualt - Trance Clear Direct Assault - Psychedelic (or 5x)
Lost Area                              Clear Area 5 (Play mode) or Play time over 5 hours
Trancemission                         Rank 1st (Lost Area)




 Zero Form  Unlocked with Second Form
 Second Form           Any Area Shot down 100% (Play mode) / Play time over 5 hours
 Third Form      Any 2 areas Shot down 100% (Play mode) / Play time over 6 hours
 Fourth Form    Any 3 areas Shot down 100% (Play mode) / Play time over 7 hours
 Fifth Form    Any 4 areas Shot down 100% (Play mode) / Play time over 8 hours
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 Final Form        Any 5 areas Shot down 100% (Play mode) / Play time over 9 hours
 Morolian Form Area 1-5 Shot down, Item capture 100% (Play mode) / Play time over 
10 hours
Immortal   Clear all Direct Assault modes
Beam Type 1  Clear Score attack more than 5 times
Beam Type 2  Clear Score attack more than 10 times
Beam Type 3  Clear Score attack more than 15 times
Beam Type 4  Clear Score attack more than 20 times
Beam Type 5  Clear Score attack more than 25 times
Beam Type 6  Clear Score attack more than 30 times
Overdrive Infinity Rank 1st (Boss Rush)
Camera View            
Near view  Rank 1st Area 2 (Score attack mode)
Far view  Rank 1st Area 3 (Score attack mode)
Dynamic view Rank 1st Area 4 (Score attack mode)
First Person view Rank 1st Area 5 (Score attack mode)
C Excerpts from iamradiox’s (2008) Rez - Complete Game Guide
Secrets:
-------------
-There are different boss fight forms. Tera, Giga and Mega (Tera being the hardest and Mega being 
the easiest). If you shot down more than 98% of the enemies before a boss fight on any level on 
any mode, you will fight the Tera form. Also, on Score Mode, that form will give you much more 
points. For the Giga form, you must get a little less percentage than that and even less for Mega. 
Sadly, I don’t know the exact percentage to get those two forms.
-On the DreamCast version, there is a line under the name Rez displayed on the VMU (Virtual 
Memory Unit). If you look at it while listening to any song (in the menu or in the game), it should 
pulse at the song’s beat.
-A screensaver fonction appears when you leave the game on the pause menu for five minutes 
or more.
-Here’s the text displayed during Area 5:
“A great prosperity came, as life conquered even the highest mountains...
Mass extinctions came wave after wave...
but empty niches always quickly refilled...
to once again prosper, grow, and reproduce...
Someday the next great emigration will occur...
as we leave this existence looking for another...
The journey will begin anew...
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Vertaling (translation): Esther Truijen, Erik Herber
Kun wij ons een radicaal andere wereld voorstellen? In onze tijd, 
die gedomineerd wordt door neoliberaal kapitalisme, lijken niet 
alleen levensvatbare alternatieven hiervoor te ontbreken maar 
ook het vermogen om ons iets voor te stellen dat hiervoor in 
de plaats zou kunnen komen. In dit proefschrift laat ik zien dat 
videospellen een bron van inspiratie en stimuli kunnen zijn om 
precies dat te doen: zich een totaal andere politieke wereld voor-
stellen dan men kent. Om dit te doen ontwikkel ik een theore-
tisch en methodologisch kader waarin videospellen bestudeerd 
worden als ruimtes waarbinnen ideeën kunnen bestaan of ge-
creëerd  kunnen worden, en waarin ze dienen als aanjagers voor 
de verbeelding. Ik onderbouw mijn hypothese met een analyse 
van verschillende Japanse sciencefiction videospellen.
Het proefschrift is opgedeeld in drie delen. In het eerste deel 
zet ik het theoretische en methodologische kader voor de analyse 
uiteen. Ik beargumenteer dat radicale politieke verbeelding 
gestimuleerd kan worden door disruptive conflicts, of uitingen 
van Otherness die we niet direct kunnen bevatten. Ik gebruik de 
term “computopische ruimte” (computopic space) om een aantal 
structurele mogelijkheden en beperkingen van deze Otherness 
aan te duiden. Deze ruimte wordt bepaald door het totaal van alle 
regels in de software die het spel reïficeren, en wordt gecreëerd 
door de ontwerper, uitgevoerd door de computer en in gebruik 
genomen door de speler. Dit maakt de ruimte voorwaardelijk, 
experimenteel, gedeeltelijk onvoorspelbaar, slechts voor een deel 
toonbaar en open voor interpretaties. Hierdoor biedt het legio 
mogelijkheden om aan Otherness en conflicten uitdrukking 
te geven. De experimentele eigenschappen van deze ruimte 
erkennend, is de gebruikte methodologie gericht op een 
combinatie van eigen (vastgelegde) speelsessies en ervaringen 
van anderen, die zijn geanalyseerd tegen de achtergrond van 
empirische werkelijkheid, politieke theorie en politieke filosofie. 
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In het tweede deel stel ik een reeks samen van videospellen 
die ik gebruik in mijn analyse. Deze spellen bevatten allemaal 
sciencefiction elementen. Sciencefiction is voor mij een thema 
waarbij ik een onmiskenbare politieke inhoud veronderstel. Eerst 
bespreek ik de grote trends in deze videospellen. Vervolgens 
verklein ik de selectie van spellen tot een aantal op zichzelf staande 
titels en spellen die onderdeel zijn van series, die ik onderzoek in 
het derde deel van deze dissertatie. Ik richt me hier met name op 
temporele verstoringen in “tijdreis-spellen” als Chrono Trigger 
en Shadow of Memories; ervaringen van buitenaardse esthetiek 
in schietspellen zoals Earth Defense Forces en Rez, en politieke 
actie te midden van geweldstechnologieën in de Metal Gear 
Solid series. De opnames die ik heb gemaakt van mijn eigen spel 
versterken en complementeren het tekstuele narratief van mijn 
bevindingen en dragen zodoende bij aan de overtuigingskracht 
en transparantie van dit narratief.
Samenvattend: De analyse laat zien dat de computopische 
ruimte een plaats kan bieden voor volledige Otherness, of deze op 
zijn minst kan benaderen, en verscheidene mogelijkheden biedt 
voor disruptive conflicts. Videospellen kunnen een productieve 
dialoog aangaan met de ideeen van kritische denkers zoals 
Paul Virilio, Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Rancière, Hannah Arendt, 
of Giorgio Agamben. Videospellen kunnen nieuwe ervaringen 
en perspectieven bieden die alle het vermogen hebben om onze 
radicale politieke verbeelding te stimuleren. Mijn bevindingen 
onderstrepen de bijdrage die videospellen kunnen leveren aan 
het bedenken van alternatieven, en benadrukken de waarde 
van verder onderzoek, verkenningen en interventies vanuit een 
academisch, ontwerpers- of gebruikersperspectief. 
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